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FOREWORD
Recognizing the need to accelerate and expand the application of
NASA-derived technology for other civil uses in the United States, NASA
officials asked the Denver Research Institute to examine how NASA might
accomplish this goal through cooperative efforts with industry. The
task statement was "to identify and assess the potential opportunities
for NASA to expand the benefits of its technological capabilities through
innovative cooperation with industry, to the mutual benefit of NASA,
American industry, and the nation as a whole."
It is not as though NASA lacks experience in this process. For 20
years NASA has been a leader, through its Technology Utilization Program,
in facilitating commercialization of technology originally developed for
the agency's aerospace programs. More recently, activities have been
introduced to exploit unique NASA capabilities related to the Space
Shuttle, including joint endeavor agreements, technical exchange agree-
ments, and guest investigator agreements--all directed toward cooperation
with industry.
The purpose of this study has been to: (I) identify further oppor-
tunities; (2) explore the range of benefits to NASA, industry, and the
nation; (3) assess public policy implications; and (4) relate this new
range of opportunities to current technology transfer programs of NASA.
The emphasis has been upon how NASA may improve its linkages with non-
aerospace industries.
The study has built upon NASA's technology transfer experience as
well as that of the Denver Research Institute in identifying and assess-
ing new patterns of using NASA high technology capabilities in commercial
applications.
The study was greatly aided by an Advisory Committee of eight persons
of distinguished reputation in science and industry who have had a pro-
fessional concern with the application of technology to social, economic
and political goals. The committee made an invaluable contribution to
the study through the members' insight and experience, by review of working
papers, discussion at three separate meetings of issues related to the
study, and by review of the report. The study owes much to the wisdom
and dedication of the Advisory Committee members.
During the course of the study, DRI staff interviewed nearly 100
officials of NASA and industrial firms who provided valuable perspective
and experience regarding means for technology transfer, opportunities
and barriers to innovation, and the benefits and costs associated with
such efforts. Finally, the study was helped immeasurably by the advice
and assistance of Charles Mathews, retired, for 35 years a prominent NASA
engineer/executive. The study team is indebted to the many officials in
NASA and private industry who contributed to this effort.
Richard L. Chapman
Study Director
Denver Research Institute
Industrial Economics Division
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FINDINGSAND
RECOMMENDATIONSFORACTIONBY NASA
"Manyof the technologies of the 1960sand early 1970s
were based on prewar science. . There is a big backlog
of postwar science now maturing. We'relseeing just the
leading edge of its commercialization."
"Technology transfer is a hands-gn process and not a mail
room or brochure-type activity.
These statements reflect two points that the Advisory Committee and
the study team wish to emphasize: first, the time and circumstances are
ripe for action by NASA;second, NASAaction should focus upon one-to-one
cooperation between its scientists and engineers and those in industry.
The following pages summarizethe results of research into NASA's
partnership with industry for transferring technology domestically. The
discussion focuses upon the study's point of departure, findings, and
action recommendations to the Administrator for enhancing technology trans-
fer.
From the outset the study teamand the Advisory Committeehave accepted
two fundamental tenets as points of departure for pursuing the task:
(I) systematic and deliberate programs of technology transfer
promote and strengthen NASA'sprimary mission of assuring
U.S. leadership in the development and application of aero-
nautical and space science and technology; and,
(2) an expandedemphasis on technology transfer is worth pur-
suing for what the U.S. economyin general can realize in
terms of technical benefits as well as for the potential
benefits to NASA.
3Clearly, the potential benefits from exploiting technology are large.
These benefits can only be realized, however, if the results of research
and development can be moved successfully from the laboratory to the
economy. As a primary supporter of R&Dactivities and generator of new
technology, it is essential that the federal government pursue technology
transfer activities.
Iwilliam F. Miller, President, SRI International, quoted in Business Week,
April 18, 1983, p. 79.
2William D. Carey, Executive Officer, American Association for the
Advancement of Science, in letter to study director, November 2, 1982.
3See Appendix A, Technology Innovation and Economic Vitality, es-
pecially pp. 2-6, 11-17.
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With or without the government's efforts, technology diffusion will
occur through traditional lines of communication, publication, job turn-
over and so on. The Technology Utilization Program is NASA's formal effort
to supplement this diffusion. By better understanding and capitalizing on
these traditional processes, NASA'stechnology transfer efforts can stimu-
late the diffusion process to accomplishments beyond those of the Technology
Utilization Program. The avenueexplored here to expand technology transfer
is through enhancedgovernment-industry cooperation.
Why should NASAtake the initiative amongfederal agencies in pro-
viding leadership on new ways to stimulate government-industry cooperation
for the transfer and application of technology? First, NASAhad a broader,
more extensive technological base (including seven major laboratories and
two flight stations) than any other agency except the Department of Defense.
Second, NASAhas an explicit legislative charter to pursue technology trans-
fer. Third, NASAhas the most experience with organized, successful programs
for technology transfer. This combination of institutional leadership and
program experience, spanning more than 20 years, places NASAin a unique
position to take the initiative in exploring innovative ways to cooperate
with American industry for the moreeffective exploitation of technology. 4
Notwithstanding the opportunities at hand, and NASA'scapability to make
substantial progress, the Office of Managementand Budget consistently has
reduced substantially NASArequests to expand its technology transfer activi-
ties. It therefore behooves NASAto strengthen its efforts to documentand
demonstrate the value to NASAand to the general economyof technology trans-
fer activities.
I. Findings
In pursuing this exploration, the study team developed eight working
papers; the Advisory Committee met on two occasions; and members of the
study team conducted over three dozen interviews with senior industry of-
ficials regarding innovation and technology transfer. In addition, the
study director made visits to assess perceptions by the Center Directors
and other officials at the seven NASA Field Centers. As a result, the
Advisory Committee and study team reached these findings:
• Foreign high technology compeition is real and must be met with
positive approaches, e.g., the exploitation of U.S. technology
domestically;
• Of seven public policy areas affecting technology transfer (tax,
patent, antitrust, regulatory, conflict of interest, freedom of
4See Appendix B, The Development of NASA's Technology Transfer
Program, pp. i-6.
Xinformation, and R&D support), only three merit substantial
NASA attention--patent, antitrust, and conflict of interest; and
• The conditions or factors for enhanced technology transfer can
be identified and provide NASA with significant opportunities for
action.
A. Foreign high technology competition. The traditional adversarial
relationship between U.S. government agencies and the private sector must
be ameliorated if the U.S. is to effectively meet foreign competition. 5
The challenge cannot be met by the erection of barriers to impede the
normal flow of technical information across national boundaries, nor by
trade restrictions. Rather, we need to learn (within the context of our
own socioeconomic system) from foreign examples, remove barriers to do-
mestic technological applications within the United States consistent
with military security, and encourage new ways to cooperate in mutual
undertakings by government agencies and private companies. Cooperation
between U.S. industry and government has historic precedents. More than
a century ago such cooperation fostered the successful development of the
railroads and modern agriculture. More recently, industry-government co-
operation contributed to the nation's premier position in aeronautics.
B. The impact of public policy questions on technology transfer.
The most important factor in the short-run affecting the application of
technology in the civil sector is the general state of the economy. As
the economy slowed down over the past several years, the growth of re-
search and development expenditures slowed, venture capital was restricted,
and private firms generally shortened their perspectives with respect to
investment, capitalization, and risk-taking in general. To paraphrase
one investment specialist, the action that will have the largest impact
on industry's willingness to invest in the application of technology is
the reduction of interest rates to under I0 percent and an upswing in
the general economy. Perhaps just as important, however, is the need
for industry to be aware of potentially applicable new technology at a
level of detail where value versus risk can be well understood. Whereas
in the past applicable technology innovations usually occurred within
a company, now they frequently occur outside, and cooperative efforts
are required to assure timely awareness. 6 NASA can improve its under-
standing of industry's needs and its ability to address those needs by
monitoring the economy and taking note of how interest rates, foreign
competition, and labor issues are affecting the industries with which
it deals.
Seven general public policy areas were reviewed to assess their
relative effect on technological innovation and transfer: tax policy,
patent policy, antitrust policy, regulatory policy, research and de-
velopment support policy, organizational conflict of interest policy,
5See Appendix C, Factors Enhancing the Competitive Posture of Foreign
High Technology, particularly pp. 27-31.
6See Appendix D, Industry Perspectives on Technology Transfer, pp. 2-7.
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and freedom of information policy. Although each of these areas has the
potential to inhibit or facilitate the application of technology, current
policies in these seven areas generally do not seriously impede increased
NASAcooperation with industry or the transfer of technology. 7
However, with regard to NASApolicy, three areas deserve continued
evaluation: patent policy, antitrust policy, and organizational conflict
of interest. NASApolicy basically has favored the private retention of
patent rights, and a continuation of this stance will facilitate tech-
nology transfer. Although antitrust policy has not been muchof a
consideration in past NASAendeavors, increasing joint endeavors and
similar cooperative activities will require somecare. 8 Recently the
Justice Department, with the encouragementof the Department of Commerce,
appears to be allowing greater flexibility for such arrangements (for
example, the Justice Department's approval of the Microelectronic and
ComputerTechnology Corporation--MCC). On the question of organizational
conflict of interest, government interaction with private firms that con-
fers benefits on those firms always raises questions about possible con-
flict of interest. 9 The private sector is concerned that no special
benefits are provided at public expense which give any one firm a competi-
tive advantage over other firms. NASAshould be sensitive to the issue
and address it before it becomesa problem rather than later.
C. Conditions for the successful transfer of technology. Discussions
with industry executives, reviews of past experience with NASA and other
technology transfer programs, and discussions with officials at NASA Field
Centers suggest that there are six conditions which, if met1ocan substan-
tially facilitate, improve, and expand technology transfer:
• a clear NASA policy regarding the concept and role of technology
transfer--beyond that of the existing Technology Utilization Program;
• senior management commitment, supervision, and application of
resources ;
• improved understandding between NASA and nonaerospace industry;
• a technology transfer program built upon NASA's technical strengths
and capabilities;
• emphasis upon Field Center technical capabilities and participation;
and
• a framework of objectives, strategies, incentives and means for
assessing and rewarding progress.
7See Appendix E, Selected Governmental Policies Affecting Technical
Innovation in the American Economy, pp. 44-47.
8Ibid., pp. 12-18.
9Ibid., pp. 36-37.
10For other agency experience see Appendix F, Lessons From the Tech-
nology Transfer Experiences of other Federal Departments and Agencies,
pp. I-4.
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Each of these conditions is addressed below:
I. A clear policy is needed regarding the concept and role of NASA tech-
nology transfer. Discussions with both industry and NASA officials re-
veal that NASA's technology transfer activities are perceived to have limited
scope and marginal or sporadic management support. Basically, the role
of NASA technology transfer usually is coneeived to be: (i) limited to
the Technology Utilization Program, (2) concerned principally with trans-
fer from NASA t__o_oindustry and not asl_ two-way process, and (3) a function
of only marginal importance to NASA.
The whole array of technology transfer resources (including people,
facilities and technology) needs to be brought within the focus of the
term, and NASA policy appropriately adjusted to reflect this fact. The
substantial promise of technology transfer through expanded cooperation
with industry cannot be fulfilled until such a broader concept is in-
stituted by the Administrator and permeates NASA.
The contrast between the broader concept of technology transfer and
the current Technology Utilization Program is striking. A comprehensive
concept of technology transfer includes, as a minimum, the following
seven activities:
(I) "hand-off" of major NASA technology applications programs--
following proof of concept--to "users," operators, or develop-
ers; examples are meteorological or communications satellites,
and aeronautics;*
(2) transfer of technology by a NASA contractor to other clients or
nonaerospace firms including its nonaerospace divisions;
(3) modification of NASA technology by other than NASA contractors
to meet nonaerospace applications;
(4) application through specifications and new or revised industry-
wide standards;
(5) stimulation of new or expanded markets outside the normal aero-
space contractor channels or subsystems as the result of NASA
procurement;
(6) problem solving through professional-to-professional communications
(face-to-face or via telecommunications), within a discipline or
technical area, often transferred by referral within an informal
network; and
llsee Appendix G, NASA Field Center Perspectives (pp. 2 and 6), and
Appendix D, Industry Perspectives on Technology Transfer.
*Because of some 70 years of combined NACA and NASA experience, during
which the NACA research community and the aeronautics industry "grew up" to-
gether, the nature of this synergistic relationship is somehwat different
in aeronautics than elsewhere. However, there is reason to believe that some
of the benefits can be duplicated if concerted attempts are made to develop
the informal networks.
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(7) transfer of techniques/information through movementof people
geographically or betweenorganizations.
The current Technology Utilization Program is aimed primarily, but in a
limited way, at the second and third activities listed above, and only
occasionally becomesinvolved in the first and the sixth. Its primary
modusoperandi has been making information available through publication
of Tech Briefs and subsequently of technical support packages (upon request)--
both based on the new technology reporting system. The dissemination cen-
ters (such as COSMIC and the Industrial Application Centers) provide further
detailed assistance to outside inquiries. More active programs, including
Applications Teams and Applications Projects, have been considerably re-
duced in recent years because of budget constraints. Our review of past
federal experiences shows the need to emphasize interactive transfer mecha-
nisms and the establishment of cooperative partnerships with private in-
dustry. The more traditional passive approaches to transfer (such as
publication) provide an essential foundation for these activities. By them-
selves, however, these passive approaches cannot produce the exploitation
of federal technology that is desired.
2. An expanded program of technology transfer will succeed only with
senior management commitment, supervision, and application of resources. The
most common response in discussion with leaders from industry and the NASA
Field Centers was a polite skepticism about how serious NASA management is
regarding technology transfer. Historically, the Technology Utilization
Program has suffered a series of ups and downs in terms of management sup-
port and resources. Both industry officials and NASA Field Center leader-
ship appear receptive to a new initiative for improved technology transfer;
however, the responsiveness will be proportional to the energy and attention
given by the Administrator to the visible resources committed to such new
endeavors, and to the effectiveness of the means to assure program compli-
ance. 13 In short, there will be a considerable shortfall between the ac-
complishment and the potential of any new program of technology transfer
unless the Administrator of NASA puts his enthusiasm behind the new emphasis.
Building new relationships will require persistence and follow-through.
3. NASA needs to become better known and accepted by nonaerospace in-
dustry, with an improved understanding of industry within NASA. Our inter-
views with representatives of industry demonstrated that substantial ignorance
continues to exist about the breadth and depth of NASA's technology programs,
even among high technology industries. Several NASA Center Directors empha-
sized the viewpoint that NASA's principal challenge in the transfer of tech-
nology is to get "the right people"l_n industry familiar with NASA's programs
and its technological capabilities. There is also considerable skepticism
within industry about the appreciation among NASA scientists and engineers
for the nature of goals and technical or economic problems which are of para-
mount interest to industry. Specifically, a common viewpoint is that
12Appendix F, p. 3.
13Appendix G, p. 2.
14Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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NASA-derived design and development tends to ignore s_h problems as pro-duction cost, ease of manufacture, and marketability. These responses
suggest that what is most needed is more frequent interaction on an engineer-
to-engineer basis between NASAand industry. This interaction should maxi-
mize industry initiative with NASApersonnel serving as catalytic agents.
The above perceptions can be altered favorably if maximumuse is madeof
industry institutions or those institutions normally used by industry.
4. A technology transfer program built upon NASA's technical strengths
and capabilities will be most effective. The NACA/NASA program in aeronauti-
cal research over the past 68 years is acknowledged to be one of the best
examples of successful technology transfer from the laboratory to practical
use. An important part of this process was the informal cooperation and
network of relationships between NACA/NASA re_archers, educators in universi-
ties, and engineers in the aviation industry. The mutual trust, communi-
cations, and sharing of information grew out of the demonstration of NACA/NASA
technical strengths valued by both academia and industry. Similar examples,
such as NASA's work in materials, noise technology, and systems integration,
make clear that the most likely avenues of cooperation between NASA and in-
dustry will be made on the basis of special NASA technological capability,
leaving the specific product adaptation to industry.
5. Emphasize Field Center technical capabilities and participation.
NASA's technical capabilities are located primarily in its Field Centers.
Each Center has its own special set of capabilities and characteristics--
technologically, managerially, and in operational style. Therefore, NASA
Headquarters should concentrate on exercising general policy guidance and
visible leadership rather than detailed management supervision in th_7Process
of facilitating outside contacts between industry and Field Centers.
6. A framework of objectives, strategies and means for assessing and
rewarding progress will be required. A more encompassing concept of what
constitutes technology transfer in NASA necessarily will require a revised
set of objectives and means for assessing progress in order to assure needed
guidance and subsequent responsiveness to these new directions. This new
emphasis on cooperation with industry can be expected to encounter no less
opposition in the Executive Branch resource justification and allocation
process than has been the experience with the Technology Utilization Program.
Therefore, it is important from the very outset that NASA systematically
lay out the objectives, resource requirements, and assessment indicators.
Resource implications of the enhanced effort are not so much in the area
of increased R&D funding as in greater allocation of in-house man hours.
Vague sentiments that technology is good for the nation are not enough to
achieve the desired results. A comprehensive technology transfer program
should identify potential technology users, lay out action steps, identify
economic factors involved, and define criteria for success or failure.
15Appendix D.
16Appendix G, pp. 3,4,7.
171bid., pp. 5-7.
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II. Recommendations for Action
The most important action is to reconstitute NASA policy to reflect
the expanded concept of technology transfer, as described above. Tech-
nology transfer should be viewed as the application of technology, derived
from and for NASA programs, to solve problems in settings, locations, or
organizations other than those for which it was principally developed, or
for actual use beyond proof of concept. To implement such a policy two
groups of actions are needed--one of an organizational nature, the other to
expand cooperation with industry. In the first, the Administrator should
institute organizational adjustments including planning and implementation
activities that reflect this new policy by establishing technology transfer
as a truly vital activity of NASA and the nation.
In the second, the Administrator should expand the channels of cooperation
with industry through a variety of actions designed to increase contacts be-
tween engineers and scientists in NASA and in industry, to provide the environ-
ment for greater interchange of information and cooperation, and to explore
new means of cooperative efforts, exchange of information and personnel, and
other joint activities.
A. Establish Technolosy Transfer as a Vital Activity of NASA. Five
actions are suggested for consideration, each of which would contribute to
establishing the necessary environment for future program activities that
have the potential for significantly strengthening and expanding NASA tech-
nology transfer activities:
• Focus leadership for technology transfer activities in NASA;
• Establish a central focus, but delegate transfer activities to
Field Centers;
• Allocate additional resources to technology transfer activities;
• Establish a technology transfer activity fund at each Field Center;
and
• Establish a NASA-wide technology transfer recognition program.
Each action recommendation is described below.
I. Focus the leadership for technology transfer activities in NASA
by creation of a new positi_ at the Associate Administrator or Associate
Deputy Administrator level. Such action would be both symbolic and sub-
stantive. It would send a signal throughout the agency of the Admi-_istra-
tor's commitment to this function. It also would give organizational
authority to the function, as well as focusing attention on it. Thus it
18See Appendix H, Evaluating Recommendations for Enhancing NASA's Tech-
nology Transfer Policy, pp. 5-7.
xvi
would give technology transfer a relative position of strength in relation-
ships with other agencies, with the Executive Office of the President, with
the Congress, and in dealings with private industry. It would provide a
natural point of liaison for senior corporate officials to explore coopera-
tive activities with NASA.
Becauseof its pervasive nature, the technology transfer function re-
quires access to and continuing support of the Administrator; however, the
quality and character of the person assigned is no less important than the
level and nature of the position. The person heading this function should
be one who is familiar with American industry (not just aerospace industry),
who can work easily and well with senior industry officials, who is a mature,
persuasive public speaker, and whohas a close rapport with the Directors of
the NASAField Centers.
Location at the Associate Deputy Administrator level maybe the most
feasible since technology transfer is a cross cutting staff function whereas
Associate Administrator functions tend to be program-oriented in nature.
Also, an Associate Deputy Administrator usually is located in the Administra-
tor's immediate office, and such an arrangement is consistent with past
practices. It also would avoid the necessity of adding marginal or unrelated
functions in order to justify the position. Steps short of this action are
unlikely to convey the significance of the function.
219 Establish a central focus but delegate technolosy transfer activi-
ties. Basically, the resources and authority to undertake specific pro-
grams should be delegated to the Field Centers, guided by appropriate
objectives established for each Field Center, individually, after joint
consultation and agreement on objectives and general strategies with the
respective Field Center Directors. 20 The Associate Deputy Administrator
for technology transfer would provide agency-wide leadership, coordination,
and evaluation, as well as serving as the principal point of contact for
corporation executives interested in cooperation with NASA.
3. A greater allocation of resources (fundin$ and manpower) should be
made to technology transfer activities. 21 The type of expanded, new, or
exploratory activities suggested here probably requires an increase of re-
sources allocated to technology transfer activities. Any such change in a
time of highly restricted budgets and in the face of continued opposition
by the Office of Management and Budget will be difficult to obtain. However,
it is also clear that those most involved in making technology transfer suc-
cessful--persons in industry and in the NASA Field Centers--will not be
convinced that NASAmanagement is serious about exploiting technology trans-
fer opportunities unless there is significant, overt evidence of willingness
to invest resources in the process. This position relates as much or more
19Ibid., pp. 7-9.
20Appendix G, pp. 5-6.
21Appendix H, pp. 9-10.
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to the use of in-house manpoweras it does to funding. In fact, participa-
tion and incentives to do so should involve all NASAscientific and en-
gineering talent. Revenuegenerated from technology transfer activities
should be available to support them.
4. Establish a technology transfer activity fund at each Field Center
under the authority of the Center Director. 22 The purpose of such a fund
would be to encourage broader participation by providing resources for:
(i) applications projects, (2) travel and related costs associated with in-
dustry liaison activities, and (3) limited problem solving activities with
industry, universities, and state or local governments. Field Center Di-
rectors should be authorized to receive reimbursement into this fund from
industrial organizations and others. The funds would be allocated to each
Field Center on a basis to be established by the Administrator. Such a
fund would provide the flexibility to exploit technology transfer opportuni-
ties, and also serve to provide recognition for excellence in technology
transfer performance. 23
5. Establish a NASA-wide recognition program for extraordinary ac-
complishment in technology transfer activities. Z4 Such a program should
include participation not only from NASA facilities, but from industry,
universities, and non-profit organizations as well. Consideration should
be given to establishing awards in conjunction with nonaerospace profes-
sional or technical societies. It might be patterned after the IR-IO0
award program. Incentives might also include individual monetary awards.
Beyond this type of recognition, the technology transfer function should
be included as a key element in performance evaluation and assessment
during the annual performance review.
B. Expand the Channels of Cooperation With Industry. Past experience,
both in the United States and in foreign countries where high technology is
being aggressively pursued, shows that active cooperation in communication
between government agencies and private industry significantly improves the
likelihood of successful transfer of technology--in either direction. 25
Therefore, it is important that NASA pursue every reasonable opportunity to
increase these ties, to become better known within the nonaerospace industry,
and for NASA scientists and engineers to become more familiar with industry.
Seven actions are suggested as practical means to further open channels of
cooperation:
• Base cooperation upon (a) areas of NASA technical strength, or
(b) areas of special interest to NASA;
• Join with industry, universities and research laboratories in con-
sortia for research and technology exchanges, particularly those
already established and proven effective;
22Ibid., PP. 11'12.
23Appendix G, pp. 3-4.
24Appendix H, pp. 12-14.
25Appendix C, pp. 9-12.
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• Expand joint endeavor activity beyond the current Materials
Processing in Space Program to include the stimulation of
bilateral ad hoc activities undertaken through Field Center
initiative, and in conjunction with technical or professional
societies;
• Bring top technical people from industry into NASA's technology
planning process--much like the NACA committee/subcommittee system,
including periodic peer review to assure program quality;
• Pilot test the feasibility of hosting engineers representing industry
who would search and assess NASA technology for applications in their
respective industries;
• Explore means by which to use industry-related publications as chan-
nels to publicize NASA technology; and
• Review with the U.S. Air Force additional means to expand or to
assure an industrial base of support to space efforts.
These channels of cooperation are more fully explored below.
I. Cooperation should be based upon (a) areas of NASA technological
strength or (b) areas of special interest to NASA. 27 The experience under
NACA's aeronautics program, examples of NASA's successful technology transfer
with nonaerospace companies, as well as experience with other agencies, all
lead to the conclusion that the transfer of technology is most often success-
ful when closely related to the technical strength of the transferring organi-
zation or to the particular technical interests of both the giving and of the
receiving organization. In order to enhance the environment for technology
transfer, NASA should survey its technological strengths, Center by C_ter,
as well as outline its special technological interests in the future. _ This
information can provide one basis for further communication with industry and
others regarding points of focus in potential transfer activities.
2. Join with industry, universities, and research laboratories in con-
sortia for research and technology exchange. _ Joining in such cooperative
efforts provides the opportunity for NASA to augment its own technical capa-
bilities in areas of interest. Also, while participating in a network for
technological interchange NASA would have the opportunity to develop a more
practical view of industries' needs. This type of activity runs the gamut
from information and technology exchange, such as that at the University of
Illinois Fracture Control Program, to major technology developments such as
the Center for Integrated Systems at the Stanford University. _ NASA should
26See Appendix I, Case Studies of NASA-Industry Cooperation in the Trans-
fer of Technology, for three illustrations.
27Appendix H, pp. 14-15.
28For examples of current areas of technical strength, see Appendix G,
p. 7.
29
Appendix H, pp. 15-16.
30See Appendix J.
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employ a variety of such centers to assess the relative value of different
types of participation, their effectiveness for providing technology needed
or desired by NASA, the extent to which they provide contacts for the trans-
fer of NASA technology, and the extent to which they lead to further useful
informal contacts. This approach would appear to require only modest funding,
and to be effective without raising a high NASA profile.
3. Expand joint endeavor activity beyond the current Materials Process-
ing in Space Program. $I Thus far, NASA's joint endeavor activity in the
current MPS Program has not been extensive. Nevertheless, as a first step
towards exploring the feasibility of further expansion of this type of ac-
tivity, NASA should determine which of its own programs appear promising
for joint activity with private industry. Then, efforts should be made to
engage appropriate industry partners. Use of NASA facilities by industry
also should be considered.
4. Bring industry representatives into NASA's technology plannin$ process.
NACA's success in gearing its research to industry needs has been linked to
the close participation by highly qualified representatives _ the aeronautics
industry in the NACA aeronautical research planning process.S° NASA should
explore the feasibility of carefully extending this process to other areas of
technology. This process might also include periodic peer review to assure
continuing quality. To some extent, a similar process has been achieved through
National Academy of Science's advisory groups and committees, periodically
reviewing NASA plans and opportunities. However, it is considerably more re-
moved from industry than was that of the NACA committee and subcommittee system.
As part of the process of exploring this feasibility, NASA will have to review
the potential problem of conflict of interest.
32
5. Pilot test the feasibility of encouraging engineers, re_resenting
industry, to search and assess NASA technology for applications. 34 Here, guest
engineers would be given extensive access to data systems and Field Center
personnel for the purpose of identifying potential applications or solutions
to problems of a particular industry. Salaries of such individuals would be
paid by the company or group of industries represented. They would be selected
by their respective participating company or industry association. NASA (at
least in the pilot stage) would absorb the cost of making NASA engineers and
scientists available for brief consultation with these persons and for some
internal data search. Conflict of interest questions would have to be con-
sidered in implementing this activity.
6. Explore means to use industry-related publications as channels to
publicize NASA technology. 35 Under the current program, NASA depends largely
upon its NASA Tech Briefs as the means of announcing new developments in
_Appendix H, p. 17.
-Ibid., pp. 17-19.
33Appendix G, pp. 5-6 and Appendix D.
34Appendix H, pp. 19-20.
35Ibid., PP. 20-21.
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NASA technology that are considered to be of interest to industry and o_
commercial potential. Although this provides for "broadcast" publication,
discussions with industrial officials reveal that this means is unlikely to
reach many decision makers in nonaerospace industry. NASA should reexamine
possible opportunities for placing similar information about its technology
in publications of professional and trade organizations and at trade fairs,
meetings and informal information networks sponsored by such groups. Report-
edly, this was explored during the early years of the Technology Utilization
Program, but there was little receptivity by those responsible for the publi-
cations. Another review would be timely.
7. Review with the U.S. Air Force additional means to expand or assure
an aerospace industrial base.30 NASA is reported to be involved in a joint
effort with the Air Force to improve manufacturing technology and to provide
information about such improvements more broadly to the aerospace industry.
This suggestion is directed toward expanding the industries from which future
work might be solicited. This can be pursued through the wider sharing of
information, a better understanding of the capabilities of those industries
not currently doing business with NASA, and establishing a broader base of
firms acquainted with aerospace technology. An assessment should be made of
what steps NASA might take, via the contract route or other means, to engage
in broader participation and ulitmately further transfer of technology.
Various high technology industries operating outside of aerospace seem a likely
group to attract. Since the industrial base serving the Air Force is similar
to that of NASA, a cooperative effort with the Air Force could make such an
exploration considerably more fruitful.
Postscript
A recent editorial, appearing in an aerospace company's in-house maga-
zine, pleaded the case for workin$ at technology transfer by combating the
false myths many hold regarding technology transfer. The myths are:
(i) that industry automatically "gobbles up" new technology as soon as it is
revealed, (2) that a "better mousetrap" is self-evident and doesn't need sell-
ing, and (3) that "exciting and valid" technology will "automatically" be
transferred. All of these myths are founded in the erroneous belief that
worthwhile transfer is a self-servicing system. The basic point of the editor-
ial, as of this report, is that a company or agency must be organized to
enhance technolosy transfer if the right connections are to De made and tech-
nology most effectively applied--and this requires conscious effort throughout
an organization.
361bid., p. 21.
37TRW Electronics & Defense/Quest, Winter, 1982-1983, p. 65.
xxi
PARTNERSHIPADVISORYCOMMITTEE
BIOGRAPHICALSUMMARIES
James C. Armstron$: Since 1972 Dr. Armstrong has been with the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company where he is currently Director, Strategic
Planning. He served four years in the Office of the Postmaster General as
Director of Support Planning, and as Director of the Systems Analysis Division.
He also worked at the Institute for Defense Analysis and was Research Associate
and Assistant Professor of Physics at the University of Maryland. Currently
an Adjunct Professor of Management at Pace University in New York, he has
served as a consultant to a number of scientific and technical organizations.
Lamont Eltinge: Dr. Eltinge joined Eaton Corporation in 1973, and as Director
of Research, has focused upon the identification and assimilation of new tech-
nologies. He has experience in manufacturing at the Electro-Motive Division
of General Motors, and industrial research--predominantly in engine, fuel,
energy, and ecology fields. He served in the Research and Development Depart-
ment of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, directed automotive research for
the Ethyl Corporation, and was Vice President of Research and Technology for
the Cummins Engine Company.
William T. Golden: Mr. Golden is director and trustee of several national corp-
orations; Director and Treasurer of the American Association for the Advancement
of Science; trustee of Mitre Corporation, Carnegie Institution of Washington,
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, American Museum of
Natural History, and others. He has been a Member of the Department of State
Advisory Commission on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid, a Member of the
Military Procurement Task Force of the Second Hoover Commission, Special Con-
sultant to President Truman on government organization for science, consultant
to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and Assistant to the Commissioner,
Atomic Energy Commission.
xxii
Augustus B. Kinzel: Dr. Kinzel is director and trustee of several national
corporations; serves as trustee of the Systems Development Foundation, the
California Institute of Technology, and the Brookhaven National Laboratory.
He has served on the Defense Science Board, the Naval Research Advisory Com-
mittee and others, and was Chief Consultant in Metallurgy to the Manhattan
District and its successors. From 1926 when he joined Union Carbide and Car-
bon Research Laboratories, Inc., he served in research and management positions,
rising to Director of Research, then Vice President for Research of Union
Carbide Corporation. Subsequently, he was President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Salk Institute of Biological Studies. He is a member of the
National Academy of Sciences and was Founding President of the National Academy
of Engineering.
James K. LaFleur: Mr. LaFleur has been President, Chief Executive Officer
and Chairman of the Board of Directors of GTI Corporation since 1975. He was
founder and president of three high technology companies, and has engaged in
a private technological consulting practice. He is a registered professional
engineer and has been awarded over 130 patents in the U.S. and foreign
countries in the fields of turbomachinery and cryogenics. He authored the
recent monograph, "R&D Limited Partnership: A Financial Breakthrough for
Inventors and Small Businesses."
Gordon H. Millar: Dr. Millar has been associated with Deere and Company since
1963 at which time he was Director of Research for six years, followed by
several years as Assistant General Manager of the Tractor Works (Waterloo),
and since 1972 has been Vice President for Engineering. Previously he served
as Engineering Manager for Meriam Instrument Company and as Director for New
Products of McCulloch Corporation. He is a member of the National Academy of
Engineering.
xxiii
Jerome Simonoff: Mr. Simonoff, currently Vice President, has been associated
with Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc., since 1967, with principal involvement
in financing high growth computer and telecommunications companies. Prior to
joining Citicorp, he worked at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratories,
engaged in economic studies and test plans for the application of satellite
technology to assist navigation of submarines. He worked on the electronic
design of data communications equipment and flight simulator computers at ACF
Industries, Inc., from 1961-63.
John G. Welles: Mr. Welles has been Vice President for Planning and Public
Affairs, Colorado School of Mines, since 1974. For 18 years previously he
was Head, Industrial Economics Division, University of Denver Research Institute
specializing in research on the management of R&D, technology transfer, and
regional development. He has worked in engineering with the General Electric
Company, labor relations with General Motors, and as a consultant to the U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment and to Business International. In 1975
and 1980 he served as chairman of the Colorado Front-Range Project on part-
time loan to the Governor's office.
• xxiv
GTI corporatnn
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James K. La Fleur
President
May 5, 1983
Mr. Richard Chapman
Project Director
Program for Transfer Research
and Impact Studies
University of Denver
University Park
Denver, Colorado 80208
Dear Dick:
I would like to offer the following comments relative
to the final recommendations that are made to NASA
regarding the Technology Transfer Project.
1. I concur that technology transfer is desirable
from the point of view of advancing this country's
scientific efforts. However efforts to facilitate this
transfer in an open society will always run directly
counter to the desire to prevent or slow down the transfer
of the identical technology to unfriendly world powers.
A judgemental call must then be made between these opposing
and somewhat mutually exclusive goals.
2. NASA has always maintained a policy of sub-
contracting the major portion of its hardware fabrication
requirements to the private sector. The major sub-
contractors to NASA have in turn sub-contracted large
portions of their work to smaller firms. This policy
has not only worked to the mutual benefit of the govern-
ment and industry in the general sense of procuring high
quality hardware but has had a secondary and generally
unnoticed benefit of transferring technology from NASA
to industry in accordance with Congressional desires.
In fact, it could be argued, that lacking the one-to-one
relationship that existed between N.A.C.A. and the aircraft
industry, that the sub-contracting policy pursued by NASA
since its inception was the most effective way of
transferring multi-disciplined space technology into the
private sector.
10060 Willow Creek Road, Sen [Diego, CA 92131
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May 5, 1983
3. There is pressure everywhere to reduce government
expenses. Recommending increased spending to accomplish
something that may already be occurring seems contrary
to national policy and good judgement at this time.
In view of the above, my recommendations would be:
l. Eliminate technology transfer as a separate
and overt activity.
. Develop arguments that the Congressional mandate
for technology transfer is already being
implemented at __n° cost via NASA's subcontracting
policy. I believe statistics are available to
indicate that a significant percentage of American
industry has benefited from technology acquired
in this fashion.
Dick, regardless of the outcome, I would not allow
my name to appear on a report that recommended a budget
increase for this activity.
Several other recommendations in the report are
defective in that implementation is either impossible or
extremely difficult. I will elaborate if you feel it is
necessary, but if my suggestions above were accepted,
nothing more need be said.
Incidently, why not recommend a program be dropped?
You might gain more respect by giving a straight forward,
simple recommendation. It is not always necessary to
conclude a study with a recommendation that the program
under study be expanded.
Sincerely,
JKL:nt
COPY
Denver Research Institute
Industrial Economics Division
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UNIVERSITY OF DENVER
An Independent University
University Park, Denver, Colorado 80208
Mr. James R. LaFleur, President
GTI Corporation
10060 Willow Creek Road
San Diego, CA 92131
May 20, 1983
Dear Jim:
COPY
[paragraph of personal reference deleted]
Let me address the main points of your May 5th letter regarding final
recommendations to NASA on technology transfer.
First, your observation regarding the conflict between facilitating
transfer in an open society and restricting transfer to unfriendly nations
is, I believe, sharedamong the other members of the committee. The judgment
call has to be made in terms of the full benefits and costs to the Nation for
any set of general policies or particular action.
Second, your point about the NASA procurement process as a natural and
effective channel for transfer is recognized. However, nearly two decades
of experience reveal that procurement is but one of a number of effective
channels for transfer, and that other channels can be opened or encouraged
with but minimum (albeit organized) effort. The Deere and Company activity,
to take one example, simply would not have occurred had it depended upon NASA
procurement activity as the mode for transfer.
Third, I believe most of us on this project agree that budget constraints
dictate a strategy of caution regarding new spending; but that does not pre-
clude readjustment or reallocation of resources within NASA.
Finally, the discussions in the cormnittee meetings, and the background
materials developed from research, field visits, and interviews--all point
toward the desirability (and utility) of an enhanced, if redirected, NASA
technology transfer effort. This is substantially at variance with your
suggestion that technology transfer as a separate and overt activity be drop-
ped. [Personal reference deleted.]
THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER IS AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION INSTITUTION
Mr. James R. LaFleur xxvii May 20, 1983
Since you disagree with the basic sense of the draft report, let me
suggest that we note that in the memorandum to Beggs, appending any comments
that you wish to make, or include a copy of your May 5th letter. The trans-
mittal letter will be amended to reflect consensus among seven Of the eight
members of the Advisory Committee. [Administrative reference deleted.]
Sincerely,
Richard L. Chapman
RLC:jb
cc: Advisory Committee members
Note: The other members of the Advisory Committee agree with the argu-
mentation outlined above. In addition several points were made by members
in their response: (i) if NASA were to eliminate overt, organized efforts
at technology transfer, relying only on their regular contracting practices
(in contrast to those recommended), there would be little or no transfer to non-
aerospace industry; (2) ideally, technology transfer should not be a separate
activity, distinct from line management, but should be integrated into line
management responsibility; and (3) although clearly not the primary activity
of NASA, technology transfer needs to be an overt, recognized NASA activity
of legitimate concern to line management.
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TECHNOLOGICALINNOVATIONANDECONOMICVITALITY
Over the last two decades, certain economists have studied and
researched the relationships amongU.S. public and private investmentln R&D,
the pace of technological innovation, and the resulting impacts on the
economicvitality of the nation. Oneof the most prominent of these econo-
mists has described the significance of these impacts on national well-being:
There has been a growing conviction in government and
elsewhere that the American economyis not growing
as rapidly as it should, and a growing awareness that
our rate of economic growth depends very heavily on
our rate of technical change. Second, the advent and
continuation of the cold war has made it painfully
obvious that our national security depends on the
output of our military research and development
effort. Third, economists and others are coming to
realize the full importance in various markets of
competition through newproducts and processes rather
than direct price competition. Fourth, unemployment
created or aggravated by technical change has become
increasingly acute, the problem reaching such dimen-
sions that the President recently labeled it one ofthe foremost problems of the sixties.
This observation, made18 years ago, remains timely in 1983.
There is substantial evidence that the economic problems of the U.S.--
competitiveness of our industries in world trade, inflation, productivity,
and unemployment--are related to the innovation process. These relationships
will be discussed later.
Further evidence exists that the process of technological innovation is
not solely the responsibility of the public sector, nor solely of the private
sector. Frank Press, then Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, impl_ed that joint public-private efforts are needed:
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The relationship between government and industry
in promoting the productivity and competitiveness
of U.S. industry is nowa very important item on
this nation's agenda. It is evident today that
the health of our economyis being adversely af-
fected by a lag in our productivity and a decline
in our industrial innovation. A reversal of this
situation is essential, not only for the domestic
effect, but also to improve our competitive position
in world markets. . . Weare already aware of
certain conditions that need correction:
• There is insufficient incentive on the part
of industry to innovate boldly--industry
leaders tell us that it is "safer" to market
incremental improvements in tried and true
products than to undertake greatly innovative
R&D.
• Industry investment is too low on exploratory
research, particularly that from which the
results would be more advantageous to society
as a whole rather than one firm or industry
in particular.
• Industrial research managers tell us that they
are having to put a larger share of their in-
comeinto so-called "defensive" measures to
meet new environmental and consumersafety
standards--as desirable as these standards may
be.... Wemust recognize that they require
resources that might otherwise be used for more
innovative work.
• Equipment and facilities are aging and not be-
ing replaced as rapidly as necessary to kee_
U.S. industries productive and competitive. _
Technological Change and the Economy_
Technological change is generally defined as an innovation that results
in a change in the production function. That is to say, it involves the
introduction of an improved method, or material, or item of equipment in
such a way as to increase the maximum output of a product (or service)
that can be obtained from a given amount of inputs (factors of production
such as labor and capital). A technological change also may result in
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the availability of new products. An innovation may, but often does not,
stem from an invention nor from a fundamental advance in scientific
knowledge or principles. Many innovations occur by transfer and/or
adaptation of known technology from one economic sector, or industry, or
nation, to another. A first use in a particular setting can be called
an innovation.
The rate of technological change is generally measured indirectly,
by measuring its effects on productivity. There are several such measures,
including the common one of change in output per manhour of labor. Other
measures involve capital inputs as well. All, however, suffer from the
limitations inherent in separating technological change effects from effects
caused by extraneous factors. Nevertheless, economists have developed a
total productivity index which reflects a rate of productivity growth of
about 1.7 percent per year during the 1889-1957 period, rising faster in
3
periods of economic expansion than in contraction/recessions.
The rate of technological change, most economists agree, is determined
by the aggregate investment by industry, government, and individual inventors
in the improvement of technology. Some dozen econometric studies have been
carried out by teams of economists in recent years, using regression
techniques to relate changes in output over time with changes in the R&D
expenditure, labor and capital invested by firms in a particular industry.
Mansfield summarizes their economic findings:
These econometric studies provide persuasive
evidence that R&D has a significant effect
on the rate of productivity increase in the
industries and time periods that have been
studied. Indeed, every study comes to es-
sentially this same conclusion. (To illus-
trate the similarity of the results, three
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entirely independent studies . . used
quite different data to estimate the elas-
ticity of output with respect to cumulated
R and D expenditures in the chemical industry,
and all three found it was about .i.) How-
ever, there is, of course, a lag between
the time when the R and D expenditures occur,
and the time of the productivity increase.
This lag tends to be longer for more basic
research than for applied research, and
longer for applied research than for de-
velopment. For major innovations, the lag
between invention and commercialization may
be a decade or more, but for more run-of-
the-mill projects, the lag often is much
shorter. 4
He goes on to point out several limitations to these econometric studies,
such as inadequate reflection of changes in the quality of goods and
services produced, problems in measuring inputs--notably capital investment,
changes over time in the comparability of data on R&D expenditure, extraneous
factors affecting correlation--such as the likelihood that firms investing
large amounts in R&D may also have progressive management that independently
advances productivity.
Possibly the most significant of these is the failure to give
proper credit and weight to improvements in the quality of goods and services
produced. Quality improvements are an important result of R&D. Mansfield
notes that the nation's economic "growth rate would have been the same
whether antibiotics were developed or not, or whether we devoted the
resources used to reach the moon to public works. Unfortunately,
the measured growth of national income fails to register or indicate the
effects on consumer welfare of the increased spectrum of choice arising
from the introduction of new products. ''5
Christopher Freeman discusses several other problems with measures of
R&D input as a surrogate for output, including the anomaly that similar
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research expenditures may or may not appear in GNPstatistics. They do
appear if government financed, whether performed by government or industry.
They do not if the R&Dis financed and carried out within the industrial
6firm, as it will not be measuredas a final product.
Several alternate measures of R&Doutput are proposed and discussed
by Freeman, such as patent statistics and numbersof scientific papers
published, but each has deficiencies. So does the difficult and lengthy
task of cost-benefit analysis of innovations, which in any case cannot
properly measure the indirect benefits resulting from the extraneous flow
of new technological information stemmingfrom the innovation process but
7flowing in manydirections and used with varying time-lags.
Social Returns on R&D Investments
In the last several years, economists have devised techniques for
providing at least rough estimates of the social rates of return from
technological innovations. Analogous to the rate of return earned on a
private investment, the social rate of return represents the interest rate
received by society as a whole from the investment in a new technology.
In 1977, published estimates were reported of the social rates of return
for 17 technological innovations. The median social rate of return from
these was a striking 56 percent annually, "which indicates that the invest-
ments in these technologies paid off handsomely from society's point of
view. ''8'9 This is compelling evidence that broad societal benefits can
flow from R&D investments. That finding bears further consideration when
considering national policy on technological innovations.
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Public vs. Private Rates of Return on R&D Investments
Intuitively, the rate of return to a firm that invests in R&D would
be less than the rate of return to society as a whole, since there are
likely to be external benefits from flows of technology to others. Some
evidence of this was presented in the 17 case studies mentioned above.
In these, the median private rate of return (before taxes) was about 25
percent, which rate corresponds to the marginal rates of return of 30-40
percent calculated by Mansfield in the chemical and petroleum industries.
In one case of an industrial product innovation, the social rate of return
was over 300 percent while the private rate of return was only 27 percent,
partly because of imitation by competitive firms within six months of its
i0
introduction by the innovator.
But will the investment in R&D take place so society can benefit in
cases where the perceived private rate of return is too low to provide an
incentive to the potential innovator? No, it will not, so long as the
firm or innovator acts rationally in economic terms. (Other research on
selection of R&D projects indicates that while risk of technical success and
risk of commercial success are weighed before the decision to proceed,
so are other less economically rational factors such as the challenge to
the interest of the research staff.) Of the 17 innovations in Mansfield's
case study, in nine cases data were available on the expected rate of return
to the innovator before the project was begun. In five of the nine, the
private rate of return was less than 15 percent (before taxes) or quite
marginal indeed. Yet the average social rate of return of these five
innovations was more than i00 percent. In about 30 percent of the 17 cases
in the sample, the private rate of return was so low that no firm, with the
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benefit of hindsight, would have invested in the innovation. Yet the social
rate of return was high enough to showthe worthwhile nature of the invest-
Ii
ment from society's point of view.
This evidence seems to point to the likelihood of a substantial under-
investment in civilian technology because the R&D investment decision is
made by the innovating firm. Where the private rate of return is too low
to encourage investment, the [usually] greater social rate of return must
be foregone by society. Some public policy implications of this circumstance
will be discussed later.
R&D Expenditure Trends in the U.S.
Detailed studies of R&D investments in the chemical, petroleum and
steel industries determined that there is a close relationship over the
long run between the amount a firm spends on R&D and the total number of
12
important inventions it produces. Not a surprising finding, but one
comforting to research professionals and research managers.
Although the relationship between R&D expenditures and technological
advance cannot automatically be extended to nations, it is nonetheless
unsettling to view statistics on the trend of aggregate R&D investment in
the United States:
From the end of World War II until the late 1960s,
the nation's expenditures on research and develop-
ment increased at a relatively rapid rate. [From
$1.5 billion in 1945 to $17.4 billion in 1963.]
But from 1968 to 1975, when inflation is taken
roughly into account, evidence presented by the
National Science Foundation seems to indicate a
decline in the total expenditures on R&D in con-
stant dollars. The number of scientists and
engineers engaged in R&D also declined--from
560,000 in 1969 to 520,000 in 1973. Some policy
makers and economists have been concerned that
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this decline may have a detrimental effect on
the nation's future rate of economic growth. 13,14
Adding additional concern is the concentration of R&Dexpenditures in
certain technological fields. During the early 1960's, over 55 percent of
the nation's R&Dexpenditures were for defense and space technology purposes.
This had declined subsequently, to 43 percent in 1970.15 However, three
federal agencies--the Department of Defense, NASA,and the Atomic Energy
Commission--accounted for 90 percent of the R&Dexpenditures of the federal
16government in the late 1960's. Furthermore, muchof the R&Dperformed by
U.S. industry is financed by the federal government. In 1974, about 40
percent of the industrial R&Dwas federally funded. Muchof this R&Dalso
is defense and space oriented, although in recent years there has been some
17shift in emphasis toward energy and environmental research.
R&Dfinanced and conducted by the U.S. private industrial sector--
which totalled $14 billion in 1974--was highly concentrated in five indus-
tries. Four-fifths of the R&Dperformed by U.S. industry was concentrated
in five industrial classifications: electrical equipment and communications,
chemicals and allied products, machinery, motor vehicles, and aircraft and
18
missiles. This phenomenonmay in part be a function of size of firm.
Several economists have stated that in recent years innovations have been
carried out primarily by large firms* because: (a) the costs of innovating
*A contrary opinion is expressed by Christopher Layton, who notes that
The best conditions for innovation are nonetheless often
found in small companies, where communications between
development, productions and marketing are easy and a
commonobjective, with strategies to implement it, can
be understood by all concerned. Statistically there
is evidence that a very high proportion of original
inventions have comefrom individual inventors, without
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are too great for smaller firms; (b) R&Dprojects must be carried out on
a large enough scale to spread risk, so that there will be a probability
of successes balancing out failures; and (c) a firm must have sufficient
control over the market to reap the rewards of an innovation, to make it
2O
worthwhile to assumethe costs.
Types of R&D Expenditures in the U.S.
Compounding the declining trend in U.S. research and development
expenditures is an evident shift in industry-sponsored research away from
the risky and ambitious projects, including basic research and long term
projects with expectations of significant time lapse before payout. If
there is indeed a shift of this type to the less risky projects involving
incremental product and process improvements, it presents an ominous out-
look for our future as innovators. Scientific breakthroughs are unlikely
to result from low risk R&D involving incremental product improvements.
The aphorism, "No guts--no glory"* may apply in R&D as well as other
enterprises.
Mansfield has categorized industrial R&D expenditures as being mainly
(about two thirds) for development, with particularly large proportions
going for development in the machinery, electrical equipment and aircraft
and missiles industries. Over all industries, about one third of
the initial backing of any organization. There is a
good deal of dispute about whether large or small firms
are then a better environment for the development, pro-
duction and marketing of a new product or process (inno-
vation); it often depends on the scale of the R and D
investment needed. Our study suggested, however, that
it was easier to get a successful innovation effort going
in small or relatively small enterprises. 19
*The original is more elegant: "Quien no se atreve no pasa la mar";
He who does not dare does not cross the sea.
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expenditures are for research and only one eighth go for basic research.
He cites a 1975 survey showing that half of the responding firms' R&D
expenditures were aimed at improving existing products, while 36 percent
were aimed at new product development and 14 percent at new process
21development.
Subsequently, Mansfield studied 119 firms to explore the hypothesis
that the proportion of industrial R&Dexpenditures on risky and ambitious
projects is declining. He confirmed the hypothesis:
The proportion of R&Dexpenditures devoted to basic
research declined between 1967 and 1977 in practic-
ally every industry. In the aerospace, metals,
electrical equipment, office equipment and computer,
chemical, drug, and rubber industries, this propor-
tion dropped substantially. In the sample as a
whole, the proportion fell about one-fourth from
5.6 percent in 1967 to 4.1 percent in 1977.... *
In four-fifths of the industries, there was also
a decline between 1967and 1977 in the proportion of
R&Dexpenditures devoted to relatively risky projects
(specifically, ones with less than a fifty-fifty
estimated chance of success). In some industries,
like metals, chemicals, aircraft, drugs, and rubber,
this reduction has been rather large. 22
Mansfield also sought reasons for the reduction from those firms
that have reduced the proportion of R&Dspending on basic research and
relatively risky and long term projects. The most frequently cited reason
was the increase in government regulations that has reduced potential
profitability of projects; chemical and drug firms were the likeliest to
cite this. Another reason given was that because of the extensive amount
of R&Dalready done, breakthroughs are more difficult to achieve than
*By comparison, Freemansurveyed 221 British firms in 1959-60 and
found that 6.5 percent of R&Dexpenditures were for basic research.
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in the past.* A third reason was high rates of inflation. This certainly
could contribute to a reduction, as muchhigher rates of return would be
needed to justify longer term payouts and higher risk projects. Mansfield
concludes that the reduction in the proportion of R&Dexpenditures for
basic research, relatively risky and longer term projects mayput a damper
23
on the rate of productivity increase.
Inflation and the high cost of capital are seen as more severely
impacting innovative, technology-intensive firms than more traditional
industries:
The needs of fast-growing, knowledge-intensive,
high technology companiesare significantly dif-
ferent from those of slower growing, capital-
intensive industries. Slower growing companies
generate most of their capital from internally
generated profits .... By contrast, fast-
growing high technology firms that are not so
capital intensive look to the equity market for
start-up and expansion capital. Moreover, their
future growth is dependenton high risk invest-
ments in research and development (R&D)....
[Thus] the present high cost of capital dis- 24
courages high risk investments in new technology.
Technological Innovation, Productiyity and Inflation
Over the past 25 years, research by the National Bureau of Economic
Research, Mansfield and others has attempted to define the relationship
between R&D expenditures and productivity increase in particular industries.
A 1959 thesis by N. Terleckyj found that the rate of growth of total factor
productivity increased by about 0.5 percent for each tenfold increase in
*One is reminded of the 19th century head of the U.S. Patent Office
who supposedly resigned because everything that could be had been invented
already.
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the ratio of R&Dexpenditure to sales. Subsequentwork by Mansfield in the
mid-1960s found that both for firms and for industries, the measured rate of
productivity change was related in a statistically significant way to the
rate of growth of cumulated R&Dexpenditures madeby the firm or industry.
If the technological change is embodiedin new equipment, a 0.7 percent
increase in the rate of productivity increase results from every 1.0 percent
increase in the rate of growth of cumulated R&Dexpenditures. If the
technological change is disembodied, e.g., better methods or organization,
there is a 0.i percent increase in the rate of productivity increase for
each 1.0 percent increase in the rate of growth of R&Dspending. Mansfield
concludes: ". . . although econometric studies of the relationship between
R&Dand productivity increase have . . many limitations, they provide
reasonably persuasive evidence that R&Dhas an important effect on produc-
tivity increase in the industries and time periods that have been studied. ''25
More specifically, the works of Solow and Denison were cited. Solow
found that between 1909 and 1949, the average rate of technological change
was about 1.5 percent per year and that about 90 percent of the increase in
output per capita during this period was due to technological change and
only a minor proportion was due to increases in the amount of capital
employed perworker. Denison found that "the advance of knowledge," or
technological innovation, accounted for about 40 percent of the total
26increase in national income per person employed during 1929-57.
In 1976 testimony before the Houseof Representatives Committee on
Science and Technology, Mansfield madea stronger connection between R&D
expenditures and the economy, although he ranked technological innovation
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behind the more obvious economic tools--monetary and fiscal policy--as
solutions to problems of unemploymentand inflation:
Nonetheless, our science and technology policies can
have important long-run effects, assuming that proper
fiscal and monetary policies are adopted. In particu-
lar, . there is a great deal of evidence that R
and D expenditures are directly related to the rate
of productivity growth (allowing for a time lag).
Since increases in the rate of productivity growth
can offset increases in labor, materials, and other
costs, they can tend to moderate the inflation rate.
Thus, our technological policies can have a note-
worthy, if secondary, influence on inflation, as
well as a major influence on our rate of economic
growth. 27
Using examples from two industries, Mansfield explained how R&Dtends to
reduce inflation, at least in the mediumand long run, through its effects
on productivity. In petroleum refining, introduction of new cracking
processes reduced the cost of gasoline in 1955 to about 18 percent of the
cost using the earlier Burton process. The development of large-scale
ammoniaplants in the 1960's reduced the cost of ammoniaby over 20
28,29percent.
He also points out two other concerns stemming from the interaction
amongR&Dexpenditures, productivity and inflation. If inflation is
high, as it was during most of the last decade, it distorts the efficiency
of the price system as a mechanismfor coordinating economic activity and
the allocation of resources, with resulting disastrous effects on pro-
ductivity. Further, high inflation rates deter investment and thus
discourage R&Dexpenditures that require new plant and equipment for its
utilization. Evenwhen R&Dexpenditures remain steady or grow they fund
projects which are not as ambitious and risk-taking as under price
3Ostability.
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Thus forms a vicious cycle of low R&Dexpenditure deterring producti-
vity, a low national productivity fueling inflation, inflation distorting
the price system and leading to purchases and investments that are less
rational and further destructive of productivity, and the resulting enhanced
inflation further discouraging R&Dexpenditure.
Technological Innovation and Competitiveness in World Markets
During much of the century from 1850 on, the United States enjoyed
a technological lead in many fields. It was the heyday of American invention
and innovation, with such breakthroughs as interchangeable parts. The
U.S. had a strong export position and could outperform much of the manu-
facturing competition from Europe, as well as other less developed nations,
despite a superior wage paid to American workers. The technological gap
which continued into the 1960s was the subject of considerable study by
economists. Some showed that most of the U.S. exports were in new products
which other countries were not yet producing--clear evidence of strong
technological innovation in the U.S., but a strength that is impermanent and
subject to attack by imitators. A series of studies by the OECD in the
late 1960s found that a large gap existed in computers and some electronic
components but not in pharmaceuticals, plastics, iron and steel, non-
ferrous metals, machine tools and scientific instruments (except for
certain specialized subsectors). Thus the American technological lead was
greatest in relatively research-intensive sectors of the economy. Further-
more, the OECD found that another factor in the U.S. technological lead was
the U.S. superior expertise in techniques of management, including the
management of R&D and the coupling of R&D with marketing and production. .31
*For a useful comparison of U.S. and U.K. allocations of skilled
manpower to marketing and production, see Layton, 1972, Chapter 2.
A-15
Howeversuperior the U.S. mayhave been in technological innovation
through the mid-1960s, there is substantial evidence that the U.S. lead
has eroded rapidly in the meantimeand the downwardtrend in U.S. techno-
logical competitiveness continues. There are many indicators of decline:
• Decreasing private investment in the research that
could lead to new products and processes.
• The increased emphasis in private sector R&D
activity upon low =isk_ short-term projects
aimed at incremental product changes.
• The declining international competitiveness of
U.S. industry as reflected in trade deficits, the
shrinking number of industrial product lines that
account for U.S. exports, and the increasing pene-
tration of domestic markets by foreign [producers]
of intermediate technology and basic industrial goods.
• The fact that in someindustries the level of tech-
nology used in production lags behind that in other
countries (for example, coal mining and steel pro-
duction).
• The difficulties in obtaining venture capital by
small, high technology firms.
• The changed direction of industrial research re-
sulting from the diversion of corporate expenditures
from commercial to other goals. 32
• As a percentage of gross national product, R. & D.
expenditure has decreased in the United States for
the past 15 years, whereas it has increased
in Japan, Germany,and the Soviet Union. Moreover,
the United States devotes a muchgreater percentage
of its R. & D. to defense and space than does Japan
or Germany. Thus, the ratio of civilian R. & D.
to gross national product is considerably higher in
Japan and Germanythan in the United States. In
1974, it was 2.27 percent in Germany,1.91 percent
in Japan, and 1.46 percent in the United States. 33
The results are all too clear. In manyof the areas where the U.S.
still maintains a favorable balance of trade--aircraft, chemicals, electrical
equipment and instruments--the continuing U.S. advantage appears due to the
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technological superiority based on an intensive investment in R&D. In
contrast, in manufacturing industries which are not typified by heavy
R&Dinvestment, the U.S. has experienced a large and continuing negative
trade balance over the decade of the 1970s. Mansfield comments:
Although it is very difficult to measure inter-
national differences in technological levels, the
available evidence suggests that the United States
long has been a leader in technology, but in the
past 15 or 20 years, the U.S. technological lead
has been reduced in manyareas. In someareas, it
no longer exists at all.
This seemsto be the judgment of many leading
engineers, scientists, and managers, and at least
two types of evidence seemto be consistent with
this view. First, there is the well-known fact
that labor productivity has increased muchmore
slowly in the United States than in Western Europe
or Japan.
Second, the National Science Board has published a
study which indicates that the United States origi-
nated about 80 percent of the major innovations in
1953-58, about 67 percent of the major innovations
in 1959-64, and about 57 percent of the major in-
novations in 1965-73.34
This unfortunate trend continues. CommerceSecretary Malcolm Baldrige
recently commentedon the decline in U.S. market competitiveness and spoke
of U.S. dominanceeroding in steel, automobiles, machine tools and consumer
electronics. Whereasa decade ago the U.S. was generating about 70 percent
of the world's new technology, this has declined to 50 percent in 1983
and by 1990 maybe only 30 percent because of the aggressive efforts by
35Japanese and other foreign competitors.
Botkin, et al., add their historical perspective:
in reaction to Sputnik, America launched a
buildup of technical education and resources to
lead the world in the exploration of space. All
these programs, along with the massive infusion
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of technical talent from Europe before and during the
war, combined to propel America on an unforeseen and
revolutionary course of technological development•
From this era of government-sponsored research and
development emergedthe computer, semiconductor,
communication, and instrumentation products that
today provide the most promising foundation for new
economic growth for the rest of this century. By
the year 2000, for example, the high tech industry is
expected to be second only to energy in its impact on
the economyof America and indeed the world.
The United States, having achieved technological
leadership and commercial success as an offshoot of
these other objectives, has no gameplan to sustain its
momentumin high technology• Wetake our success for
granted, not appreciating the underpinnings that have
supported our achievements and that will be required
to maintain our leadership. 36
Mansfield, while recommendingincreases in technological investment,
stresses the need for selectivity:
• . the available evidence indicates that U.S.
exports frequently are based on someform of
technological edge over other countries• Also,
there is someevidence that this edge has been
narrowing. However, from this evidence alone
(assuming it is entirely correct), one cannot
conclude that a great deal of additional money
should be spent on R and D. Whether or not more R
and D should be carried out in particular areas
depends on the extent of the social payoff there
from additional R and D, not on whether or not our
technological lead seemsto be shrinking in these
areas. In other words, it depends on the social
rate of return discussed previously.37, 38
Public Policy Mechanisms to Stimulate Innovation
If, as follows from the above, the U.S. is in need of increases in
R&D investment to stimulate technological innovation, productivity and
competitiveness in world trade, what public policy mechanisms seem most
appropriate and effective? Most particularly, what lessons are there
for NASA policy makers and for U.S. industrialists?
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Mansfield gives cautious, qualified answers. He recognizes some
underinvestment in civilian technology, attributable to the relatively
low rate of private return from a socially-valuable innovation. He also
discusses favorably the possible role of the federal government in reducing
this underinvestment. Yet, even though someR&Dprojects that would pay
off handsomely to society at large are left unfunded, Mansfield says that
economists do not have techniques that are sufficiently precise to indicate
how much the federal government should spend on particular kinds of R&D.
He gives two guides, however: (a) for a variety of reasons, he guesses
that there is a particular need for more long-term, relatively basic R&D
projects; here, he commentson the federal government's role in reducing
underinvestment; and (b) the decision on whether more R&Dshould be carried
out in particular areas depends on the extent of the social payoff there
from additional R&D,not on whether our technological lead seems to be
shrinking in these areas. In summary,he indicates a need for more long-term
basic research, more R&Din our key R&Dintensive industries so that we may
maintain our competitive edge, and federal government involvement in
39
reducing underinvestment in civilian technology.
Christopher Layton, writing from the British perspective, proposes
several policy solutions to the moreserious problems of the U.K. in
sustaining innovation and technological advance. Someof these may be
applicable to the U.S. as well. Layton calls for a redirection of quali-
fied scientists and engineers nowworking in government research laboratories
on projects that mayyield no immediate practical result to helping industry
discover and serve society's needs by, for instance, marketing engineering
4Oprojects. Although Layton describes U.K. problems--e.g., national social
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values that give low rank to industrial employmentand applied research--
that do not apply to a significant extent in the U.S., his call for
redeployment of government scientific and engineering expertise to support
of industrial technological advanceseemsto suggest an appropriate
solution to certain of our problems.
A second suggestion cited by Layton is attributed to Dr. H.H. Gardner
of the British Aircraft Corporation. Gardner proposes that panels be set
up in each major industry and closely linked to the universities [which
are all government supported] to look at the needs of the next I0 to 20
years and orient university research to fit them. Suchan approach would
not only makebetter use of national resources and provide an exciting
motivation for university research but would form part of an "education
spectrum" in which a researcher would movefrom industry to a university
to obtain a grounding in technology and its relation to society then work
on industry-oriented research before returning to an industrial R&D
41
career.
Building on this suggestion and incorporating ideas from a U.S. aero-
space executive interviewed during this study, it seemspossible to create
a series of panels of persons involved in major industries, with close
links to the space program and to universities, to determine areas of common
R&Dinterest. Such panels could identify areas of high priority in R&Dand
establish the basis for NASA/industry/university partnerships to work
on these.
Secretary Baldrige, in January 1983 cONgressional testimony, called
for revisions in federal antitrust policy to encourage combining expensive
42
research efforts amonghigh technology firms. That suggestion also
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parallels views expressed by industrial R&Dmanagers interviewed for this
study, notably senior R&Dmanagersin the automobile industry who deplored
the inability to cooperate or even communicate in pollution control research
efforts.
Finally, Mansfield discusses critically three kinds of policy mechar#i_ms
that have been proposed to help deal with the underinvestment that exists in
U.S. civilian technology:
• federal government grants and contracts to industry
for more R&Dwork, presumably R&Dwith a high
social rate of return but an insufficient private
rate of return to stimulate private industrial in-
vestment in it;
• increased use of federal government laboratories
for the conduct of such R&D;
43
• tax credits for private industry conducting R&D.
The third of these has becomepart of the present internal revenue code,
despite criticism of it as a policy mechanism:
With regard to tax credits, it is evident that they
would reward firms for doing R and D that they would
have done anyway, that they would not help firms with
no profits, and that they would encourage firms to
define R and D as widely as possible .... for firms
that can appropriate little of the social returns
from new technologies, R and D would still be unprofit-
able even if the tax credit existed. 44
Another telling criticism of national tax policy is that it aids the
capital intensive traditional industries more than high technology firms
which look to the equity market rather than to internally generated funds
for start-up and expansion capital:
National economic policy, embeddedin the new
tax laws, provides accelerated depreciation of capital
investments, liberalized investment tax credits, and a
new twist--"safe harbor leasing"--whereby losing
companies can sell their investment tax benefits to
profitable ones. this policy reinforces
capital intensive "sunset" industries at the expense
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of knowledge-intensive "sunrise" industries. Even
worse, this policy prolongs the life of dying
companies and ignores the needs of growing firms.
Scarce capital resources are dissipated, providing
marginal returns to the national economy.
In the context of tomorrow's economyit makesecono-. 5
mic sense to invest more in education than in steel. 4
The first two of the policy mechanismssuggested above are closely
related to the topic of this study. Both types of government-industry
partnership to promote socially valuable R&D--increased federal grants and
contracts to industry for R&D,and increased use of government laboratories
to conduct it--have the potential of stimulating investment in socially
desirable R&Dand of reducing the time lag between invention and innovation,
which averages 10-15 years for major innovations but is shorter for innova-
46tions developed with government funds than with private funds.
Mansfield's discussion of the shortcomings of these two policy mechan-
isms (which is not to say that he disapproves of them) relates to the
problems of central planning, which is as difficult in R&Dmanagementas
it has proved to be in the national economic managementof socialist countries.
With regard to grants and contracts, as with any
selective mechanism,one runs into the problem
that benefits and costs of various kinds of R and
D are very hard to forecast. As we have seen, even
major corporations have difficulties using various
forms of cost-benefit analysis for R and D project
selection, although they have a benefit concept
that is mucheasier to estimate than most govern-
ment agencies do.... Further, . such esti-
mates may be biased for parochial, selfish, or
political reasons, the result being a distortion
of social priorities, if the estimates are taken
seriously.
With regard to the increased use of government
laboratories to promote civilian technology, our
results . suggest the problems in having
R and D conducted by organizations that are not
in close touch with the marketing and production
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of the product. It is very important that there be
unimpeded flows of information and good coordination
of R and D, on the one hand, and marketing and pro-
duction on the other. Otherwise, the R and D is
likely to be misdirected, or even if it is not, it
maybe neglected or resisted by potential users ....
this is a difficult problem for various divisions of
a firm, and it would seemto be madeworse if the R
and D is done in government laboratories. In the last
decade, manygovernmentshave tended to convert
government laboratories and to increase the amount
of government financed R and D done in industrial firms
in order to bring R and D into closer contact with
application and commercialization.47
Nevertheless, Mansfield seemsto agree with Eads and Nelson
that there is an appropriate role for the federal government, in
partnership with industry, to fund and conduct research of manifest social
benefit. This can be done, Eads and Nelson point out, by continuing some
successful R&Dpolicies of the past--notably the NACApolicies of the 1920s
and 1930s--rather than in programs such as the breeder reactor in which
the federal government acts to an unprecedented extent to fund and control
the development of products for production and sale by private companies
through the market. 48
Eads and Nelson point out that the federal government has historically,
with few exceptions, avoided supporting or conducting R&Daimed specifically
at improving particular classes of products or services which normally are
sold to the public through the marketplace. Exceptions have been products
or services of merit to the general welfare (e.g., R&Don health related
products; cures for dread diseases), or products involving large fractions
of society as producers (e.g., agricultural research to benefit farmers),
or products closely linked with natienal defense (e.g., aviation development).
" by and large in all of these cases public funds tended to go into
research and exploratory development, with comm.ercialdevelopment being
left to private initiative. ''49
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The pre-1960 public support of research relevant to
civil aviation is directly relevant. In 1915 the
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA)
was created to spur the development of American
aviation. During its heyday during the 1920s and
1930s, NACApioneered in the development and
operation of R and D facilities for general use
(wind tunnels, for example), in information col-
lection and dissemination, and in basic research
and exploratory development. It undertook major
work on aircraft streamlining, design of engine
parts, properties of fuels, and structural aspects
of aircraft design, and it built and tested
a variety of experimental hardware. But NACAdid
not directly support the development of particular
commercial airplanes. Indeed, the idea that such
a role should be assumedby the federal government
was explicitly rejected 50
The conclusion of Eads and Nelson is that the federal government is
most successful and is following sound precedent when it avoids distorting
the traditional decentralized modesof R&Dorganization, decision-making
and risk-taking, by attempting to install a more concentrated and detailed
central planning structure. Instead, as in NACA'ssupport of basic
research and exploratory developments, public funding in the early stages
of the R&Dprocess can be expected to spur private development spending by
making clearer the development options and reducing the cost of the
51developments needed to achieve a given performance enhancement.
This approach, which stimulates private R&Dspending in socially
valuable fields yet avoids the dangers of overcentralized control and federal
subsidy in the production of private marketplace products, appears to offer
promise to U.S. policymakers searching for the best public policy mechanisms
to revitalize U.S. technological innovation and the national economyso
dependent upon it.
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THEDEVELOPMENTOFNASA'STECHNOLOGYTRANSFERPROGRAM
NASA's technology transfer program was instituted some20 years ago.
In the following discussion, the legislative basis for NASA's technology
transfer activities is briefly examined; the institutional development
of NASA's Office of Technology Utilization (TU) is traced; the technology
transfer programs that the TU Office has undertaken are described; and,
an assessment of NASA'scurrent technology transfer program is provided.
The Legislative Basis for Technolosy Transfer
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 set out eight objectives
for the newly created space agency; among them were two that related to
technology transfer. First and foremost, NASA was to contribute to ". . .
,vI
the expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space.
It was the fourth objective which included technology transfer. It started
as one of NASA's missions ".. . the establishment of long-range studies of
the potential benefits to be gained from, the opportunities for, and the
problems involved in the utilization of aeronautical and space activities
,,2
for peaceful and scientific purposes.
Technology transfer was more specifically addressed in the description
of the agency's functions. Three functions were set out in the law. The
first was to conduct aeronautic and space activities; the second was to
provide a mechanism for conducting scientific measurements and observations
in space. The agency's third function was " to provide for the widest
practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its
activities and the results thereof. ''3
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Twoobservations are in order. First, the transfer of technology was
not explicitly established as the agency's primary objective or function.
In fact, it would be considered of secondary importance to the first goal:
the exploration of space.
Second, the legislation charged NASAwith a task (i.e., technology
transfer) which was relatively unprecedented as a formal government function.
Technology transfer had been occurring informally between government,
industry, the universities and the public for years, but no agency prior
to NASAhad such a clear, emphatic mandate to pursue this task in a pro-
grammatic way.
An Institutional Approach to Technology Transfer
The informal transfer of technology from NASA to industry and the public
would have occurred with or without a formal technology transfer program.
People talking to people, NASA engineers taking new jobs, and NASA scientists
publishing scholarly articles are means of technology transfer which do
not depend on an established program to disseminate information. Indeed,
it is likely that much, if not most, technology transfer occurs serendipit-
ously through informal means.
Furthermore, many of NASA's technology transfer activities may be
categorized as instances of direct application. For example, through its
LANDSAT program, NASA makes its satellite technology available for surveying
the earth's resources. The resulting information can be used for such
purposes as agricultural crop forecasting, rangeland and forest management,
J
and mineral exploration.
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While informal transfer and direct application are important components
of the dissemination of NASAtechnology, this discussion focuses upon NASA's
formal program for "horizontal" technology transfer. Horizontal transfer
occurs when technical information is generated within one context and applied
4
in a different context. Since 1963, the Technology Utilization (TU) Program
has been the entity responsible for the formal transfer of NASAtechnology
such as the use of aerospace technology for medical applications.
A brief institutional history. The NASA technology transfer program
was drawn from various offices, under different program titles. By 1963
the Office of Policy Analysis included the Technology Utilization Program.
In 1966 an Office of the Assistant Administrator for Technilogy Utilization
was created. During the early 1970s, the TU Program was under the Assistant
Administrator for Industry Affairs, and the program's administration was
the sole responsibility of an office with director-level status. When the
shift was made to the Office of Space and Terrestrial Applications in 1977
the director of the TU Program was given other program areas to supervise,
which, in effect, lowered the status of the program within the NASA hier-
archy. For the first time the TU Program was included in one of NASA's
major mission areas, whereas formerly it had been considered part of NASA's
support functions. To some extent, this move may have isolated the TU
Program from the other mission areas, which it was also intended to serve.
When it was placed under the aegis of the Office of External Relations in
1980 and again directly linked with Industry Affairs, the TU Program was
once more formally recognized as a support function.
One indicator of the TU Program's evolution as a formal institution
is its historic levels of funding. This information is provided in Table i.
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Annual appropriations for the TU Program remained between $3.8 and $5.5
million from 1964 to 1975. Between1975 and 1980, appropriations for the
program doubled. In 1981, however, program appropriations were cut by
25 percent.
In constant dollars, appropriations for the program have dropped 35.8
percent from their peak in 1980. In fact, after adjusting for inflation,
1982 and 1983 are revealed as the years of lowest funding since 1963.
As might be expected, these reductions have renewed an interest
in cost control and productivity amongthe TU Program administrators. In
fact, the reductions mayhave accelerated a trend which has characterized
the development of the TU Program: an evolution from an experimental to
a more established approach to transferring technology.
It was widely recognized during the sixties that, in order to transfer
technology, it was necessary first to learn more about the technology
transfer process. This was to be accomplished through experimentation.
Witness the commentsof the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences in its FY 1967authorization for NASA:
"The Committee, as it has in previous years, fully
supports the concept of the program (the TU Program).
It recognizes, however, that it is still highly ex-
perimental and, based upon an analysis of the indivi-
ual elements, the Committeebelieves the program
should be maintained at a level essentially consistent
,,5
with the previous 2 fiscal years.
WhenDeputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans,Jr., was asked the purpose of
the $5 million authorization for technology utilization in FY 1968, he
replied, "The basic purpose of the $5 million item is to, you might say,
experiment with the processes involved in making technological and
scientific information available to all sectors of the United States. ''6
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TABLE1
LEVELSOFFUNDINGAUTHORIZATIONFORTHENASA
TECHNOLOGYUTILIZATIONPROGRAM,FY 1963-1983.
(In THOUSANDSOFDOLLARS)
YEAR ACTUALDOLLARS* CONSTANTDOLLARS**
1963 $ 866 $ 2,727
1964 3,080 9,575
1965 3,850 11,767
1966 3,900 11,588
1967 4,000 11,553
1968 3,800 10,533
1969 3,800 9,996
1970 5,000 12,417
1971 4,000 9,524
1972 5,000 11,525
1973 4,000 8,680
1974 4,500 8,799
1975 5,500 9,854
1976 7,500 12,705
1977 8,100 12,889
1978 9,100 13,451
1979 9,100 12,089
1980 11,980 14,020
1981 8,800 9,330
1982 8,000 8,000
1983 9,000 9,000
*Data for 1963-1969have been adjusted to exclude authorizations for
policy analysis.
**Historic data adjusted to 1982dollars using the ConsumerPrice Index.
Source: NASA
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Through experimentation, NASAprograms for technology transfer evolved
as established, ongoing institutions. In April of 1969, Richard L. Lesher,
Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization, reported, "The founda-
tions of the Technology Utilization Program have becomestabilized. ''7
By 1978, Louis Mogavero, Director, Technology Utilization Office, could
report " the program has nowachieved a significant level of maturity
in technology transfer," but he was quick to point out that " we
are still not satisfied that the mechanics of the process are fully under-
stood. ''8
NASAadministrators are not likely ever to be "satisfied" with their
understanding of a process as amorphousas technology transfer. Neverthe-
less, over the course of twenty years, the agency has developed an institu-
tional approach to transferring technology, and these programs have
experienced somesuccess in accomplishing this task. The development of
these programs is the subject of the next subsection.
The NASA Technology Transfer Programs
Publications. Since its early years, the TU Office has conceived of
technology transfer as consisting of three functions: technology identifi-
cation, evaluation, and dissemination. In the early sixties, Technology
Utilization Officers opened offices in each of the NASA field installations
in order to monitor innovations and advances in NASA technology and to review
contractor reports of innovation. These contractor reports are required by
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Section 305(b). There
is also a New Technology Clause incorporated in NASA contracts requiring that
the contractor search for and report all new technology resulting from work
under the contract. These New Technology Reports were forwarded to an in-
dependent research institute, which was responsible for evaluating the
technology for its commercial potential.
O,o_,,_,.,,-PAGE IS
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If evaluation revealed that an innovation had potential for commer-
cial application, information on the new technology was then disseminated
through NASA publications. The best known of these publications, NASA
Tech Briefs, is still in use. NASA Tech Briefs serves as an announcement
bulletin by providing a one or two page description of an innovation.
Various compilations and elaborations of NASA Tech Briefs have been de-
veloped to provide more comprehensive information on topics of interest.
One of these is the Technical Support Package (TSP), which provides backup
information for the material initially reported in Nasa Tech Briefs.
The number of requests for publications provide one measure of the
performance of the NASA publications program. A graph of requests for
TSPs is provided in Figure I.
FIGURE 1
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While the increase in requests has not been steady, the figure does
show the number of requests surpassing I00,000 in 1977, an indication of
substantial interest in NASApublications. In 1979, NASAreported that
requewts for new subscriptions to the NASA Tech Briefs were averaging 1,300
a month. 9
The NASA publications program has not been problem free however.
Since the program's inception, one problem has been to motivate innova-
tors to report their findings to the TU office. Without their help in
identifying new technologies, the first step in the transfer process
is impeded. Lesher expressed the problem as follows: "the aim, of course,
is to achieve a condition where scientists and engineers accept responsibi-
lity for the documentation and reporting of their R&D results in the same
spirit that they accept responsibility for the R&D itself. ''I0
This condition does not tend to occur naturally with NASA employees
and contractors, even though new technology reporting is required. Some
scientists and engineers, dedicated to the agency's primary mission of
space exploration, may regard technology reporting as an unnecessary
bother. NASA has attempted to address this problem by streamlining the
documentation process and by rewarding technology reporting with recogni-
tion and monitoring awards. As of 1982, 80 percent of the New Technology
Reports were the result of contractor work, while the remaining 20 percent
ii
were attributable to NASA employees.
Of course, the problem of technology reporting is not unique to the
publications program. It can crop up in any of the programs for NASA
technology transfer, but it is most evident in the publications program
which depends for its success on the volume of information generated.
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Indeed, the very volume of information published is another of the
problems encountered by the publication's program. As Harvey Brooks has
written, "the problem is not so muchaccess to information as it is
12identification of relevant information." While publications provide
an inexpensive meansof disseminating information to a broad audience,
the recipient may feel overloaded with information. Lacking the time to
read and evaluate each of the publications NASAsends him, the potential
user may fail to notice the publication that is particularly relevant to
his needs.
The Dissemination Centers. The TU Office recognized the limitations
of publications as a means for technology transfer. There was a need to
assist the potential user in finding the information relevant to his needs.
To this end, NASA initiated a program to provide clients with computerized
searches of the NASA data bank. The institutions!for providing these
services were named Regional Dissemination Centers (RDCs), later to be
called Industrial Applications Centers (IACs). The first of these centers
was established at Indiana University in 1963.
The success of the RDC at the University of Indiana, and of its
predecessor, a pilot project at the Midwest Research Institute, led to the
creation of more RDCs/IACs in the following years (see Table 2 ). In
1965, four RDCs were in operation. By 1967, twice that number were operat-
ing. Through most of the 1970s, six RDCs/IACs were in business.
The dissemination center program has been characterized by changes
and experimentation. For example, one of the RDCs, Project ASTRA (Applied
Space Technology-Regional Advancement) at the Midwest Research Institute,
began as an e_or_ to identify NASA technology which could be used by mid-
western companies for new product development or in process improvement
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efforts. In 1963, the program wasmodified to experiment in technology
dissemination by mail and telephone. Its purpose was to provide rapid
response information on specific technical advances that midwestern firms
found interesting. In 1966, ASTRAswitched from providing free services to
charging fees, and in 1967, it added retrospective searching and custom
interest profile services. In 1968, this RDCwas phased out of existence.
Over the course of its dissemination center program, NASAhas experi-
mented with ways to expand the RDC/IACinformation base, reach new groups
of users, and improve the services offered. Developments in each of these
areas are discussed below.
Through NASA's efforts, the centers' information base has grown into
one of the world's largest repositories of technical data, including informa-
tion from the Department of Defense and articles from scholarly journals
as well as NASAtechnical data. Recognizing that its computer programs are
a valuable type of information in themselves, NASAopened the ComputerSoft-
ware Managementand Information Center (COSMIC)at the University of Georgia
in 1966. Although not technically an IAC, COSMICprovides interested users
with access to NASAand other agency computer programs in much the same
way an IAC provides access to technical articles.
Attracting new users has always been one of the biggest concerns for the
dissemination center program. Early in the program, George S. Simpson, Jr.,
Assistant Administrator for Technology, Utilization and Policy Planning,
described the purpose of the RDCas ". to make the total of NASAscientific
and technical information available on a local basis, so that the private
13
user can comedirectly into contact with it in a routine fashion." While
the RDCs/IACshave been distributed geographically around the country,
they have never been "local" sources of information for the majority of po-
tential users. Six or eight centers cannot be expected to provide a high level
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TABLE 2
NASA REGIONAL DISSEMINATION CENTERS
Name Organization Location Began Full
Operation
Aerospace Research
Applications Center
(ARAC)
Center for Application
of Sciences & Tech-
nology (CAST)
Knowledge Availability
Systems Center (KASC)
New England Research
Application Center
(NERAC)
North Carolina Science
& Technology Research
Center (NC/STRC)
Project ASTRA
Technology Application
Center (TAC)
Western Research
Application Center
(WESRAC)
Kerr Industrial Appli-
cations Center (KIAC)
Indiana Bloomington,
University Indiana
Wayne State Detroit,
University Michigan
University of
Pittsburgh
University of
Connecticut
Research
Triangle
Institute
Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania
Storrs,
Connecticut
Research
Triangle Park,
North Carolina
September 1963
July 1964
September 1964
July 1967
November 1964
Midwest Research Kansas City, May 1962
Institute Missouri
University of
New Mexico
Albuquerque,
New Mexico
Los Angeles,
California
University of
Southern
California
Southeastern Durant,
Oklahoma Oklahoma
State
University
March 1966
April 1967
July 1978
of local accessibility. To illustrate this point, consider the RDC/IAC
in comparison to another well known information dissemination system: the
Department of Agriculture's county extension agents. While a county agent
is truly available on a local level, the closest IAC is often located far
from the potential user. In fact, potential users often are not aware
of the existence of NASA dissemination centers.
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NASAhas undertaken several measures to address this problem. In the
mid seventies, it established outreach offices for the IACs in highly urban
areas, such as San Francisco, Chicago, and Dallas. The personnel at these
offices acted as "sales agents" to identify potential customers and provide
them with access to an IAC outside their immediate geographic area. Further-
more, the agency placed representatives of the IACs at selected NASAfield
centers to coordinate technical responses to customer inquiries. NASA
placed advertisements in periodicals to expand the public's awareness of the
availability of NASAtechnical information. In cooperation with other
government agencies, such as the Small Business Administration. NASAalso
sponsored conferences on seminars which publicized NASA's technology transfer
programs. Despite these efforts, customer awareness remains one of the big-
gest problems for the IAC program.
NASAalso has taken steps to expand its customer base by using existing
mechanismsto identify state and local government and industrial clients.
Experimental programs were launced in FY 1977 to establish state applications
centers in conjunction with the Universities of Florida and Kentucky. These
programs operated much like IACs to provide technical assistance on a state
and local level, but they concentrated on a particular state instead of a
region, and they focused on small businesses and less industrialized areas.
In addition to expanding its information and customer base, the dis-
semination center program sought to improve the quality of its services by
emphasizing personal contact at the RDCs/IACs. IAC applications engineers
were appointed to assist the user in defining his problem and interpreting
the information uncovered by the computer bank search. The applications
engineer also serves as a liaison between the user and NASA,providing the user
with a meansof pursuing more detailed information on a topic of interest.
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In a 1969 evaluation of the University of NewMexico's Technology Appli-
cation Center (TAC), the Denver Research Institute concluded that this RDC's
14
services were of "substantial value" to researchers. A 1977 study by
Mathtech, Inc. found that the benefits of COSMICoutweighed its costs by
15
a ratio of four to one.
For the program as a whole, one measure of its performance is the level
of industrial contributions received. This assumes that the level of con-
tributions provides an indication of the value industry ascribes to the
services provided. Figure 2 was presented before the U.S. Senate in 1978.
It shows that in 1975, income from industry and contractor cost sharing
surpassed NASA's costs in supporting the IACs and COSMIC.
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Figure 3 provides a comparison of revenue sources for the dissemination
centers in 1972 and 1978. By 1978, the users' share of the total budget
had climbed to 52 percent, up from 30 percent in 1972. While these data
provide evidence of progress in soliciting user support, it is noteworthy
that the centers are not self supporting.
FIGURE 3
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Applications Teams. In recognition that technology is transferred most
effectively through personal contact, NASA launched an experimental effort
in 1967 to promote the application of NASA technology to the biomedical
field through the participation of multidisciplinary teams. These teams,
known as Biomedical Applications Teams, or BATeams, were formed at three
independent research institutes to assist biomedical researchers in iden-
tifying problems impeding their research. Once a problem was identified,
the BATeam would describe it in a "Problem Abstract," conduct a computerized
search for relevant information in the NASA data bank, and circulate the
"Problem Abstract" to NASA laboratories to see whether NASA scientists
and engineers were aware of potential technological solutions for the
problem.
The success of the original BATeams led to the creation of additional
teams in later years. In all, nine teams were created, seven of which were
in operation in 1981. These included BATeams and Technology Application
Teams (TATeams). The TATeams worked in the same manner as the BATeams,
but concentrated on different areas of interest. TATeams have applied their
expertise in fields such as air and water pollution, transportation, and
mine safety.
With the budget cuts of 1981, the number of applications teams was
reduced from seven to two. Compared to the publications program, the
applications team program requires a higher level of funding per contact
with potential users. However, the ratio of successful transfers to the number
of contacts is higher for the applications teams. This is because the ap-
plications teams offer the benefits of personal contact, which include
quick response to user questions and commitment to overcoming the barriers
to transfer. In short, the applications teams provide champions or catalysts
for change who will actively promote technology transfer.
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Personal involvement with technology transfer not only affects the success
of the transfer, but also the types of transfer which occur. It has not
always been clear why NASAhas pursued transfers in particular fields.
As often as not, the areas of transfer seemto reflect the interests and
know-howof the transfer agents as muchas any defined agency objective.
Applications Pro_ects. Applications projects go one step beyond the
identification of problems and potential solutions. Daniel J. Harnett, then
Assistant Administrator for Industry Affairs and Technology Utilization,
raised the concept of applications projects in testimony before the U.S.
Senate in 1971:
" . We are re-examining our program objectives.
In general, we receive, process, and disseminate
technology but stop there, at the point at which
we make it available to others. It may now be
feasible for us to more actively pursue adapta-
tion, adoption, and utilization by closing the
gap between creating an awareness of new tech- 16
nology and putting it to work in another sector."
In technology applications projects, NASA actually develops a prototype that
can be tested and demonstrated for its usefulness. An applications project
may be initiated by a request from a government agency, the efforts of a
NASA technologist, or through the work of an applications team.
By their very nature, the applications projects tend to be ad hoc
efforts. They are an expensive but effective means of transfer, which relies
on a change advocate or champion to accomplish the technology application.
In its 1977 analysis of selected applications projects, Mathtech found
the benefits of these projects to consistently outweigh their costs.
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NASA's Technology Utilization Program Today
In its present form, the NASA TU Program is the embodiment of lessons
learned, administrative priorities, and financial constraints. Through
experimentation with technology transfer, NASA has developed a better (but
by no means complete) understanding of how the process can be promoted in
a programmatic way. In the TU Program's fifth year of operation, Lesher
summarized some conclusions about technology transfer and the TU Program.
Several of these lessons are particularly relevant to the present discussion:
• " . technology utilization must be viewed as a mission for
the entire institution, not as a separate secondary effort.
• . . a technology utilization program must be geared to the
provision of services, not just abstracts, indexes, or docu-
ments.
• . . . all services must have built-in measures of effectiveness--
and, for us, the marketplace has proved the most effective
measure."17
By these standards, the TU Program in its present form is neither a
complete success nor a failure. Institutionally, the TU Program usually
has been positioned within the administrative structure of NASA in such a way
that it can serve all the major mission areas. However, the TU Program, the
TU Officers, New Technology Reporting, and applications projects are still
largely regarded as a "separate, secondary effort." The TU Program has
gone beyond the provision of abstracts and documents to the provision of
services, but these activities have been constrained by budget considerations.
While NASA has measured its program in the marketplace and documented in-
creases in requests for publications and user financial support, its IAC
program has not achieved self sufficiency, the ultimate measure of accep-
tance in the marketplace.
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It is in the provision of services, "not just abstracts, indexes, or
documents," that the development of the TU Program has been most noteworthy.
The use of applications engineers at the IACs, the work of the applications
teams, and the successful applications projects reflect the most innovative
approaches NASAhas taken to technology transfer. These measuresreflect
NASA'sconviction that technology transfer includes " . working contin-
ually with potential users to identify technological demandsor needs;
creating an infrastructure of problem-solving transfer agents or gate keepers;
and perhaps most importantly, serving as champions and catalysts of the
18technology transfer process itself."
These types of measures also a_e the most expensive in terms of cost per
user contacted. As such, they are vulnerable to budget cuts and perhaps are
more dispensable than the publications program. In times of significant
budgetary constraints, publications provide a way of making information
available to a wide audience at a relatively low cost. Whether a transfer
is actually accomplished, however, will depend on the initiative of the po-
tential user to find the right information, get his questions answered, and
hurdle the obstacles of application.
Today the TUProgram dependson four methods to promote technology trans-
fer: (i) publications, (2) dissemination centers, (3) applications teams,
and (4) applications projects. Experimentation within the program has been
slowed by budget constraints as well as the natural formalization of the pro-
gram over time. The level of activity (such as the number of applications
teams in operation) has been reduced due to fiscal considerations. In light
of funding restraints, the program's present challenge is to maximize the
effectiveness of its efforts so that progress continues in making transfers
as well as in learning about the technology transfer process itself.
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FACTORSENHANCINGTHECOMPETITIVEPOSTUREOF
FOREIGNHIGHTECHNOLOGY
I. INTKODUCTION
Anyone watching the trends in international trade over the last two
decades knows that the United States is playing a proportionately
smaller role in the world economy. For example, a recent analysis by the
Office of Foreign Economic Research, Bureau of International Labor Affairs,
U.S. Department of L_o_j £_und that U.S. explore_shares between 1970
and 1977 for 102 manufactured commodities had trend declines in 71% of these
I
commodities compared to 26% for Japan and 24% for West Germany. Furthermore,
an analysis of U.S. export performance in third country markets compared to
that of Japan, the U.K., West Germany, and France showed tha t of the top 17
U.S. export commodities, all 17 showed losses to these competitors between
1970 and 1977.
Certain agricultural products, and high technology products, such as
aircraft, computers, chemicals, and machinery products traditionally have
been a source of strength in the U.S. trade balance. The U.S. dominance
in world trade of high technology markets is being rapidly eroded, however,
to the point that (third country markets aside) there is increased competition
from foreign producers in the U.S. domestic market. This is particularly
significant because these are among the sectors of the U.S. economy which
contribute the most to productivity growth, to holding down inflation, and to
creating jobs. (In fact, a recent U.S. Department of Commerce report showed
that high technology companies created jobs 88% faster than other businesses
2
between 1957 and 1973. )
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It should comeas no surprise that, in the face of an increasing accumu-
lation of physical capital and semiskilled labor in the developing countries.
they have becomeincreasingly competitive in those low technology commo-
dities traditionally representing U.S. comparative advantage--even in the U.S.
domestic market. However, major inroads have been made into U.S. domestic
and export markets in other industries where economics of scale in production
are critical, and/or where there are only small, inefficient producers or
major producers serving only the U.S. market. 3 It has been asserted that to
be competitive internationally a firm or technology must first be competitive
4in its own domestic market. Becauseincreasing competition is being felt
by U.S. producers of high technology in their ownhomemarket, it is useful
to determine what factors, both at homeand abroad_have contributed to this
state of affairs.
Foreign technology maybe deemedas competitive in the U.S. market if
it is viewed by the purchaser as comparable in quality, price, performance and
overall delivery and servicing requirements and/or provisions. Primary empha-
sis is placed on the cost effectiveness of the purchase based on and compared
to technological alternatives offered by competitors. Given this, two
related facts are especially pertinent: one, that innovation leading to in-
creased productivity (and therefore decreased cost per unit of manufactured out-
put) is a pr&mary determinan,t of competitiveness; and two, that the U.S. ratc
of productivity growth is the lowest of all the developed countries except
5the U.K. (See Table I below.) Germany,France, and Japan all are outpacing
the U.S. in productivity growth, and the pressure felt by U.S. high tech-
nology producers in the domestic market is exerted principally from Japan,
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and to someextent, from Germany. Therefore, while the body of this discussion
will introduce data from all four major competitors (Japan, Germany, France,
and the U.K.), the primary emphasiswill be placed on Japan, and secondary
emphasis will be on Germany. Data for other countries will be introduced
only to provide examples of particularly important factors contributing to
the competitiveness of their high technology exports.
TABLEI
Internationalindicesof L bor
Output per Hour o.f
Manufacturing Workers,
Normalized to 1967
Productivity
200
180
160
140
120
Japan
France .//
_ I z f I !
100,67 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78
Source: "Productivity," U.S. Congress, House, Joint Economic Committee,
Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. Hearings Before
the Committee June 5, 19791 p. 3.
C-4
II. GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
Several types of government policies and programs abroad both actively
and passively support economic expansion and productivity in general, and the
development of high technology and innovation specifically. Some are "global"
in that they are not focused on specific industries or technologies, and
their impact on the enhancement of innovation, productivity, and competitive-
ness is intended to strengthen general national competitiveness and facili-
tate a more productive economy. Selective technological innovation programs,
on the other hand, are designed to encourage specific industries or technolo-
gies, and represent a direct government intrusion into the market place. 6usually
A. GLOBAL PROGRAMS AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS ENCOURAGING INDUSTRY--AND NATION WIDE
INNOVATION, PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITIVENESS.
i. Industrial Restructuring Plans and "Administrative Guidance." Given the
continuously intensifying level of international competition, major foreign
industrial programs generally have moved away from relatively short term,
defensive industrial policies, to longer term well coordinated offensive
industrial policies. In Japan, for example, the national economy has not
been left to the free play of market forces. At the end of World War II,
it was perceived that a well planned and coordinated economic policy was
necessary to put the country back on its feet by assuring that scarce re-
sources were allocated to those sectors of the economy which could produce
the best results. Accordingly, the Japanese government undertook to
identify objectives and priorities for the Japanese economy. The govern-
ment of J_pan is characterized as being a "well structured planning
organization" with effective coordination between legislative and execu-
7
tive branches, thereby assuring compatibility of goals and approaches.
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Industrial policy is tied closely to national development policy.
While there is only a limited legal basis for the government's involvement
in the private sector, the "administrative guidance" that takes place is
based on a history of close communication between the Japanese business com-
munity and the government that began with the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912).8
Furthermore, the acceptance of government goals and priorities by the
business community is based on two factors:
• "A reluctance on the part of both business and government to uni-
laterally adopt policies or undertake major moves in the high
priority sectors of the economy without consulting each other;
• a propensity, which all Japanese share, for a consensual approach
to harmonizing differences that may exist within as well as between
each group.
The relationship is also based upon a spirit of confidence and
trust and in a conviction that such a relationship is the most efficient
way to achieve a high rate of growth for both the business community
specifically and the country in general. It is interesting to note that,
possibly as a result of the tendency to mediate disputes and avoid con-
frontations, Japan has roughly 1/30th the number of lawyers as does the
U.S.,IO with roughly half the total population. This also reflects a pre-
dominantly leadership-oriented, rather than regulatory, government approach
toward business.
Even in the face of the above, it would not seem reasonable to term
the Japanese economy as "planned" in the communist or socialist sense,
even though the contact and coordination between government and business
is close. Some feel that it is, in fact, difficult if not impossible to
make a clear distinction between government and business. The terms "mixed
economy," "consent economy" and "sponsored capitalism" have been used to
describe the government guidance to private sector activity. IIsystem of
It has been pointed out that industry does not always follow government
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direction, and occasionally works without significant government assistance
on major efforts. Onetime, for example, the government felt that Japan
could not compete in the automobile industry since the market was dominated
by the U.S. Even though they were deprived of preferential government finan-
12
cial treatment, the industry proved innovative and becamesuccessful. The
point is that:
"The administrative bureaucracy exerts a powerful influence
on the course and shape of Japanese development. It promotes, pro-
jects, controls, regulates, and often manageseconomic activity. In
doing so, government consults frequently with the industry and firms
involved, both before and during the implementation of measures
and programs adopted. ''13
Within this general approach, national economic plans are developed
under the direction of the Prime Minister and prepared by the Economic
Planning Agency (EPA) assisted by representatives from business, and to
a lesser degree, universities, research institutes, and the press. Targeted
industries are selected by the EPA, broad objectives for the economy are
set and forecasts of production and investment levels are made to provide
industry with a plan of the forecast direction of the economy. Industrial
planning is then carried out by the Ministry of International Trade and In-
dustry (MITI) in close collaboration with businessmen. Specific industry-by-
industry goals are set within the framework of the EPA plan. These plans and
goals are set on the basis of a number of factors, including everything from
foreign policy and foreign aid objectives to projected make up of the Japanese
labor pool, and indepth analyses of technologies and markets. Once such "plans"
are set, whether by negotiation, consensus, or threat, (depending on your
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perspective) a direct effort is madeby the government to assure that _s
objectives are met. Fiscal, financial, material, and other incentives are used.
2. Special Tax and Depreciation Measures. Tax and depreciation incentives
for investment in productivity, innovation, and RiD are extremely important
and are widely used in Japan and Europe. In Japan, for example, there were
special tax exemptions and accelerated depreciation rates were granted to
export-oriented industries in the 1950's and 1960's (such as textiles, steel,
chemicals, and consumer electronics) to encourage the buildup of foreign
exchange reserves and to finance imports of technology and equipment.
Currently, Japan offers special tax treatment for RiD expenses in industry,
and special tax treatment for corporate incomes derived from exporting
technology. Both Germany and Japan offer special tax treatment of grants
14
from private sources to promote science and technology.
In Japan, France, Germany, and the U.K., further tax incentives are
offered to companies complying with government industrial policy. Qualify-
ing plant and equipment are eligible for up to 100% first year depreciation
allowances in the U.K. (50% in France), and in some cases organizations
engaged in scientific research are exempt from corporate taxes. Tax de-
ductions for investment in RiD are nearly universal, and in Japan there
is even special tax treatment of inventor's costs and income. Germany also
offers fiscal incentives for extra-professional scientific work.
3. Preferential Financing Provisions. In Japan, the New Technology Develop-
ment Corporation ( a government corporation) gives special financial assist-
ance to firms commercializing research results. If the venture is not
successful, the loan need not be repaid. In addition, the Corporation
undertakes to introduce government and university developed research to
companies for commercialization under the above terms. In general,
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preferential loans are offered by banks to high priority industries and
technologies in accordance with the national and economic development
plans developed by the EPAand MITI. Since the Japanese government owns
the banks, this constitutes a subsidy for high technology high growth,
high productivity industries. Becausethe average net worth of Japanese
corporations is only about 20%,they are highly leveraged by such bank
loans. This high debt/equity ratio facilities Japanese government in-
fluence in the allocation of financial resources and enhances control
over Japanese industrial developmentthrough government ownedbanks.
Direct financial assistance also is offered in Japan through a number
of MITI, Japan Development Bank, Small Business Finance Corporation, Minis-
terial, and other agencies' activities which subsidize R&Dfor "important
technology," technological improvement, and applied technologies of various
types. Similarly in France, Germany,and the U.K., various direct finan-
cial assistance packages are offered. Interest free forgivable loans
(such as under the First Innovation Program in Germany), grants (e.g.,
Financial Support for R&Din Industry Program, in U.K.), equity sharing
(in France), and other subsidies are granted to targeted industries.
In manycases, small and mediumindustry is favored by special programs
which subsidize salary and other costs for R&Dstaff, internal and ex-
ternal research projects, modernization, managementimprovement, energy
15
conservation, joint ventures, structural improvement, etc.
Other specific forms of direct financial assistance of interest
include the European Recovery Program Special Fund, comprising DM500
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million (1978) in loans to targeted small and mediumsized firms in
Germany,and the R&DIndustry Program in the U.K., which supports small
firms, research associations, and university R&Dwith $9.5 million/year.
The U.K. National Research and Development Corporation supports joint
ventures with industry. In France, the government offers grants for
16industrial modernization and funding for new enterprises.
In manycases the above direct financial assistance, in addition to
loan guarantees, insurance assistance, government certification, interest
subsidies, etc. are offered in response to a failure of liberal tax in-
centives to provide the basis for internal companyventure capital forma-
tion. Becauseof cultural and/or structural impediments in Japan, Germany,
and France, the U.K. is the only one of the four countries with any signi-
ficant numberof private venture capital companies. In any event, such
direct subsidization is granted on the premise that selective public in-
vestment in private industry will be repaid in the form of national and
sectorial competitiveness, productivity, and efficiency.
4. Aid to Cooperative Research And The Use Of Government R&D Facilities
By And For Industry. Complex research projects involving the resources of
diverse technical fields, industries, universities and government facilities
are more and more often promoted and coordinated by governments. Most
foreign cooperative R&D programs support both the development of tech-
nology for a specific targeted industry, and also the development of
technologies to be used by a number of firms or industries. They also
often support specific projects at individual firms in addition to industry
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wide work at research institutions. Other than the U.S., all of the world's
industrialized countries have at least one formal mechanismfor supporting
cooperative R&Dbetween government, industry, and academia, and such tri-
partite arrangements clearly spearheadefforts at innovation and productivity
improvement. The role of the government is of direction, leadership, and
coordination of the national effort_ and funding. The role of industry
is not only to provide funding, but also to utilize the research results in
the proprietary development of its products. The role of the universities
is to carry out the research and to assist in the implementation of the
results. The Germansand the Japanesehave decided that, especially in
new fields emerging from the confluence of many technologies, the most
effective way in which to utilize diverse and decentralized research re-
sources is on a cooperative, cost-sharing basis. Manyexperts agree that
such cooperation is a necessary prerequisite to a dynamic industrial policy,
and that it is effective in enhancing national and sectoral innovation and
productivity and, therefore, competitiveness.
Examplesof such cooperative R&Dprograms abound. In Japan, the
Synthetic R&DProjects _ogram provides financial aid to industry to pro-
mote joint R&Dbetween governmentresearch institutes, industries, and
universities. This is done through the Science and Technology Agency, the
Agency of Industrial Science and Technology and numerousministerial and
other research corporations oriented toward specific technologies. In
Germany,80 research associations in 31 branches in industry used DM67
million in fiscal year 1979 in joint R&D. In England there are more than
50 industrial research associations involved in cooperative R&Dwith industry.
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In France, efforts are being madeto push ahead in the areas of information
processing, microelectronics, consumerelectronics, and automation through
strong government-industry cooperation in 14 national projects under the
17Ministry of Research and Technology.
GovernmentR&Dfacilities in manycountries are madeavailable to
perform research for individual firms on a fee basis. The West German
Fraunhofer Society for the Promotion of Applied Research, the U.K. Atomic
Energy Harwell Research Establishment, France's Delegation General a La
Recherch Scientifique et Technique, and Japan's Agency of Industrial Science
and Technology (amongat least 21 others in Japan) are all available for
this purpose. Several governmentsgive grants to small, innovative firms
which maybe used to purchase research services from such facilities. 18
It is worthy of note that, with the blessings of their governments,
European corporations are entering into complex joint ventures to acquire
19technology from the U.S. and Japan. Having put together a four-way
venture in telecommunications, the chief executive of AEG-Telefunken
recently said that this was doneprimarily because, without such co-
operation, AEGcould not even reach the break-even point on manyproducts.
5. Technology Information And Transfer Service. The promotion of cooperative
research is also achieved through non-traditional modes of interaction and
the exchange of information. Japan's New Technology Development Interaction
Program and Synthetic R&D Projects, and Germany's Advisory Committee System
interconnecting industries and R&D institute boards, and the Max Planck
Gasellschaft are all oriented toward specifically enhancing information
exchange between industry and universities.
C-12
Specialized Information Centers in key scientific and technological
areas in all four countries, but Japan, especially, have been charac-
20terized as excellent environments for information gathering. NIST
(National Circulation of S&TInformation), the Japan Patent Information
Center, Oceanic Science and Technology Center, and at least seven other
agencies are designed specifically to transfer technical information and
expertise. In addition, there are numerousorganizations which do so as
an important ancillary service coincidental to their primary R&Dactivity.
Information gathering in Japan maybe viewed as something of an ob-
session. The Japanese continually send groups all over the world to visit
countries and find out what is happening in economics, technology, and
other areas. Japan has about 45 English speaking correspondents in Wash-
, , 3''21ington, D.C. alone while there are "perhaps U.S. correspondents
in Japan who can speak Japanese. This is indicative of a highly developed
consciousness of the necessity to go to where the information is and
procure it in the most efficient manner.
6. Regulatory Provisions and Enforcement. Government regulations of
various types have a significant influence on innovation and productivity,
and therefore on competitiveness. In Japan, enforcement of anti-pollution
and anti-monopoly regulations historically has been lax. Currently,
however, there are more than 14 anti-pollution laws in addition to the 1967
Anti-Pollution Measures Basic Law which are being more stringently enforced
as a result of a rapidly deteriorating environmental situation in the 1960's
and 1970's. Since 1975 many industries have been required to spend as much
as 20-30% of their investment capital on pollution control and abatement
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equipment. At the sametime, however,"the Japanese government sometimes
encourages the mergers and technical cooperation amongcompeting companies
to strengthen their economicbase. ''23 Frequently, in times of economic
recession, the governmenthas allowed industries to engage in price fixing.
A similar situation exists in Germany. There is a general attitude that
environmental restrictions will be enforced to the extent practical,
ensuring continued gains in productivity, but not to preserve what might
be regarded as inappropriate or unreasonable standards. Government
seeks industry participation in the formulation of regulations; and there
is somefeeling that regulating agencies should determine the "ends" to
be achieved, while allowing industry to determine the necessary "means"
to achieve those ends.
7. Employment Adjustment Programs. The impact of technology on employment
promises to be considerable in the future. Bearing in mind the constant
search for labor saving devices, the use of robots, etc., governments
have initiated numerous programs to insure continuing labor-management
harmony, reduce labor resistence to displacement by technology introduced
to production lines (and elsewhere), and to encourage the conversion of
labor from lower to higher technology occupations. Japan and Germany
both offer free job placement and advice, pay for advanced training and
re-training, and maintain formal systems to encourage employment stabil-
24
ization. The Japanese rely heavily on lifetime employment systems
in larger corporations to maintain employment, re-train displaced em-
ployees and send them to other operational departments in the company.
This is done with the assistance of government loans, grants or other
subsidy support.
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8. Export Promotion. Because of its near total dependence on imports
for energy, raw material, and other resources, Japan has developed policies
and programs to promote the export of manufactured goods. Govern-
ment financial incentives to export high technology specifically include
special loans to cover export insurance and risks occurring as a result of
foreign exchange fluctuations. There are special tax incentives taking
the form of deductions on income from technology exports. For example,
certain exporters can deduct a part of export income as a business cost
if it is saved as a reserve for developing overseas markets. There is a
proportionately larger depreciation allowance for capital equipment used
to manufacture exports, and various reserves to cover overseas investment
risks. Additionally, marketing assistance is provided by JETRO (Japanese
External Trade Organization--a government agency) through information
services, and a number of sophisticated general purpose trading companies
provide a "one stop" source for the full range of services which are
required to sell a wide variety of products abroad. These trading
companies are particularly important vehicles for information gathering
and dissemination because they have offices around the world. They do
from $30 billion to $60 billion worth of business per year and provide
valuable services, especially to small and medium sized companies that do
not have the resources to otherwise compete internationally.
The governments of Japan, the U.K., and France all offer substanti-
ally more official and more complete export financing packages than does
the U.S. Japan, Western Europe, and the U.S. have all agreed to maintain
currently available terms for export financing at their current levels
until further notice, leaving the U.S. at a continuing cooperative dis-
25
advantage.
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All of the above "global" policies and programs point to a concen-
trated effort to encourage industrial development as an integral
and logical componentof a larger, longer range national economic develop-
ment scheme. Manyhave pointed out that such long range planning and govern-
ment support for industrial or technological development enables industry
to concentrate on long range considerations such as market share lending to
long term profits, and that this allows them to be less concerned with short
26
term profits, like their U.S. competitors. Others point out that such
planning and coordination betweengovernment and business would never be
possible in the U.S., given the traditional adversary posture between the
27U.S. government and the private sector. Still others state that, even
given a relaxation of that adversary posture, it is doubtful if the U.S.
possesses adequate talent to engagein such exercises as national economic
28planning. Such long range planning and cooperation between government
and industry as manifested in the policies and programs described
above have greatly enhancedthe competitive stature of Japanese (and other
countries_) industries in the U.S. high technology market.
B. SPECIFICPROGRAMSTO ENHANCEINNOVATION,PRODUCTIVITY,ANDCOMPETITIVENESS
IN SELECTEDINDUSTRIESANDTECHNOLOGIES
There are several notably successful programs specilically aevotea
to promoting the development of selected industries and technologies in a
number of countries, especially Germanyand Japan. While manygovernments,
including the U.S., offer support of various types to industries and sectors
in structural decline, these generally are not in high technology areas, but
rather in sectors such as shoes, textiles, clothing, ship building, steel,
foundries, etc. Specific defensive measures in support of such industries
world wide have included everything from nationalization, subsidization and
reorganization to special tax considerations and trade protection.
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Of more direct interest are measureswhich promote high
technology, high growth industries. It has been suggested that one reason
for the disparity in growth and productivity rates between U_S. and Japan-
ese industry is because the U.S. generally only subsidizes low productivity
industry, while Japan generally only subsidizes high productivity industry. 29
It is worth noting that both Japan and Germanymakean effort to develop
industries which utilize technologies not easily adopted by the developing
30countries.
In Japan and Western Europeancountries there are several programs
designed specifically to support high priority, high growth industries. For
example, the following are estimates of direct Japanese government assistance
to industries for R&Din 1977:31
- Chemicals ¥ 1.1 billion
- Ceramics ¥ .4 billion
- Iron & steel ¥ .6 billion
- Nonferrous ¥ .4 billion
- Machinery ¥ 3.5 billion
- Electrical machinery ¥ 7.5 billion (includes computers)
- Transportation (non-auto) ¥ 12.2 billion
- Special corporations for promoting R&Dalso contributed ¥ 8.7 billion
During the 1970's the Japanesegovernment (MITI) committed $350 million to
a research project for very large scale integrated circuits, and it is esti-
mated that during the sameperiod companies spent 20 times more on the same
"project. ''32 Companiesobtained funds for the work through banks offering_con-
cessionary loans. In 1981MITI persuaded 14 J_anese co_panies to join a research
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association in the field of genetic engineering to conduct an estimated
$150 million in government sponsored research. 33 Governmentspending in
the area of energy research (conservation, coal liquifaction and gas-
sification, alternative energy) is roughly $2.5 billion per year. MITI
has pledged $450 million to a i0 year R&Dproject in ceramics and new
34plastics.
All of the above are in addition to the previously described "global"
programs and policies.
The Japanese government, in its Industrial Policy Vision of the 1980's,
identifies the following targeted technologies and industries:
- optical fibers
- ceramic materials
- amorphous materials
- high efficiency resins
- coal liquefaction
- coal gasification
- nuclear power
- solar energy
- deep geothermal generation
- ultra high speed computer
- space development
- ocean development
- specialized aircraft 35
Development of these areas will be promoted through direct government
R&D funding, made more efficient through mechanisms promoting cooperative/
joint R&Djand the availability of government R&D facilities, and made cheaper
C-18
and more attractive through the various tax and other policies encouraging
their implementation.
Likewise, West Germanyhas several programs designed to promote the
development of specific technologies. Amongthem:
- electronic components
- communications and information techniques
- physical technologies under threshold conditions
- optics and measuring techniques
- control engineering
- power engineering
- materials technology
- processing engineering construction techniques and manufacturing
techniques
- mining processes
- innovation in small businesses
- nuclear technology
- civil aircraft development
36
- data processing
The Germangovernmentwill spend $135 million over the next three
37
years to help companiesapply microelectronics to new products. Utilizing
the tripartite action of government, industry, and the universities, the
Germangovernmenthas funded a massive program of manufacturing technology
R&Ddesigned to have the greatest impact on industrial manufacturing producti-
vity. The greatest share of the research, development, and the implementation
is toward "the applications of the computer to on-line optimization and auto-
mation of both the soft and hard componentsof the total manufacturing system''--38
computer integrated manufacturing. This represents a concrete manifestation
of the cooperative/joint research mechanismdescribed above under global
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programs, and its efficiency is enhancedby the availability of facilities
from AIF (Federation of Industrial Research Associations--80 such associations
in 31 branches of industry) and FLG(Fraunhofer Society for the Advancementof
Applied Research).
In the U.K., several programs directly finance industrial high tech-
nology development. For example:
- ComputerMerger Scheme,DevelopmentContracts Scheme,and Advanced
ComputerTechnology Project have provided $2 million in contracts
to computer R&Dfirms, $36 million in grants in high priority
R&D,and $1.3 million in annual investment in advanced computer
R&D.
- Department of Industry--several schemesin energy conservation, pro-
duct and process development, and micro-processor applications.
- R&DRequirements Boards support chemicals and minerals; engineering
materials; mechanical engineering and machine tools; computers,
systems, and electronics; space technology; and civil aircraft
technology R&D.
- High Technology Department of Industry Sectoral Industry Schemes
in electronic components, instrumentation and automation, and
microelectronics.
Other governmentprograms directed $13 million into R&Dat three leading
electronics firms and $24 million into telecommunications in 1979.
In France, efforts are being madeto transform the nation's electronics
industry into a single, integrated whole by investing in 14 national projects
in areas of speech synthesis and recognition modules, computer aided design
and manufacturing systems, mini- and micro-computers, and a very large main-
frame computer model.
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These efforts by the Japanese, German, French and U.K. governments rep-
resent a direct intrusion into the market place and constitute direct subsi-
dies of technological development. In looking at the technologies selected
for support, it seemsthat targets are chosen on the basis of their higher
chances for competitive success in the market place.
III. OTHER FACTORS ENCOURAGING INNOVATION, PRODUCTIVITY, AND COMPETITIVENESS
IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
In addition to the formal policies and programs described above there
are several other factors contributing to the rapid growth and productivity,
and therefore competitiveness, of foreign high technology industry. While
many of these factors are directly related to, or occur as a result of, such
policy/program incentives, some appear to have been preexisting and have
actually encouraged such policies/programs.
A. CAPITAL INVESTMENTS
Many industries in Japan maintain what is called a i0 year "scrap and
rebuild plan" to remain competitive in international markets. 39 This reflects
the availability of large amounts of capital and provisions for accelerated
depreciation offered to high priority, high growth, high productivity indus-
tries. Such industries are, as previously mentioned, heavily debt financed,
and as the Japanese government owns the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Japan
owns the commercial banks, preferential financing (and perhaps financing
period) is available only to targeted industries. Furthermore, the Japanese
government backstops the banks, thus giving them greater security in under-
taking risky investments and loans.
The large amounts of capital needed for these investments are made
available because of the 20 plus percent of disposal income savings
rate of the Japanese worker. (See Table II below.) This rate of
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TABLE II
R_I PerCap_ Bispo_Ne PCm_alIncome,
1978 Dollars
25,000
Japanese Rate
(Projected}
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
Source: "Productivity," U.S. Congress, House, Joint Economic Committee,
Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. Hearings Before
the Committee June 5, 1979_ p. 4.
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savings helped to maintain an annual level of investment in plant
and equipment of 29%of real output between 1962and 1972.40 In 1978, Japan
allocated 10.9%of GNPto gross fixed capital formation in machinery and equip-
ment (the U.S. allocated 7.3 %, Germany8.9%, France 9.1% and U.K. 9.2% in
the sameyear).41
The capital available per worker in Japan increased by 10.1%per year
between 1963 and 1975 (compared to 1.7% for the U.S.), while the Japanese
share of world capital doubled from 7 to 15%(the U.S. share declined from
42%to 33%) in the sameperiod. 42 Foreign high technology competition may
well continue and in fact increase in the 1980's because the U.S. continues
to lag behind Japan and Western Europe in net real investment growth, and is,
in fact, maintaining the lowest rate of productivity growth of all our major
competitors except the U.K.
B. TECHNOLOGICALINNOVATION- R&D
The official stance at the U.S. Office of the Japanese Productivity
Center is that the importance of technological breakthroughs in increasing
43
productivity cannot be overemphasized. Studies by experts in the past tend
to substantiate this stance, as indicated by the following table:
TABLEIII
CONTRIBUTIONTOPRODUCTIVITYINCREASES
[In percent]
Studies Labor Capital Technology
Denison................ 18
Kendrick ............... 10
Christenson, Cummings,and Jorgenson 14
Average ............. 14
20 62
18 72
42 44
27 59
Source: "Productivity," U.S. Congress, House, Joint Economic Committee,
Washington, D.C., U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1979. Hearings Before
the Committee June 5, 1979_ p. 16.
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On average, technology is viewed as the leading contributor to productivity
improvement. And yet, according to the OECD,U.S. Governmentspending on
civilian industrial growth in total (not only R&D) in 1976 was the lowest of
all the developed countries both in absolute terms and as a proportion of total
44
government spending. Japanese investment in industrial R&D consistently has
outstripped U.S. investment over the last decade. Japanese total R&D invest-
ment reached a level of 2.5% of GNP in 1981 compared to about 2% for the U.S. 45
It is important to note that the U.S. figure also includes space exploration
and weapons production, whereas nearly all of the Japanese figure went to
R&D for commercial products and processes. In addition, U.S. industry funds
only 44% of total R&D compared to Japan's industry rate of 71%. 46 Perhaps
even more important is a comparison of the downward trend in percentage of
GNP devoted to total R&D in the U.S. and the upward trend in Japan, Germany,
France, etc.
Japan has placed heavy emphasis on the development of high speed and
large-scale computers, peripheral equipment, medical electronics, and com-
munications equipment R&D. Wherever a serious attempt is made to develop
practical industrial applications of high technology to increase productivity,
industrial efforts are met with enthusiastic encouragement by the government,
as evidenced by the various general and specific policies and programs des-
cribed above.
In addition to conducting basic and innovative R&D at home, the
Japanese are known as masters at improving on other nation's products and
processes. Over the past 30 years, Japanese firms have spent more than
$30 billion in fees and royalties for foreign technology.47 Past successes
are a matter of record, but the tendency for exploiting U.S. technological
achievements continues and the Japanese are known as being among the most
asiduous pursuers of scientific, technological, and industrial information
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48in the U.S. Japanese-U.S. technological cooperation is likely
to be weakenedby the recent Silicon Valley industrial espionage scandal in-
volving employees of Japan's Hitachi, Nissei, and Mitsubishi. Although there
was an outcry deploring these =ompanies' "wretched ways of collecting foreign
49knowhow"in the Japanese press, feelings in the U.S. are plain.
Incentives exist, then, not only to promote the conduct of R&Din Japan,
but also to promote its rapid commercialization, providing the activities
relate to a high growth, priority industry or technology. Given Japan's
emphasis on developing a high technology, knowledge intensive society, nearly
any high technology effort contributing to increased innovation and producti-
vity and to lower costs for industrial output would appear to qualify
for preferential treatment.
In Germany,and elsewhere in Western Europe, the trend also is
toward cooperative R&Dbetween government, industry, and universities, and
targeting specific research areas for government research funding--such as
computer assisted machining and computer integrated manufacturing. In
Fiscal Year 1979, the Germangovernmentcontributed DM67 million to such
cooperative research through 80 research associations in 31 branches of industry.
In the U.K. about 50 industrial research associates participate with the
GovernmentScience Research Council attempts to direct students toward industry
and to administer priority funding in areas of industrial relevance. The French
also aid government, industry and university cooperation through technical
50research contracts and collective research centers.
C. RISE IN THEEDUCATIONALLEVELOFTHEWORKFORCE
The Director of MITI, in a recent interview, said that Japan was "really
trying to create knowledge intensive industries. All industries have to become
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smarter both in the way they makethings and in the amount of knowledge the
products themselves contain. ''51 To achieve these goals, and to improve worker
skills, Japanese companies generally spend more moneyper employee than their
52U.S. counterparts in training workers. While it is true that 48%of U.S.
high school graduates attend college, as opposed to only 42%for the Japanese,
Japanese high school graduates generally are better grounded in science and
mathematics than their U.S. counterparts, and they do considerably better in
international comparative tests, especially in science. Also, a muchhigher
percentage of Japanese students are in engineering (20%undergraduate and 40%
53
post graduate). With only half the population of the U.S., Japan is now
graduating about 20,000 more engineers per year than the U.S. Partly as a
result of a muchgreater effort to meet manpowerneeds through government-
business cooperation, superior scientific, mathematics, and engineering talent
is being developed in Japan even though Japan has fewer teachers per number of
54
students than the U.S.
D. LABOR-MANAGEMENTRELATIONS
In 1977, Japanese corporations were losing about 1.5 million mandays
to strikes per year comparedto the figure of 35 million days in the U.S.55
In managementas well as on the shop floor in Japan, participatory and concen-
sus-based decision making is prevalent. Labor managementcouncils, quality
control circles, and various other worker-oriented voluntary programs have
56
contributed greatly to the workers' sense of security, to increased pro-
57ductivity, cost effectiveness, and quality control in production, and to a
dampeningof labor agitation. 58
The Japanese, and to someextent German, propensity to avoid confronta-
tion has contributed to harmoniousworker-managementrelations. While in the
U.S., the U.K. and elsewhere in varying degrees, labor has agitated against
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the introduction of labor replacement technology, the Japanese have kept un-
employmentto the 2-3% level through corporate life-time employmentsystems and
government sponsored retraining programs. W_eregovernment sponsored programs
do not pay for such training, corporations do. Even in ti_s of economic re-
cession, Japanese corporations do not lay off employees unless bankruptcy is
imminent. If employees are not senior enough to be retired with special bonuses,
they generally are transferred to other companieswhen openings occur. Because
of these policies, Japanese workers see the commitmentmadeto them by the
corporation, and in time realize that their ownprosperity is directly linked
to that of the corporation. Workers know that, by and large, if they are dis-
placed by a technological improvementwhich increases productivity on the
production line and this lowers costs, that this increases profits which go
into other lines of production, and in turn enables the worker to be retrained
and reemployed. Given a high level of labor stability and security, an equally
high degree of mutually directed confidence exists which allows for the rapid
introduction of innovative, labor saving technology which increases productivity,
and therefore competitiveness.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While all four of the U.S.'s major national competitors in high
technology have engaged in an effort to design and implement a national in-
dustrial policy, some have been significantly more successful than others.
It is therefore of little value to note the Japanese success and suggest
that their planning model is worth following elsewhere, given the consider-
able difference between the U.S., Japan, and other national environments.
It may, on the other hand, be useful to examine some of the reasons
why policy, per se, was successful in Japan, and not particularly successful
in, say, the U.K., and see if there may be some lessons to be learned.
Often, it is pointed out that the Japanese political and social system
is dominated by a cultural tradition steeped in highly formalized systems of
etiquette, loyalty, and duty and dominated by a strictly structured hierarchy
of power and roles. A spirit of cooperation and an aversion to confrontation,
it is said, makes the consensual approach to decision making possible and practi-
cal iLL J=_=,, _nd when combined with a p_rvasive patriotism provides for
easier direction of group efforts such as industrial plans. The above could be
offered as at least partial explanation for the Japanese success, but it offers
no hint as to the cause of the U.K. failure, for certainly the British can be
attributed with no less of a traditional love of God, King, country, and "form,"
nor can they be described as thriving on confrontation, although British labor
militancy certainly has had a negative effect.
The secret, at the risk of being simplistic, rests in something deeper,
and more closely tied to what may be described as basic human nature, not
culturaly defined or determined. The basic issue is that of reacting to a
perceived threat and maintaining one's security. Since perception
defines reality for the individual, it is the key word. The Japanese
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perceive, and truly so, that they are an island nation with few natural re-
sources. Japan depends on overseas supplies for 90%of her energy and raw
materials. Shewas left at the end of World War II with a destroyed economy,
the Emperor humiliated, and a crushed national pride. In a way, she had
been overcome, more than by anything else in the final analysis, by tech-
nology. With little arable land and a large population expandedby returning
soldiers and colonists, Japan had to develop an internationally competitive
industrial sector that could both meet domestic demandand also export to
finance required imports of food, energy, and raw materials. It was perceived
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as a question of "adapt or die" at the time, and continues to be. It is
significant to note that the perception has not changedat all from that time
to the present. Japan continues to be highly reliant on imports of energy and
raw materials, continues to have little arable land, and continues to have a
large population. She also continues to react to these threats and to strive
to insure her security. Japaneseare united in facing international com-
petition because they know that if they do not, they will be left behind.
Their exports will no longer be able to finance imports necessary, literally,
for survival. The Japanese view survival as the basic issue.
The U.K., on the other hand, also was left with an economyin ruins.
Its political and social systems were, however, reinforced. The British had,
after all, won the war. There was, therefore, less reason to restructure or
change. Because they were "successful," they were hindered from making changes
in thinking. Given the courage of their convictions, there was little reason
to continue in other than traditional ways, which they largely did.
The radicalism in the restructuring of the Japanese economyre-
flected the high degree to which the Japanese felt threatened. They
also had the benefit of millions of dollars in U.S. aid, advice
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and other assistance. The JapaneseProductivity Center, for example, was
founded by the U.S. State Department as part of the post war reconstruction
assistance program and, until 1962, received about $i million per year in assist-
ance. Put to good use, this assistance provided a meansfor Japanese execu-
tives and engineers to gain a windowon the state of the art in U.S. management
and production processes, and to better understand trends in technology,
industry, and management. A willingness to restructure--to change--combined
with an understanding of current and future technology trends certainly facili-
tated the foundation of successful policy. The Japanese understanding of such
trends and the adequacy of their projections are reflected in their current
success. An accurate perception of economic threat and a willingness to
change to meet it headlong, has played a large role in this success.
Japanese decisions in the planning process have been madeon the basis
of sound business and managementjudgment, basically unhindered by popular
political interference or adherence to ideals of free _nterprise or democracy.
Growth, productivity, and foreign exchange earnings have been the targets.
The U.S. posture in general seemsto be tha_ given a heritage of vast
resources and an innate quality knownas "Yankee ingenuity," the U.S. can
and will rise to any occasion. The problem is that the U.S. depends on ex-
ports less than any other developed nation for its economicwell being.
It has taken years to convince the American people that "exports meanjobs,"
and that it takes exports to finance imports. The characteristic response
of industry and government to foreign competition is to cry "foul," and to decry
"unfair" Japanese managementand government practices and to threaten the
initiation of protectionist measures, rather than to learn from the competition,
and initiate innovative_ practices to improve productivity and competitiveness.
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In addition to the U.S. failure to respond effectively to the changing
international trade environment, there has been little U.S. appreciation
for the real strength of the Japanesethreat because it was asserted that
the Japanese cannot create, only copy. Or that Japan can compete in U.S.
markets only by dumping.
Given an adequate understanding of the true nature of the threat, the
following recommendationswould seemto be in order:
- Put industrial productivity on the samefooting as defense and space
as a matter of national security.
- Identify specific industries as preferential by virtue of their con-
tribution to high technology, productivity, innovation, foreign ex-
change earnings, or other desirable qualities, and offer every practical
incentive to promote their development and advancement.
- Do not subsidize or otherwise support industries in structural decline
at the expense of industry on the ascendancy except in cases of absolute
necessity as dictated by national security interests.
- Recognize the growing competitive advantage of the developing countries
in labor intensive, low productivity, low technology industry, and
divert wasted capital in the U.S. away from such industries which will
not be competitive without protectionist measures that are largely
counterproductive.
- Initiate a meaningful job retraining program to assure the replace-
ment of workers displaced by technology.
- Initiate a public awareness program to prepare the U.S. public for a
high technology future and to better acquaint them with a realistic
role for the U.S. in an international economy undergoing radical change.
- Require scientific and technological curricula for graduation from
U.S. secondary and high schools.
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As nations vie in an ever morehighly competitive modefor a more secure
portion of the high technology market, productivity and the ability to produce
high quality goods at lower prices will be increasingly important. Specifi-
cally, the U.S. will be required to be innovative in formulating its response
to foreign competition strengthened by close cooperation between governments
and industry. It is entirely possible that new models for such cooperation
in America may hold the key to maintaining or increasing U.S. comparative
advantage.
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INDUSTRYPERSPECTIVESONTECHNOLOGYTRANSFER
DRI research staff interviewed executives from a variety of businesses
including high technology (electronics, medical equipment), automobile and
heavy manufacturing, engineering and product development and the investment
capital field. Both large and small firms were represented. The purpose of
these in-depth, semi-structured interviews was to obtain perspective from
industry on the technology transfer challenges facing NASAand the competi-
tive challenges facing the United States.
The areas of discussion included, but were not limited to, the following:
changes in patterns of technology acquisition over the last 20 years; in-
fluences of foreign competition; channels of technology transfer; industrial
patent policy; university linkages; and barriers or incentives to the transfer
of technology or to innovation.
The structural differences between governmentand industry stand out
clearly--one is politically responsive and the other responsive to market
forcesl ....However, even though these differences generate skepticism among
managersof industry, there is strong interest in the possibilities for co-
operation and a realization of what might be gained through searching for
better ways to transfer or exchangetechnology.
Industry Perspective on Government Research and Development
Industry representatives generally believe that government-generated
technology includes many innovations that would be attractive to industry
although there is a feeling that government technology often is too expen-
sive for commercial application without substantial (and expensive) adapta-
tion. Those companies already in contact with NASA Centers such as Lewis
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and Langley have had substantial success in obtaining valuable information
and assistance. If industry and government cooperate in the transfer of
information, the relationship is most effective when it is one of equals,
with NASAscientists and engineers learning from counterparts in industrial
laboratories, and vice versa.
The often adversarial relationship between government and industry needs
to be overcome. There is a traditional perception, greatest in the non-
aerospace and commercial sector, that government does not understand the
needs of industry. Oneexample is NASA's development of a one-of-a-kind
spacecraft. Given that highly specialized and custom crafted expertise,
the obvious questions asked by industrialists are: "How can NASAunder-
stand the problems of manufacturing 150 million silicon chips?" or "What
does NASAknow of the quality control problems of an automotive assembly line?"
NASAdevelopment experience is concentrated in technical avenues of
science and engineering, and reflect little experience with industrial
problem areas of marketing, manufacturing and competitive economics. Even
someaerospace executives perceive NASAas "goldplating" or compulsively
flight qualifying all hardware regardless of cost.
NASAwas cast as typically proposing solutions to problems with little
thought to cost or time constraints. Although this perception of high
quality standards often is a positive one, it makesNASAsolutions appear
too expensive for commercial application without substantial modification.
It was often stated by respondents that NASA'splanning process appears to
lack consideration of potential commercial impacts; a closer relationship
with the affected sectors of industry would be welcomed to enhance potential
technology transfer opportunities. Muchof industry has little interest in
R&Dthat is not clearly linked to products which fit a particular industry's
market objectives.
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In the best of all scenarios for industry, NASAwould include in its
planning priorities consideration of commercial opportunities and the steps
necessary to bring an innovation to the point of operational readiness.
It was recognized by industry officials that this might not be possible given
NASA'smission-oriented goals. Suggestions were madefor a "middleman"
linking mechanismto be established outside commercial industry and govern-
ment. This third party linkage might be found in a university setting or
could be an independent entrepreneur familiar with both NASAresearch and
industrial procedures. This linkage might overcomebarriers between govern-
ment and industry relating to style, organization and scale of costs.
Industry's Environment
As well as understanding the needs and problems of industry, interview
respondents believed that any successful technology transfer program must
also exhibit an awareness and sensitivity to industry constraints, so dif-
ferent from those of government. Industry measures innovative success in
terms of profit dollars generated within a specified payback period. NASA's
measure of success is more in terms of technical objectives met.
The costs of adaptation of a NASA-generated innovation add more burden
to the cost formula. Industry leaders stressed that this adaptation, and
in many cases redesign and engineering costs, often seem to be more than
originally anticipated, which causes the shelving of worthwhile innovations.
The more risk that the government can assume in product or process develop-
ment, the more likely it will be that a firm will be in a position to accept
the remaining cost risks of introducing a process or product into the com-
mercial mainstream. Those costs of adaptation and introduction often were
cited as being up to ten times the cost of the basic technology development.
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If NASAcould select a few projects for development to the operational stage
(and provide someguarantee of exclusive rights), the ratio of successful
application would be higher and generate stronger interest by industry.
Industrial representatives viewed government technology transfer activi-
ties as lacking in the marketing acumenessential for the industrial world.
It was recognized that there is little incentive for NASA's scientists and
engineers to becomeavid champions for the commercial marketing of their
technology. Again, the need for an entrepreneur to match technology to
needs often was mentioned.
Another problem for industry is generating capital for innovation.
The most pessimistic view expressed was that the less government work a
companyengaged in, the better the chances for private venture capital for
innovation. Particularly in the case of small businesses, there is a short-
age of capital for applying government-generated technology. Becausesmall
companies often are not aware of areas of government interest, they miss out
on innovative ideas and chances for contract awards that go to larger firms.
Even highly qualified small engineering development firms cannot afford to
keep current with NASAtechnical needs and cannot afford to risk investment
in technology outside their narrow specialty areas. This could he changed
if very modest funding for proposal preparation were madeavailable by NASA
in areas of specialized innovation needs.
Views on proprietary data issues were mixed. Most conceded that NASA
needed to assure sometype of exclusivity or competitive advantage. In one
case example cited, a government laboratory released the technology for an
implantable insulin pumpand no companypicked up the development option
because exclusive rights were not offered. However, in the semiconductor
industry, patents and licenses often have value only for use in a portfolio
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for trading purposes. The technology is moving so rapidly that patents have
little value as competitive safeguards. The leading companies in the micro-
electronics industry concentrate on moving into an area rapidly, reaping the
benefits and then licensing the technology to someoneelse after only a few
years. Safeguarding industry proprietary information remains a concern in
assessing risks attendant to joint or cooperative endeavors.
Channels of Communication
There was substantial agreement on the importance of personal communi-
cation in technology transfer. While some persons were familiar with NASA's
formal Technology Utilization publications programs, such as NASA Tech Briefs,
they accorded it little weight in comparison with person-to-person communi-
cation. Modest changes and ideas can be generated by paper-based information,
but major transfer of information rarely occurs without sustained individual
attention. The respondents strongly believe that personal networks and oral
communication are the most effective way to secure appropriate information.
Personnel mobility also was mentioned frequently as a favored transfer
mechanism. In fact, technology transfer within the semiconductor industry
is fueled by frequent and competitive personnel transfer. One of the auto-
mobile industry executives stated that, in certain cases, a researcher will
be relocated to a manufacturing division along with his innovation to see
that it is implemented properly.
Informal networks, kept that way by design, are favored. This is true
both within and outside a corporation. Several respondents offered the
possibility of inviting NASA scientists and engineers to visit their facili-
ties as well as visiting NASA laboratories. This accords with the historical
evidence that American corporations consider themselves as "givers" u_A_
technology and not as "receivers." There appears to be a trend now in
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American industry to be less reluctant to borrow ideas from others, perhaps
a backing off from the "Not Invented Here" (NIH) syndrome. Even larger, high
technology firms no longer are able to fully meet their own technology
requirements through solely in-house efforts. There is considerably more
pressure to moveproducts or processes into the marketplace quickly and
hence the willingness to buy or borrow what once might have been in-house-
developed technology.
Participation in technical or professional conferences is a primary
source of technology. Suchmeetings provide neutral ground for the exchange
of information and ideas.
Global Technology Search
There is increasing recognition that U.S. industry is in global competi-
tion for markets as well as innovative ideas. All were in favor--some more
cautiously than others--of an increased role for NASA in technology transfer
in order to facilitate industry's competitive position. It was also noted
that Congress may become more amenable to the idea of government
providing technical and cooperative assistance to industry.
On the other hand, serious doubts were noted about American cultural
incentive to cooperate. Japan appears to have better cooperative spirit,
although no one thought a wholesale adoption of foreign solutions would
bring a workable answer. Some spirit of cooperation has been shown by par-
ticipation in university/industry consortia such as the University of
Illinois' Fracture Control Program and MIT's Industrial Liaison Program.
Membership in such programs usually must be justified as a way to generate
income-producing technology rather than only supporting basic research.
These programs have benefits to both parties, because the participation fees
D-7
can provide needed equipment to universities and industry access makes
available industry operating knowledge to students. Such consortia drew
praise as workable transfer mechanismsand as worthwhile for membership
by NASA.
Another idea for cooperative activity involves industry officials work-
ing with NASAplanning people to identify future areas of research. This
arrangement would encourage constructive interaction on how NASA'sresearch
areas might complementindustrial research areas. Although the substance
of this suggests a Research Council, it could be extended to advertise future
technology trends through publications read by key technical and industrial
officials. If NASAscientists and engineers (and their technology) had a
higher visibility in industrial publications, at association conferences
and seminars, and in university consortia, it would establish a wider national
network for exchange of technology.
Enhancing Technology Transfer
The industrial executives interviewed were skeptical about the depth
of NASA's commitment to technology transfer, pointing to the small institu-
tional budget. If technology transfer is an important objective, it needs
to be provided with resources to match the rhetoric. These resources do not
necessarily have to be allotted to the formal Technology Utilization Program.
One suggestion mentioned by a former NASA official was to give each Field
Center discretionary funds (an extremely valued incentive) based on the
number of transfers achieved in a year's time.
The ideas of quantifiable measures of success and establishing goals
and objectives for the program were favored. Among such were developing
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articles for publication and membershipin trade associations. Oncethe
objectives are established, they need to be implemented by links to perfor-
manceand salary reviews. It is the experience of industry that, unless
objectives are rewarded in a formal evaluation, they will be neglected.
The technology transfer program needs greater visibility in NASA's
hierarchy. Suggestions for achieving a greater presence ranged from dedica-
tion of a Field Center as "leads in transfer activities to the idea of
designating technology transfer responsibility at the level of Associate
Administrator. It will be a time-consuming process for NASAscientists
and engineers generally to develop a sense of rapport with non-aerospace
industry as a "user community" and technology transfer as an important
priority. Support for this type of change must comefrom top NASAleader-
ship backed by credible resources, and be sustained for a long enough period
to permeate the NASAculture.
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Selected Governmental Policies Affecting Technological
Innovation in the American Economy
Technological innovation is essential to a healthy, growing economy.
Government interest in promoting such innovation is self-evident. How-
ever, innovation is a complex and not completely understood phenomenon.
While the general factors leading to successful innovation can be identi-
fied, there is no set formula assuring its achievement.
The governments of the industrialized nations have taken widely
differing approaches to promoting technological innovation, ranging from
the very active role of the Japanese government to the more passive role
of the U.S. government. In Japan, economic development has been directly
identified with technological development, and government policies and
resources are specifically directed toward supporting this technological
development. The United States, however, has never developed a coherent
policy regarding technological development and innovation. Instead there
are a wide variety of policies that affect innovation, few of which con-
sciously consider that effect.
First there are the general macroeconomic policies that affect the
overall health of the economy. To the degree that these policies help to
create a strong and growing economy and engender a feeling of confidence
in the country's economic future, innovation is encouraged. Although
obviously critical, these policies are outside the scope of this paper.
A second set of policies includes those generally created for purposes
other than promoting innovation but which may directly and significantly
affect that process. Those policies that adversely affect technological
innovation need to be reviewed to determine if their objectives can be
achieved in other ways. As examples of this set of policies, antitrust laws,
environmental regulation, the Freedom of Information Act, and organizational
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Finally, there are policies that are created, at least in part, to
promote innovation. Such policies need to be reviewed to determine their
effectiveness. Those found to be effective (and that meet other public
policy objectives) should be considered for expansion. Those found not to
be effective should be changed, or perhaps eliminated. In this paper,
patent policies, tax policies related to innovation, and policies regarding
procurement and direct federal support of research and development are re-
viewed as examples.
In the past decade, the relationship between government policies and
1technological innovation has been muchexamined. This paper draws heavily
on the body of knowledge that has been developed in this process. In some
areas, it is apparent that this intensive analysis has already yielded
tangible results. In other areas, particularly where the issues are more
complex and controversial, there is still much to be done.
iSee for example:
• Arthur D. Little, Inc. and Industrial Research Institute, Inc.,
Barriers to Innovation in Industry: Opportunities for Public
Policy Changes, Washington, D.C.: Nation_l Science Foundation,
Sept. 1973.
• R.G. Noll, et al., Government Policies and Technological Inno-
vation, Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1974.
• Office of Technology Assessment, Government Involvement in the
Innovation Process, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1978.
• Advisory Committee on Industrial Innovation, Final Report, Wash-
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2U.S. Tax Policies
Tax policies can act as a spur to innovation in a number of ways.
They can provide favorable treatment of research and development (R&D)
expenditures. They can provide favorable treatment for income gained as
a result of successful R&D. They can encourage capital investment generally.
They can encourage the start-up of new companies interested in funding new,
high-risk ventures. As such, these policies act as an incentive to encourage
private uses of funds. Minimal government involvement is required.
Decision making remains in the private sector. On the other hand, there is
no assurance that these incentives will actually produce the desired private
actions.
Research and Development Incentives
Present U.S. tax policies targeted most specifically at encouraging
innovation relate to treatment of research and development expenditures.
Firms are permitted to fully deduct the noncapital costs associated with
research and development in the year in which they occur. Since this im-
mediate expensing reduces taxable income, a tax savings is realized. The
net effect is to lower the effective cost of and thus encourage R&D.
2The information in this section is drawn largely from:
• Mansfield, Edwin, "Tax Policy and Innovation," Science, Vol. 215,
12 March 1982, pp. 1365-1371_
and
• Cordes, Joseph J., The Impact of Tax and Financial Regulatory
Policies on Industrial Innovation, Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Science, 1980.
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To encourage increased R&D,the EconomicRecovery Tax Act of 1981
authorized a 25 percent tax credit for certain R&Dexpenditures which
exceed the average expenditures incurred by a firm during a preceeding
"base" period (generally the previous three years). A tax credit is a
strong incentive since it reduces not just taxable income but the taxes
themselves. This provision expires in 1986.
Capital Investment Incentives
Since the early 1960's the tax laws have been modified several times
in an effort to encourage capital investment. These modifications are
especially important since many economists believe that new capital in-
vestment in plant and equipment is the primary moving force in technolog-
3
ical change. Two general approaches have been taken. One has been to
allow the use of accelerated methods of depreciation so that (compared
to traditional depreciation methods) recovery of the investment is speeded
up, thus lowering taxes and increasing cash flows more immediately follow-
ing the investment. The 1981 Tax Act simplified and greatly speeded up
depreciation schedules so that most types of R&D capital equipment may now
be fully depreciated in three years and most other capital equipment in
five years.
The second major approach has been to allow a tax credit to be taken
for a specified percentage of the investment for new capital equipment.
The 1978 Tax Act permanently enacted the existing i0 percent investment
tax credit and allowed corporations to use the credit to offset up to 90
3See for example, J. Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.
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percent of their income tax requirements. Thus a firm making a $I million
capital investment is able to directly reduce its income taxes by $i00,000.
This tax savings effectively reduces the cost of the investment.
New Business Incentives
New firms are often cited as the source of much innovative activity.
Therefore, tax provisions encouraging the startup of new firms, especially
those oriented toward investing in new technological development, may be
considered to encourage innovation. An important source of funds for new,
high-technology companies is the "venture capital" industry. This industry
has expanded substantially in recent years because of the special tax
treatment allowed for income returned to shareholders of qualifying compan-
4
ies.
Another important source of funding for new businesses is the Small
Business Investment Company (SBIC), as authorized by the Small Business
Investment Act of 1958. After meeting certain SBIC requirements, a company
may be able to access low-cost funds from the Small Business Administration
thus leveraging its existing capital base. It also receives certain tax
advantages primarily relating to losses on stock and debenture investments
(it may fully deduct these losses). SBICs are also very active in high-
technology oriented investments.
4Normally, a corporation pays taxes on its income and then the share-
holders also pay taxes on the income that is distributed as dividends.
However, venture capital companies satisfying the requirements of the
Securities and Exchange Commission that they provide capital only to firms
primarily involved in developing new products, processes and technology
need not pay taxes on the income that is distributed to stockholders.
E-6
A third organizational arrangement that has becomea source of funds
for new technology-based firms is one where a corporation with no more than
25 stockholders qualifies for treatment according to subchapter S of the
tax code. To do this, the corporation must (amongother requirements) be
domestic, must have all individual stockholders, and must get no more than
20 percent of its revenues from passive investment income. A subchapter S
corporation enjoys the limited liability of a corporation but its earnings
are not taxed until they are distributed to the stockholders. There are
certain other tax advantages as well.
Another approach that has been suggested is the use of an R&Dlimited
5partnership. A limited partnership is a statutorily-authorized means
under which an investor can participate as an owner in a partnership but
with his liability limited to his investment. Such limited partners may
not take part in the actual control of the business. The tax advantage
of a partnership arrangement is that partnership income, losses, deductions
and credits pass through directly to the partners. In the case of an R&D
limited partnership, it appears that partnership expenditures for R&D
activities maybe deductible from the individual incomes of the partners
and that any income realized from the sale of a successfully developed
invention maybe treated as capital gains income.
5james K. La Fleur, The R&D Limited Partnership: A Financial Break-
through for Inventors and Small Businesses, Los Angeles, Calif., 1981.
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Finally, a loss from a transaction involving "small business stock"
may, under specified conditions, be treated as an ordinary loss rather
than a capital loss. This has the effect of allowing a larger tax re-
duction and mayencourage more investment in new small businesses.
Other Proposals
In addition to these existing tax incentives, there are a variety
of other proposals. Many relate to tax reform issues generally such as
lowering the capital gains taxes and eliminating the double taxation of
corporate income paid as dividends to stockholders. Others are targeted
at encouraging investment in small, technology-based firms such as allowing
the returns from investments in such companies to be "rolled over" on a
tax-free basis into other similar investments. Still others are directed
at stimulating R&D.! An example is the proposal to allow immediate write
off of expenses for capital assets acquired for R&D purposes.
Conclusion
Generally U.S. tax policies have provided favorable incentives for
R&D activities, including provisions for a variety of organizational ar-
rangements designed to promote innovation and technological development by
new businesses. Direct government involvement can be kept at a minimum,
while the use of private funds is encouraged through such existing tax
policies and proposed tax'reforms.
U.S. Patent Policies
Article One of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to "promote
the progress of science and the useful arts by securing for limited terms
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries." Since 1861, U.S. patent law has granted this exclusive
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right to makeuse of patent inventions for a 17-year period. Patent rights
have traditionally been considered to be a major incentive for innovation
since they allow the developer of a new invention the opportunity to ex-
clusively benefit from its commercial use during this period. In recent
years, a numberof issues regarding the patent system have been raised,
leading to greatly renewed Congressional attention and activity.
Inventions Made With Federal Funding
One important area concerns the ownership of inventions made by non-
government entities while conducting federally funded research and develop-
ment. Early policy statements tended to support government ownership of
patent rights in such situations. However, a 1971 statement by President
Nixon authorized federal agencies to grant patent ownership or exclusive
use "where it is deemed necessary to create an incentive for further de-
velopment and marketing. "6
Interpretation of this policy varied widely within different parts of
the federal government. In 1979 Congressional hearings, it was reported
that various Executive agencies were using approximately 20 different patent
7
arrangements. In 1980, Congress established a uniform policy in this area
with the passage of Public Law 96-517. This law gives nonprofit organiza-
tions (including universities) and small businesses the ability to retain
title to inventions made in performance of government-sponsored grants and
8
contracts.
6Background Materials on Government Patent Policies, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.,
1976, p. 17.
7Testimony of the GAO Comptroller General, Hearings on S.4i4, Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., ist Session, May 1979.
8On February 18, 1983, President Reagan issued a memorandum that ef-
fectively extends this policy to large businesses as well.
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Adequacy of Patent Life
A second issue is the sufficiency of the 17-year period. The pharma-
ceutical industry especially has argued that this term is inadequate since
government premarket clearance procedures of new drug products are so
9
lengthy that the effective period of protection is far less. In 1981,
the Senate passed a bill that would extend the term for agricultural
chemicals and pharmaceuticals for up to seven years. The House is pres-
ently considering a similar bill.
Patent Reliability
A third issue is the reliability of the protection afforded by a
patent. It has been pointed out that "the courts, when in doubt, tend
to rule against the patent system and declare the patent invalid. ''I0
In part, this is probably a reflection of a certain bias against the
monopoly status granted by a patent. However, it also is a reflection
of the complexity of those cases. Patent case decisions have varied widely
among the different circuit courts in the U.S. In 1982, Congress passed
a bill creating a central court of appeals for all patent cases coming from
federal district courts. It is hoped that this will bring greater uni-
formity in patent decisions.
Conclusion
The effectiveness of the patent system itself has been generally
called into question. The procedure for obtaining a patent has become
9See, Office of Technology Assessment, Patent-Term Extension and the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Washington, D.C.9 1981.
i
_0judith Obermayer, The Role of Patents in the Con_Lercialization of
New Technology for Small Innovative Companies, Cambridge, Mass.: Research &
Planning, Inc., 1982, p. 2.
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increasingly complex and costly. In someareas, the technologies change
so rapidly that companies do not bother to go through the patent process.
iiCongress has been unusually active in the patent area in recent years.
Most of the attention to this point has focused on patchwork corrections
to the existing system. It maybe that the time has come for a more
fundamental reassessment of the efficacy of this system.
U.S. Antitrust Policies
The antitrust activities of the U.S. government are intended to en-
courage a competitive economy. Although the primary benefit of competition
concerns prices, it is also considered an important spur to innovation.
Thus, to the degree that antitrust policy is successful in promoting com-
petition it may also be a favorable force in the innovation process. The
one major study that has been undertaken on this subject, however, sug-
gested that in somecases the actual effect of antitrust enforcement has
12
not been favorable and that improvementsare warranted.
Market Structure and Innovations
The original thrust of antitrust policy was to break up monopoly
control of markets. The model of perfect competition, at the center of
classical economic thought, showed that the ideal market involved a large
number of sellers (as well as buyers), none of_hom possessed any special
form of market control. A school of economists, led by Joseph Schumpeter,
llln addition to those areas already mentioned, Congress is also con-
sidering legislation that would increase the fees paid in the patent process
with the increased revenues going to expand and modernize the Patent and
Trademark Office
12Ginsburg, Douglas H., Antitrust, Uncertainty, and Technological
Innovation, Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1980.
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challenged this model and asserted that "large size and somemonopoly
(i.e. market) power are prerequisites for economic growth through techno-
,,13logical progress.
Considerable study of the relationship between market structure and
innovation has occurred in the last several decades. While the findings
are neither uniform nor conclusive, it is clear that the classical model
of a perfectly competitive market is not conducive to innovation. The
availability of somemarket power to be able to take advantage of an
innovation appears to be an important incentive. On the other hand,
barriers to entry in a market can reduce the incentive to innovate.
Beyond these rather general statements, little else can be asserted
conclusively.
Constraints to Success
Antitrust policy has recognized that the size of a firm or the con-
centration of the market in which it operates are not the primary indica-
tions of antitrust violations. Thus, it is often said that "size alone
is no offense." But if size is not an offense, it has certainly been
grounds for suspicion. Similarly, firms operating in concentrated markets
(so-called oligopolistic markets) are scrutinized carefully. In such
markets, there is some question about whether antitrust policy allows a
firm to be "too" successful if the effect is to further concentrate that
market. The U.S. automobile industry was a good example of this situtation
131bid_______.,at i0.
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for manyyears during which General Motors had to be careful not to domi-
nate the market so much that it would becomesubject to a dissolution pro-
ceeding. Foreign competition has now changed this situation considerably.
The uncertainty that antitrust policy poses for otherwise legitimate
competitive actions is illustrated by a recent action by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) against E.I. duPont de Nemours& Co. Du Pont had developed
an innovative production technique that gave it a substantial cost advantage
in the titanium dioxide (Ti02) pigment market. The FTC complained that
du Pont, by greatly expanding its production capacity to take advantage of
this cost advantage, had "unlawfully" attempted to monopolize this market.
As Ginsberg quite cautiously concluded:
If the FTCstaff's views--that du Pont violated the law
at least in part, by reason of its rapid expansion of
capacity to exploit a newand cheaper way of making
Ti02--prevails, then the line between successful tech-
nological innovations and unlawful meansof commercial-
izing and exploiting that innovation will have been
substantially blurred. 14
Joint Ventures for Research and Development
Another point of interface between antitrust policy and innovation
that has received substantial attention in recent years concerns joint
ventures between firms for research and development. Joint R&D efforts
have increased in popularity for a number of reasons:
14Ginsburg, op. cit., p. 23.
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Economic pressures stemmingfrom growing difficulty of
private industry to produce profits from R&Dspending
are a principal stimulus to cooperation. By combining
research efforts, the excessive costs associated with
manyprojects can be distributed amongparticipating
firms. Individual firms unwilling or financially un-
able to assumespeculative risks associated with long-
term basic research projects necessary for the techno-
logical advancementof their industry can utilize
joint research ventures to share these risks. Coopera-
tion in conducting research can also avoid needless
and costly duplication resulting from competition in
the development of newproducts. 15
In spite of these potential economicadvantages, it has been suggested
that the use of such joint ventures has been limited due to concerns about
antitrust violations. For example, in the report of the Advisory Committee
on Industrial Innovation during the Carter Administration it was stated
that "proposals for technically meritorious joint research projects were dis-
couraged by legal counsel because of the uncertain possibility of future
antitrust attack. In each such case joint research did not occur, and the
research was not undertaken at the individual firm's level. ''16
The ShermanAct, centerpiece of U.$. antitrust policy since its passage
in 1890, begins by stating that "every contract, combination. . or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade" is unlawful. Thus if an arrangement between
two or more companieshas the effect of restraining trade, i.e., reducing
competition, then that arrangement is a violation of the provision. Tech-
nological innovation is an important source of competition in many indust-
ries. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department has approached joint research efforts with caution.
15Note, Joint Research Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws, George Wash-
ington Law Review, Vol. 39, pp. 1112-1113, July 1971.
16Advisory Committee on Industrial Innovation, Final Report, U.S.
Department of Commerce, September 1979, p. 107.
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Antitrust Guide
In an attempt to clarify its position, the Antitrust Division published
an Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures in November 1980. It
takes the approach of setting out the analytic procedure that the Division
uses to evaluate the antitrust implications of such joint arrangements. The
key factors in the evaluation are
the nature of the proposed research, the joint venturers, the
industry and the restraints on conduct imposed in connection
with the project. In general, the closer the joint activity
is to the basic research end of the research spectrum--i.e.,
the farther removed it is from substantial market effects and
developmental issues--the more likely it is to be acceptable
under the antitrust laws. Also, the greater the number of
actual and potential competitors in an industry, the more
likely that a joint research project will not unreasonably
restrain competition. And, the narrower the field of joint
activity and the more limited the collateral restraints
involved, the greater the _ances that the project will not
offend the antitrust laws.
Two other relevant issues concern collateral restrictions involving
the joint ventures or outsiders and limitations on access to the joint
venture or to its results. In general, collateral restraints must be
necessary for the success of the venture and must not have significant
anticompetitive impact. 18 Acceptable collateral restraints could in-
clude the obligations to exchange any results from research undertaken
previously in the field of joint research and the duty not to disclose
results of the joint research to outside parties until patents are obtained.
17"Antitrust Guide for Joint Research Programs," Research Management,
Vol. 24, No. 2, March 1981, pp. 30-31.
18Ibid., p. 34.
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Regarding access to the venture, the Guide states that
if a joint research venture becomesthe key to competing
effectively in markets served by the participants, and if
the research effort is not practicably or effectively dup-
licable by excluded firms, access to the venture, (or to
its results, if participation itself is not essential) on
reasonable terms maybe mandatedby the ShermanAct. 19
Again, it is emphasizedthat the more basic the research, the less concern
there will be regarding access.
In conjunction with the publication of the Guide, the Justice Department
has sought to convey the messagethat it is not opposed to joint research.
For example, in a 1980 presentation the then deputy assistant attorney
general of the Justice Department stated that
antitrust laws do allow significant cooperation among
firms, even major competitors, where necessary for
research and development of new technology. While
there are literally thousands of joint ventures, oper-
ating in the fields of research and development, few
have been attacked under the antitrust laws. The
Justice Department has never challenged a pure re-
search joint project--that is, a project devoted
solely to research and involving no collateral
restrictions. The Department has challenged only
three research joint ventures in the last two
decades--and each involved significant collateral
restraints which retarded innovation. 20
To further reduce uncertainty in this area, the Justice Department has
encouraged the use of the "Business Review Procedure," a mechanismunder
which it will review a proposed joint activity and effectively approve or
disapprove it. For reasons which are not clear, only 21 such reviews have
21been requested since 1968.
191bid., p. 35.
20Ewing, Ky. P., Jr., "Joint Research, Antitrust, and Innovation,"
Research Management, Vol. 24, No. 2, March 1981, p. 27.
211bidL__, p. 33.
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Industry Research Ventures
An important development in recent years has been the creation of
several industry-wide research organizations. While the forms vary, the
intention is to encourage research in areas basic to the respective indus-
tries. An early example was the Electric Power Research Institute, founded
by electric utilities throughout the country to conduct research on a wide
variety of matters of importance to this industry. The Gas Research In-
stitute is a similar organization created to conduct research for the natural
gas distribution industry. Since these industries are regulated monopolies,
such research activities do not raise antitrust questions.
A somewhat different approach has been taken recently by a group com-
prised of manufacturers and users of semiconductors. Called the Semiconductor
Research Cooperative (SRC), it is an independent organization established
to generate a pool of funds, equipment and technical personnel that will
be used to support basic research requirements for the semiconductor in-
dustry. This cooperative approach is seen as a response to similar coopera-
tive efforts being undertaken in Japan and Europe. The SRC is expected to
become a major source of funding for such research at selected university
centers. Membership arrangements include the following aspects:
Corporations that join SRC will contribute amounts based
on their worldwide sales or purchases of semiconductors.
In return, they will receive progress reports on the work
SRC sponsors and, although patent policies have yet to be
worked out in detail, they will almost certainly get
royalty-free licenses to use patented processes that arise
from SRC projects. This arrangement means that every mem-
ber company will have access to the entire pool of SRC-
sponsored research, and sma_ companies will pay less than
large ones for that access.
22Colin Norman, "Electronics Firms Plug Into the Universities,"
Science, Vol. 217, 6 August 1982, p. 514.
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According to a recent article in Fortune magazine, "Perhaps the most
positive contribution governmentcan maketo American innovation and ex-
port competitiveness would be to facilitate rather than discourage this
kind of joint research. ''23
Still another unique cooperative arrangement is the Microelectronics &
ComputerTechnology Corp. This newly-formed organization is a for-profit
joint venture of 15 companies that will sponsor and conduct research in
such areas as computer-aided design, integrated circuits, software, and
advanced computer designs. It is expected to have a budget of between
$50 million and $i00 million. The Justice Department has found this
arrangement acceptable under its business review procedure, leading some
commentators to conclude that cooperative arrangements will be given
24greater leeway than in the past.
Patent Licensing
Finally, there is the issue of antitrust policy as it affects patents--
especially patent licensing. Patent law represents a special exception to
the general antimonopoly policy. Clearly, however, a patent may not be
misused in illegal ways to expand the force of the monopoly. For example,
patent licensing agreements that also contain some form of restraints of
trade such as fixing the price at which the final product may be sold are
not protected by the patent laws and have been directly opposed by the
Justice Department. On the other hand, the degree to which a company
23Tom Alexander, "The Right Remedy for R&D Lag," Fortune, January 25,
1982, p. 68.
24"IBM and Intel link up to fend off Japan," Business Week, Jan. i0,
1983, p. 98.
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can continue to hold its monopolyfollowing expiration of its basic patents
by meansof additional key improvementpatents is still a matter of con-
siderable uncertainty. An FTCcomplaint against Xerox Corporation on this
issue was settled by consent decree, leaving the matter unsettled.
Conclusion
Not surprisingly, the Justice Department sees antitrust policy as
being pro-innovation: "Antitrust policy strives, therefore, to keep markets
competitive in order to promote innovation, and to encourage innovation in
order to promote competition. ''25 Yet it is clear that innovation has flour-
ished in places like Japan where there is no such antitrust policy. U.S.
industry is facing increasingly stiff international competition both in home
markets and around the world. U.S. antitrust policies were formulated and
developed at a time when this international competition was virtually non-
existent. Moreover, this international competition has resulted in no
small part from the active support and involvement of the governments where
these foreign firms are located. In this changing context, U.S. antitrust
policy may be in need of broad-ranging reassessment to assure that U.S.
firms are not operating at an unnecessary disadvantage and that valuable
innovation is not being discouraged.
Government Regulation
In general, regulation is used to achieve a public policy objective
that is not being fulfilled under normal free market conditions. Origin-
ally, regulation was directed at situations where normal competition was
25Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures, p. 3.
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considered to be undesirable--primarily in the areas of transportation and
utility service. This regulation was economic in nature and simply created
a set of special conditions regarding market entry, product prices and other
forms of competition in these industries. More recently, the use of regu-
lation has been greatly expandedto pursue other objectives relating to
pollution control, health and safety in the workplace and consumerproduct
safety. Taken together, it is now clear that regulation is a major factor
in the U.S. economy.
Regulation and Innovation
The impacts of government regulation on business and industry have
been widely discussed and analyzed in recent years. Relatively little of
this analysis, however, has concerned itself with effects on technological
innovation. Nor is this a simple matter. One report has concluded:
The effect of regulation on technological innovation
remains highly controversial. The research which
has been undertaken in this area indicates that the
effects which exist, though substantial cannot be
simply characterized. At a minimum, it is nec-
cessary to recognize both positive and negative
impacts and to distinguish the effects of regu-
lation on the development of new compliance
technology from the more general effects that
it may have on the rate and direction of 26
technological innovation in the broad sense.
The diversity of regulations is so great and the effects on different indus-
tries (and even different companies within given industries) are so variabl_
that it is difficult to generalize. Indeed, most of the studies of this
subject have followed the approach of analyzing individual industries.
26Office of Technology Assessment, Government Involvement in the Innova-
tive Process, 1978, p. 7.
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Competitive Effects
It is possible to point to some general factors. First, regulation is
likely to increase the cost of doing business. In many cases, those in-
creased costs are substantial. The funds to comply with regulation must be
diverted from some other application, presumably a profit-making one. Firms
have an incentive to achieve compliance at the least possible cost. Within
a given industry, higher profit firms with larger sales suffer less from
regulation than do their smaller competitors. This is because the larger
company can spread out the costs of compliance among more units and thus in-
crease its unit price less to cover these costs. 27 In this way regulation
may give larger companies a competitive advantage. In turn, this may make
it more difficult for smaller companies to find the funds needed to develop
innovative production techniques and innovative products.
Of course, considering only the compliance costs neglects the value of
the regulatory outcomes. For example, if human health, productivity and
longevity are bettered by requiring reductions in pollution, then the costs
may be considered well worthwhile. Moreover, regulation produces a demand
for the technology needed to achieve compliance. This demand may be the
source of important innovation. Indeed, industries have developed in re-
sponse to pollution control and worker safety requirements that are actively
seeking to develop products and techniques that will allow compliance at
the lowest cost.
27See, for example, Clarkson, Kadlec and Laffer, "Regulating Chrysler
Out of Business?," Regulation, September/October 1970
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Thus it maybe that regulation has not so much impeded innovation as
changed the nature and direction of innovation from merely focusing on
developing products and production processes to other efforts. If this
is indeed the case, presumably it is a reflection of our desires to make
improvements in these other areas.
Regulatory Approaches
Regulation can be accomplished in a variety of ways. The most common
approach taken has been to dictate a performance standard to which a regu-
lated firm must adhere. While directly controlling performance may in
itself achieve the desired objective, often it is just assumed that this
will be the result. In many cases, however, the relationship between an
activity and the desired objective is not well understood. Required per-
formance procedures that do little to achieve objectives are obviously
undesirable. Yet government has often gone ahead and required specific
types of performance in spite of a lack of knowledge about their real
effectiveness.
The general alternative to this approach is to require the outcome
and leave the choice of the means up to the regulated entities. The primary
advantage to this approach is that it allows those who know the problem
best to devise the most cost-effective ways to overcome it. The primary
disadvantage to this approach is that enforcement is very difficult and
compliance is likely to be highly uneven. Short of incorporating major
changes such as a marketable permit system or emission charges, such an
approach has generally been considered acceptable only when tied together
28
with specific performance standards as well.
28For a good discussion of these alternatives, see Tom Alexander, "A
Simpler Path to a Cleaner Environment," Fortune, May 4, 1981, p. 234.
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Effect of Regulation on Technolosy
Most regul_torystandards are developed on th'e_basis of what can
be achieved by existing technology. For example, the 1970 Clean Air Act
requires that new stationary sources of air pollution use the "best available
control technology" [emphasis added] and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 require that industrial polluters use the "best practi-
cable control technology currently available" [emphasis added]. The interpre-
tation of these standards is left to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
which must assess the pollution reduction capabilities of existing technology.
In effect, when the EPA establishes standards based on what it determines
to be the best available technology, it is also selecting the technOlogy that
should be used. While a firm may legally use a different technology, if it
fails to meet the standards it certainly will be penalized. On the other
hand, if it uses the EPA-chosen technology and does not meet the standards it
29
may be able to avoid these penalties.
Moreover, because the EPA has tended to change its standards, it has
not benefited companies to be in the lead in adopting a particular technology.
Rather, there is an incentive with this system to continue to operate old
facilities and postpone building new ones (to which more stringent standards
apply) until the final performance standards are established and the tech-
nology to achieve those standards is demonstrated.
In spite of these disincentives in the system, it is clear that regula-
tion can act to spur technology development. In cases where the need has
29Wesley A. Magat, "The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation,"
Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 43:_Winter/Spring 1979, p. 18.
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been considered great, it has even been used to "force" that development. A
prominent example is provided in the case of emissions controls for auto-
mobiles. In the 1970 Clean Air Act, Congress legislated the requirement
that new automobiles manufactured in 1975 achieve a 90 percent reduction in
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide emission, even though the technology for
its achievement was not yet available.
This approach produced mixed results. In fact, emissions from new
automobiles have been reduced considerably, though not in the time or by
the amount originally required by Congress. On the other hand, it has been
pointed out that this hurry-up approach caused the U.S. automotive companies
to go with the catalytic converter, a more obvious but also more expensive
approach than a redesigned engine such as was successfully developed by
30Honda.
In another example, the EPAdecided that flue gas desulfurization
(scrubbing) was the best approach to removing sulfur dioxides in emissions
from coal-fired electric power plants. In 1971, EPAestablished its sulfur
dioxide standard based on its determination that scrubbing removes 70 per-
cent of the sulfur dioxides. At the time this standard was established,
three scrubbers were in operation. The oldest, built in 1968, was abandoned
by the end of 1971.31 The electric utility industry complained that not
only was the technology unproved but also that it was unreliable, expensive,
and the creator of substantial amounts of its ownpollution (a waste sludge).
301n fact, Chrysler developed a "lean burn" engine that would have
satisfied emission standards only slightly less stringent than were finally
established. See, Clarkson et al., op. cit., P. 46.
31Bruce Ackerman and W. Hassler, "Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the
Clean Air Act," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 89, 1980.
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While scrubber technology has been improved in the last decade, it has been
pointed out that the incentive to develop alternative, potentially more
desirable approaches such as fluidized bed combustion is reduced.
Conclusion
When a regulatory approach is adopted to achieve some desired objective,
there is an implicit presumption that the benefits will outweigh the costs.
However, the hoped-for benefits are often given more attention than the
costs. And, indeed, enough experience with newer regulatory schemes is
just being gained to be able to understand the nature and extent of some
of these costs. For example, recent studies of the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry have pointed to some alarming trends related to innovations in-
cluding:
• increased costs and lower yields on new drug introductions
• declining rates of new product introductions
• fewer independent sources and increased concentration of
new chemical entity (NCE) introductions
• declining growth rates for domestic R&D and shifts in R&D abroad
• NCE introductions available abroad before the United States. 32
While regulation alone is not responsible for these trends, it does appear
to be a major factor.
Furthermore, a survey conducted by Edwin Mansfield of the University of
Pennsylvania of over i00 firms accounting for about one half of all industrial
R&D expenditures in the United States showing a decline in basic research ex-
penditures between 1967 and 1977 in nearly every industry received this
explanation:
32These studies are summarized and discussed in Grabowski, Henry E.j
and J.M. Vernon, The Impact of Regulation on Industrial Innovation, Wash-
ington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1979, pp. 16-19.
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Whenasked why they reduced the proportion of their R&D
expenditures going for basic research and relatively risky
projects, the reason most frequently given by the firms
was the increase in government regulations, which th_
felt had reduced the profitability of such projects.
Congress has been considering a bill (S.I080) that would require federal
agencies to complete a formal cost-benefit analysis for any new major regula-
tion. While cost-benefit analysis is no answer in itself, it may be helpful
in requiring agencies to consider all of the known and knowable implications
of new regulations including their effects on innovation. Presumably, as
with an environmental impact statement, if the consequencesare found to
be too adverse, either mitigating changes will be madeor the regulation
will not be promulgated. While major regulatory reform appears unlikely
at this time, somebalance of regulatory objectives with other economic
objectives including technological innovation is clearly essential.
Federal Procurement and Direct Support
of Research and Development
In a report done for the Office of Technology Assessment, it was
concluded that two of the most effective policies in influencing the rate
and direction of technological changeare federal R&Dsupport and procure-
34
ment of innovative technology-based products. Research and development
is essential for innovation. While private industry is motivated by com-
petition to engage in R&D, the long lead times, high risk and substantial
expensehave been thought to require government funding as well.
33EdwinMansfield, "Comments"in Towards an Explanation of Economic
Growth, Symposium 1980, University of Kiel, 1981, p. 146.
34Office of Technology Assessment, Government Involvement in the
Innovation Press, Washington, D.C._ 1978, p. 4.
E-26
Funding for R&D
Originally, U.S. government support was directed toward strengthening
the science and technology infrastructure as in the case of support for
education and toward developing knowledge and products for its own use as
in the case of national defense. The level of government support remained
modest until World War II demonstrated the central role of science and
technology in society. Since then, government support of R&D has increased
dramatically. At this point, roughly half of all R&D performed in the U.S.
35
is funded by the federal government. About 15 percent of all R&D is
performed at federal laboratories and centers.
Procurement
In addition to this direct support of R&D, federal procurement ac-
tivities often have indirectly supported the R&D necessary to supply the
product desired by government. Government purchases can represent a major
guaranteed market that reduces the risk of product development and assures
sufficient sales to make that development worthwhile. Since the government
is the user, it can provide clear directions for the research and development
needed.
The combination of R&D support and procurement has been found to have
had a major influence on technological development in areas such as the
electronics industry:
35_it should be noted that this share is down considerably from the early
1960's when government funding accounted for about 65 percent of total U.S.
R&D expenditures. R. Piekarz) E. Thomas and D. Jennings, "International Com-
parisons of Research and Deyelopmept Expenditures," National Science Foundation:
ashington, D.C., Jan. 6, l_J, _aDie i.
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The U.S. government used, in order to stimulate innovation
in the electronic industry, various instruments: e.g.
financial support for R&D,procurement incentives and it
created a general climate favourable to innovation. The
mix of these three instruments was the most important
reason for the successfulness of the project. Direct
R&Dsubsidies were given, and companieswere sure to find
a willing purchaser. Companieseven funded several times
as muchR&Dsupport as has been funded by DOD. This was
due to the fact that the government, by its procurement
policies and by creating a favourable climate, reduce_6
uncertainty at the demandside of firms considerably.
Most of the writing in this area emphasizes that government support has been
important in product development and diffusion rather than in invention.
However, it is also pointed out that somegovernment (especially DOD)practices
encouraged new companies to becomesuppliers, thereby promoting an important
37
source of innovation.
Civilian R&D
Direct federal support of innovation through R&D and procurement has
been most successful where government was itself the primary user of the
desired product. And, in fact, until fairly recently, most government-
supported R&D was of this type--primarily in the areas of defense and,
later, space. Beginning in the 1960's, steadily increasing levels of
funding have been directed at what is generally called "civilian" R&D--
that is, research and development where government itself is not the
direct user but rather the results are to be applied to deal with general
social and economic problems such as energy, environment, health and trans-
portation.
36W. Overmeer and F. Prakbe, Government Procurement Policies and
Industrial Innovation, Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific
Research, November 1978, p. 60 (reproduced by NTIS).
37See, e.g., OTA, op°cit., p. 37.
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Effective Manasement of R&D
There are inherent difficulties in the effective management of govern-
ment funding where the government is not the direct user. Since the actual
users are generally not involved in the R&D, the work tends to lack defini-
tion. Often there is little or no concern about its actual application.
As a result, the work may be ineffective or altogether inappropriate (as,
for example, developing an exotic and expensive technology that is not
competitive in the market). This leads to what has been called "implemen-
tation failure. ''38
Several studies have considered this issue. A 1976 Arthur D. Little
report concluded that "federally funded civilian research and development
is not sufficient--by its self--to bring about technological change in the
,,39
private sector to any significant extent. It suggested that government
incentives (including direct funding) are not the precipitators of innova-
tion, but at best, are "additive"--perhaps providing a needed boost to the
process. Based on a number of case studies, the study identified six ele-
ments which it said must converge for technological innovation to occur:
• knowledge generated through R&D
• user need
• an advocate or champion
• availability of resources
• favorable risk factors
• favorable timing
38peter W. House and D.W. Jones, Getting It Off the Shelf: A Method-
ology for Implementing Federal Research, Boulder: Westview Press, 1977.
39Michael Michaelis, Ed., Federal Funding of Civilian Research and
Development, Boulder: Westview Press, 1976.
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Federal funding policies, in combination with other government incentives
and requirements, can greatly influence this process but cannot control it
entirely.
A 1977 study by Houseand Jones concerned itself with weaknessesin
federal research managementhat have resulted in little of this research
4O
achieving commercial use. They conclude that "implementation concerns.
should drive the overall R&Dprocess, rather than be viewed as the final
stage or last event in the development of a technology" and suggest the
use of a "Technology Implementation Plan" at the program level to achieve
this objective. 41
A RandCorporation study analyzed the effectiveness of 24 federally
funded demonstration projects and identified the following specific charac-
teristics associated with those that were successful:
i. A technology well in hand. Projects showing significant diffusion
success were those in which the principal technological problems
had been worked out beforehand.
2. Cost and risk sharing with local participants. The cases showing
significant diffusion success involved nonfederal cost sharing
while those funded entirely by the federal government resulted in
little or no diffusion.
. Project initiative from nonfederal sources. Demonstration projects
originating from private firms or local public agencies enjoyed
greater diffusion success than did those directly pushed by the
federal government.
. The existence of a strong industrial system for commercialization.
Diffusion proceeded more rapidly when there were obvious manu-
facturers and purchasers of the new technology, and when markets
for similar products existed.
400p. cit.
41Id. at p. xiv.
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5. Inclusion of all elements needed for commercialization. Demonstra-
tions showing significant diffusion success included in their project
planning and operations potential manufacturers, potential purchasers,
regulators, and other target audiences.
6. Absence of tight time constraints. Demonstrations facing externally
imposed time constraints fared less well than did the others. 42
Based on these findings, the report then went on to suggest a number of
guidelines that federal agencies involved in demonstration projects could
follow to increase the likelihood of success in future projects.
Similarly, a 1978 study by SRI International analyzed federal agency
management practices for a large number of civilian R&D projects and corre-
43
lated these practices with the commercial outcomes of the projects. Based
on this analysis, 36 operational guidelines are presented and discussed. They
are grouped under three general headings: market planning and analysis; market
intelligence and communication techniques; and selection and management of
R&D performers. The first group of guidelines is directed towards having
the agency understand and analyze the market during the planning phases of
R&D. The second group of guidelines concerns the need for effective
communications with and information gathering from participants in the R&D
delivery system (including R&D performers and potential buyers and users).
The third group primarily concerns the choice of and relationship with the
R&D performer.
42Walter S. Baer, L.L. Johnson, E.W. Merrow, Analysis of Federally
Funded Demonstration Projects: Final Report, Santa Monica: Rand, April 1976.
43Norman B. McEachron, H.S. Havitz, D.S. Green, J.D. Logsdon, and
E. Milbergs, Management of Federal R&D for Commercialization, Menlo Park:
SRI International, Sept. 1978.
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Current R&D Policy
The Reagan Administration has undertaken a fundamental reassessment of
the federal role in research and development. Although its policies are not
yet fully articulated, it is clear that federal support in many areas of R&D
is being reduced. In general, work with direct commercial application is
being deemphasized and private industry is being encouraged to pick up the
slack in this area. R&D required to meet regulatory objectives is still
being supported, though at somewhat reduced levels. Traditional areas of
government support since World War II, such as defense and nuclear energy,
are receiving increased assistance.
Conclusion
While the government is in a position to greatly influence technological
change through its direct support of R&D activities and procurement of tech-
nology-based products, federal support is being curtailed in some areas.
In addition to these problems, many attempts to transfer technologies
developed to civilian use have resulted in cases of implementation failure
and have not been successful.
Organizational Conflict of Interest
When government agencies contract with private organizations for the
provision of materials or for R&D services, potential conflict of interest
is an important issue. One definition of organizational conflict of interest,
orginally developed by the Atomic Energy Commission, is
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• A situation where a contractor, normally a corpora-
tion, has interests, either due to its other activities
or its relationships with other organizations, which place
it in a position that maybe unsatisfactory or unfavorable(a) from the government's standpoint in being able to secure
impartial, technically sound, objective assistance and advice
from the contractor, or in securing the advantages of adequate
competition in its procurement; or (b) from industry's stand-
point in that unfair competitive advantage may accrue to the
contractor in question.
Twotypes of potential conflicts arise •from this definition--those
affecting government objectives and those affecting private sector
objectives. Governmentagencies have an interest in assuring that no
improper influence or unfair advantage is used to affect the selection
process in contracting with outside organizations. Governmentagencies
also want to assure that the outside contractor does not have adverse or
competitive interests that might negatively influence the matter under
contract. The private sector, in turn, is concerned that government not
unduly favor certain organizations and, through public funds and support,
unfairly affect private competition.
Potential Conflict of Interest in the Selection Process
The main issues here involve situations where key agency personnel
have close relationships with organizations seeking contracts (as, for
example, may exist if former government employees now work for these
private organizations and vice versa) and where private organizations have
assisted in preparing the request for the contract arrangement. In each of
these situations, questions regarding conflict of interest may be raised.
During the Carter Administration, the issue of the "revolving" door
between government and industry was widely discussed. One result was
passage of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-521).
Title V of the Act places restrictions on the employment activities of
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all former federal employees in order to avoid conflict of interest situ-
ations. For example, senior governmentemployees who leave their positions
cannot, for a two-year period, assist an organization involved in any
formal or informal appearancebefore their former agency. One effect of
this law is to discourage governmentservice by well-qualified industry
44personnel.
The old Energy Research and DevelopmentAdministration (ERDA)had a
regulation pertaining to this concern:
A contractor's judgmentmay be biased because of past or
present relationships of its officers or employees with
other organizations and because of organizational relation-
ships (e.g., interlocking directorships). In selecting
a contractor to develop technical specifications in con-
nection with competitive procurement or to perform evalua-
tion services on technical proposals, consideration should
be given to present andpast relationships of the contract-
or's organization and personnel to the companieswhose pro-
posals are to be evaluated. In order to avoid or minimize
organizational conflicts of interest and to avoid assignments
of work which would create unavoidable conflicts of interest,
these relationships mayrequire that an organization be
eliminated from consideration for selection, or that a
reasonable period of restraint, for example, 1 year, be
imposed on the organization or on the use of certain em-
ployees in the performance of contract work.
Regarding outside assistance in preparing contract requests, the Office
of Managementand Budget proposed the following restrictions in the awarding
of grants:
In order to insure objective contractor performance and
eliminate unfair competitive advantage, a contractor that
develops or drafts specifications, requirements, a state-
ment of work, or invitations for bids and/or a request
for proposals for a particular procurement shall be ex-
cluded from competing for and performing work under the
44See, e.g., "Interest conflict laws need revamp for U.S. to tap
industry experts," Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 79, April 20, 1981, p. 25.
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directly ensuing procurement except when the grantor
agency gives approval to a grantee's request t_5waive
this requirement for a particular procurement.
NASAhas a regulation that restricts on-site support service contractors
who prepare specifications or statements of work from competing for
contracts which incorporate such specifications or statements for three
46
years. The Department of Defensehas similar provisions in its con-
47tracting regulations.
Conflict of Interest in Performance of the Contract
The government's interest in obtaining "impartial, technically sound,
objective assistance" may be promoted by requiring all potential contractors
to disclose information bearing on potential conflicts of interest. For
example, the Department of Energy requires in certain circumstances that
the submitter of a contract offer include a statement that describes "all
relevant facts concerning any present or planned interest (financial,
contractual, organized, or otherwise) relating to the work to be per-
formed hereunder and bearing on whether the offeror has a possible con-
flict of interest. . ,,48
Much of the interest in this issue arose as a result of a contract
award by the Office of Coal Research (then in the Department of the
Interior) on a sole-source basis to Bechtel Corporation for a study of
coal slurry pipelines. At that time, Bechtel had a 40 percent interest
45Federal Contracts Report, No. 671, March 7, 1977, Appendix D, Draft
of Proposed Changes to Attachment O, Procurement Standards, FMC 74-7.
46ASPR, Appendix G.
47NPR 1.113-2(b).
48Regulation 9-1.5405 and 9-1.5406. This disclosure requirement only
applies to evaluation, technical consulting and management support services.
It does not apply to contracts for research and development or architect-
engineering services.
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in Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. (ETSI), the proponent of a major
coal slurry pipeline from Wyomingto the southeastern U.S. Senate hearings
were held concerning this contract award in 1975. During these hearings,
Senator Abourezk argued the position that "a conflict may exist wherever a
contractor mayreceive benefits from the contract beyond those specified in
the contract."
In addition to conflicts that may exist before entering into a contract,
there is also the concern about conflicts that could arise because of later
developments. Thus, for example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commissionprohibits
a contractor, during the term of the contract, from entering into any con-
tract with others if such other contract may give rise to an actual or poten-
49tial conflict of interest.
Unfair Competitive Advantage From Contract
The performance of a government contract necessarily benefits the
private performer. Under most contracts, materials or services are being
purchased. Salaries and organization overhead are paid. Fees may be paid
and direct profits earned. In the case of research and development contracts,
the fund of information available to the private R&D performer is purposely
increased at government expense. In general, these advantages are a nec-
cessary and desirable part of the process.
However, there are certain aspects of this process that have drawn
attention as allowing unfair advantages to contractors. One situation is
where the contractor receives the proprietary data of other companies in
the course of its work. The Department of Defense regulations provide that
4943 Fed. Reg. 3288, Jan. 24, 1979.
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if a contractor agrees to conduct studies or provide
advice concerning a system, which work requires access
to proprietary data of other companies, the contractor
must agree with such companiesto protect such data
from unauthorized use or disclosure so long as it re-
mains proprietary. 50
NASAalso has a regulation requiring its contractors to protect the pro-
prietary data of others obtained under the contract and not to utilize
51
such data to compete with its owners.
A more difficult situation involves the case where a private organi-
zation has performed substantial development work under government contract
and the government then desires to purchase quantities of the resulting
product. One response to this problem has been the establishment of govern-
ment sponsored nonprofit corporations to perform the conceptual design,
analytical studies, systems engineering and technical directions. Private
firms providing these services have often been subjected to so-called
"hardware exclusion clauses" under which they are barred from seeking the
52
subsequent follow-on production contracts. At the sametime, DODregula-
tions note that
in development work it is normal to select firms which have
done the most advancedwork in their field. Even though
contractors mayhave performed such development work on a
DODcontract and have an unavoidable competitive edge in
contracts for the items developed, this advantage is not to
be considered unfair and no prohibitions on follow-on work
should be imposed.53
50ASPR,Appendix G.
51NPRq.i13-2 (b).
52Leonard Rawicz, "Organizational and Individual Conflicts of Interest--
Impact of the Roles on Contracting," Briefing Conference on Government
Contracts, March 13 & 14, 1978, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, p. 138.
531d. p. 141.
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Conclusion
There is no uniform government policy regarding organizational conflict
of interest. Some government agencies have no published regulations dealing
54
with organizational conflict of interest. Others have rather limited
treatment of this subject, often developed in response to specific issues
rather than based on a full consideration of the issue. Most Congressional
attention to this issue has been in relation to specific agencies. In some
respects, this approach is appropriate. The definition of conflict of
interest may well depend on the mission or responsibilities of the government
entity. A regulatory agency such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may
require one set of standards while a more broad-based entity such as the
Department of Defense may need something quite different. It also seems
desirable to allow agencies to develop their own procedures for identifying
and evaluating potential conflicts of interest.
At the same time, this area of organizational conflict of interest is
inherently fuzzy. The interrelationships of government and industry are
always the subject of suspicion by some. The General Accounting Office
stated in a 1980 report that it found potential conflict of interest
situations in I01 of the 156 contracts that it sampled at 6 government
55
agencies. A flagrant case of abuse of the discretion available to govern-
ment agencies in this area could result in legislation that is overreactive
and unduly restrictive. Indeed, with respect to the Ethics in Government
Act, that may already be the case.
54For example, the Department of the Interior has only an internal
procurement bulletin. The General Accounting Office Study, referenced
above, also found that the Consumer Products Safety Commission had no
conflict of interest regulation.
55Lloyd Schwartz, "Regulatory Analysis Pacts Cited in Conflict-of-
Interest Probe," Electronic News, V. 26, Supplement pp, May 12, 1980.
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The Freedomof Information Act
Whenthe Freedomof Information Act (FOIA) was first passed in 1966,
it was done so in the context of two decades of greatly increasing government
activity. Internal documentation of this activity was generally treated
as confidential irrespective of the information involved. The basic in-
tention of the FOIAwas to open up the workings of government--to make
available information on what governmentagencies were doing.
Congress did recognize that not all government-held information should
be available. The Act specifies nine areas in which disclosure requirements
maybe exempt. Included are matters that are:
i. Specifically authorized and properly classified as secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy;
2. Related solely to the internal personnel rules as practices of an
agency;
3. Specifically exemptedfrom disclosure by statute;
4. Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential;
5. Inter-agency or extra-agency memorandaor letters not otherwise
available by law except to an agency in litigation with the agency;
6. Personnel, medical, and similar files whosedisclosure would
constitute an invasion of privacy;
7. Under somecircumstances, investigatory records compiled for law
enforcement purposes;
8. Records related to the regulation or supervision of financial
institutions;
9. Geological and physical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
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Although this matter is not totally settled, most courts have ruled that
these exemptions are discretionary. Even if the material requested could
be considered to fall within one of the exemption categories, the agency
could still determine that it is in the public interest to release the
information.
In 1974, the FOIA was amendedto require that agencies either grant
or deny an FOIA request within ten working days, though there is no
specified time within which the material must be madeavailable if the
request is granted. While the agencies can charge for the search time
and for copying materials, they cannot charge for their review time. In
practice, the fees charged tend to be minimal.
Disclosure of Business Information
One unforeseen consequence of the Act is the degree to which it is used
to gain information about businesses. It has been estimated that about two-
thirds of the requests for information under the FOIA come from industry or
56
its representatives. As government has expanded the scope of its involve-
ment with industry, substantial amounts of business information have passed
to government. While the fourth exemption listed above was intended to
protect "trade secrets" and treat commercial or financial information as "privi-
leged or confidential," this exemption was construed narrowly in a 1974
decision that has been followed by other courts. The Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia concluded in the so-called National Parks I case
that
56Richard A. Mann, "Industrial Espionage Made Legal: The Freedom of
information Act," University of Michigan Business Review, 31:13-!7
(Nov. 1979), p. 13.
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commercial or financial matter is "confidential" for
purposes of the exemption if disclosure of the infor-
mation is likely to have either of the following ef-
fects: (I) to impair the government's ability to
obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to
cause substantial harm to the competitive position _the person from which the information was obtained.
Thus, the exemption is only to apply where disclosure can be shownto
cause substantial competitive harm. It has been argued that this is a
major alteration in the intent of Congress. Nevertheless, other courts
have followed this approach.
A Freedomof Information request is made, of course, to a government
agency. However, the governmentagency is poorly equipped to evaluate
the competitive effect of releasing business information. In most cases,
the affected party is the business--not the government agency. Yet there
is no requirement that the business be contacted before information is
disclosed. One result has been an increasing numberof "reverse-FOIA"
suits brought by the submitters of information to prevent an agency from
disclosing that information. Evenwhen an agency does contact the sub-
mitter regarding an FOIA request, it is no easy matter to show substantial
competitive harm within the ten-working-day requirement.
Some Examples
The consequences of disclosure can be significant. In one prominent
example, a company had designed a 42-person inflatable life raft and had
submitted its design and testing data to the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion for approval which it received. Shortly thereafter, a competitor
used the FOIA to obtain portions of this information which it used to
57National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
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design its own comparable raft. The competitor then won a substantial
58contract for the sale of these rafts.
Another example involved a technology developed by DowChemical to
detect and reduce a hazardous impurity (bio-chloromethyl ether) in a
59
commercial process. Personnel from the National Institute of Occupa-
tional Safety and Health (NIOSH)had visited a Dowplant to obtain infor-
mation regarding this matter and wrote up a report of their findings. A
representative from Mitsubishi Chemicals learned of this report in a meet-
ing with NIOSHpersonnel. He requested and received a copy. Mitsubishi
had been negotiating with Dowto license this technology.
In a recent example, the Environmental Protection Agency inadvertently
disclosed the secret formula of MonsantoCompany'swidely used agricultural
herbicide, Roundup, in response to an FOIA request by a Washington, D.C., law-
60yer. Although the ultimate recipient of the information is not known for
certain, it is thought that it went to a rival company. At the present time,
the Monsantoproduct holds a dominant position in this market.
Agency Difference
Because there is no requirement for uniformity, the approaches among
the agencies differ substantially. Some agencies have policies that favor
disclosure. For example, the Consumer Product Safety Commission requires
58B. Schors, "How Law is Being Used to Pry Secrets from Uncle Sam's
Files," Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1977, p. i.
59Attachment V to Written Statement, Jack I. Palley, Attorney, Dow
Corning Co., Freedom of Information Act Oversight, Hearings, Committee
on Government Operations, July 14, 15 and 16, 1981_at p. 553.
60Washington Post, Sept. 18, 1982, p. i.
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a submitter of information who seeks confidential treatment under exemption
four to accompanythe submission with a specific request for confidentiality,
to identify the confidential portions, to state whether the information has
ever been released to a nonemployee, to state whether the information is
commonlyknown or readily ascertainable by outside persons, to state how
release of the information would be likely to cause substantial competitive
harm, and to state whether the submitter is authorized to claim confidenti-
ality on behalf of the organizations involved. The Commissiondoes not
determine whether an exemption applies until an FOIA request is received. 61
Others tend to provide moreprotection for business information. For
example, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) developed its own internal
procedures for defining the kind of information that should fall within the
fourth exemption. It reviewed its files and categorized the kinds of infor-
mation it found there in order to develop a consistent and comprehensible
approach to disclosure. Where information requested under the FOIA is
found to fall within the definition of the fourth exemption, FDAwill not
release that information.
The attitudes and approaches of the agencies are often a reflection of
their missions. The ConsumerProducts Safety Commission is an outcome of
the consumermovementof the 1970s. The FDAhas been around in someform
for most of this century and has developed long-term working relationships
with the businesses it regulates. While the variability in treatment creates
uncertainties for business, it also allows an agency to establish the ap-
proach that seemsbest suited to its activities and functions. Subject
61Kevin R. McCarthy and John W. Kornmeier, "Maintaining the Confidentia-
lity of Confidential Business Information Submitted to the Federal Government,"
The Business Lawyer, 36:57-78 (Nov. 1980), p. 74.
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to judicial review, agencies can adopt procedures that will provide the
fullest possible opportunity for companies that submit information to
demonstrate the need for confidential treatment.
Proposed Changes
There has been some movement since the Reagan Administration took
office to change the FOIA. William French Smith, Reagan's Attorney
General, rescinded the guidelines established under the Carter Adminis-
tration that had urged nondisclosure only where "demonstrably harmful."
Several bills have been introduced in Congress in the past two sessions
that would tighten the standards and procedures for disclosing business
information. For example, it is proposed to change the standard for non-
disclosure from whether the sumbitter would be substantially harmed to
simply whether the submitter would be harmed. Other likely changes include
extending the time agencies have to make decisions on FOIA requests, requiring
notification of the submitters when an FOIA request involves its information,
and allowing agencies to increase fees charged of those making an FOIA request.
Conclusion
The Freedom of Information Act may well have a chilling effect on the
willingness of a company to voluntarily submit information to a government
entity and thus may hinder public/private cooperative efforts. Certainly
at this point, companies know that they must take steps to protect their
information by requesting confidentiality. If the agency has a procedure
that is supportive of this need for confidentiality, the burden on the
company may not be too substantial. Nevertheless, the company must always
be prepared for possible court review of an FOIA denial _y an agency. The
existing review standard of "substantial competitive harm" is not an easy
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one to meet. Reverse-FOIA suits have not succeeded in clearing up the
problems. It is clear that changesare needed to eliminate this unneces-
sary problem.
E-45
Summaryand Conclusion
In surmnary,federal tax provisions are generally a favorable influ-
ence on the development of technology and innovation. Specifically, non-
capital R&Dexpenditures are given favorable treatment. Capital investment
generally has been encouraged through investment tax credits and accelerated
depreciation. Start-ups of new businesses, especially those oriented toward
investing in "high tech" opportunities, have been favored with tax incen-
tives. Other improvementshave been proposed and maybe warranted. On
balance, however, the tax structure cannot be considered an impediment to
innovative activity.
The patent system has been improved in several ways during recent
years. Governmentpolicy with respect to rights to inventions arising out
of federally funded research and development has been clarified. Neverthe-
less, there are indications that the system is not able to keep pace with
the rate of new inventions, that it is unnecessarily costly, complicated,
and often insecure, and that, as a result, it is not being used in many
cases. Again, while improvementsare clearly warranted, it is doubtful
if the problems with this system have a significant effect on technological
development.
Antitrust laws appear to have mixed effects. Antitrust enforcement
is intended to promote competition and competition encourages
innovation. However, enforcement that penalizes successful innovation
behavior as in the du Pont case tends to counteract other positive effects.
Treatment of joint R&Dventures by the Justice Department now appears
more favorable, opening the way to increased use of this cooperative approach.
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Regulatory effects are varied and difficult to categorize. On the
one hand, regulation can be used to promote innovation and technological
development in areas where normal market incentives donot. On the other
hand, regulation may inhibit other innovation by diverting resources or
restricting certain types of activities. Most of the U.S. regulatory
schemesappear to have been developed with little or no regard for their
effect on innovation and perhaps not enough consideration of their effects
on the U.S. economyin general.
Federal procurement of technologically-oriented goods has been success-
ful in several important instances in promoting more rapid development of
technology. Federal support of R&D,especially for civilian application_has
been less successful. The purpose of procurement, however, is to acquire
the needed product. Broader innovation benefits are incidental. Efforts
to transfer usable innovations are not well organized and supported and
the results have been uneven. Moreover, federal support for R&Dis being
cut back in certain areas, especially for work with commercial application.
Potential conflict of interest must be considered in any contractual
arrangement between government and a private firm. A variety of issues
are involved including such things as improper influence in the selection
process, conflicting objectives in the contract performance, and unfair
competitive advantages arising out of the contract performance. As the
Bechtel contract with the Office of Coal Research illustrated, the govern-
ment's interest in obtaining highly qualified assistance can raise questions
about the benefits that mayresult. These are difficult judgments not
readily susceptible to absolute rules and standards. Attempts to establish
such standards such as with the Ethics in GovernmentAct maybe unneces-
sarily restrictive. However, uncertainty regarding conflict of interest
maywell hinder somepublic/private interaction.
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The Freedomof Information Act presents another potential impediment
to public/private interaction. The possibility that confidential business
information given to the governmentcould be madepublic under an FOIA
request undoubtedly inhibits a willingness to share information. Although
there are relatively few significant instances of important confidential
information being released through the FOIA, these occurrences have received
considerable publicity. Someimprovementshave been madebut others are
needed to remedy the situation.
This review of selected governmentpolicies demonstrates that the
general underlying intention is to encourage innovation. In some instances,
this intention is quite explicit as in the case of the patent law. In
other instances, such as the tax provisions encouraging capital investment,
innovation is an indirect but important beneficiary.
Furthermore, where specific impediments to innovations caused by exist-
ing policies have been identified and agreed upon, a numberof changeshave
been made. Exampleshere include the change in patent laws allowing universi-
ties and small businesses to be able to patent inventions madeduring any
federally funded research and the development by the Justice Department of
a Guide regarding joint R&Dventures. In addition, somepolicies favoring
innovation have been improved and expanded. A prominent example is the
expanded tax benefits allowed for R&Dexpenses in 1981.
On the other hand, this review also illustrates the absence of a clear,
explicit policy regarding innovation. Indeed, the role of the federal
government in the innovation process seemsto be in flux at present. Direct
federal funding for civilian R&Dis being cut back after 15 years of continu-
ous, substantial growth. Thus, at least with respect to this approach to
encouraging innovation, it appears that the federal government is reducing its
active involvement in the innovation process.
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An important corollary to this approach, however, is the requirement to
actively eliminate impediments to desired private activity. If the U.S.
government is moving in the direction of less active involvement in the
innovation process, then it must assure that private sector opportunities
are not unnecessarily inhibited by other federal policies.
This raises somedifficult issues. For example, antitrust policy is
well established. In their general outline, its objectives are probably
favored by most Americans. Yet, in its application, it appears to discourage
cooperation between companies and mayeven discourage being too successful.
Similarly, manyof the objectives being sought through environmental,
health, and safety regulation are widely desired. However, the "command
and control" approaches that have been adopted are costly and appear, on
balance, to limit rather than encourage innovation. Yet, judging from the
legislative debate in the past two years regarding amending the Clean Air
Act, major changes in U.S. regulatory structure are not likely.
Innovation activity in the U.S. economyas measuredby such indicators
as patent applications and productivity improvements has been lagging in
recent years. However, it should be noted that productivity has been
lagging in other countries as well during this sameperiod. The government
policies reviewed in this paper are only one part of many factors at work
in the innovation process. In general, the policies reviewed here tend to
favor innovation or at least do not significantly impede it. Certainly,
many improvementsare possible and would be desirable. However, in the
absence of a coherent policy that would clarify and give directions to the
federal role in innovation, such incremental changes are not likely to have
a significant effect.
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LESSONSFROMTHETECHNOLOGYTRANSFEREXPERIENCES
OFNON-NASAFEDERALDEPARTMENTSANDAGENCIES
Introduction
Because of its high technology focus and well publicized efforts in
the area of technology transfer, NASA is the federal agency most commonly
associated with the field of technology transfer. In fact, however, many
other departments and agencies of the federal government have also been
directly or indirectly involved in the effort to transfer the results
of federal R&D to other sectors of the economy.
The history of federal attempts to promote technology transfer is
a checkered one. Agency efforts typically have been characterized by
poorly defined (and often conflicting) mandates, sporadic commitment,
irregular funding, and experimentation with a variety of organizational
structures and transfer mechanisms. Few federal agencies have been able
to maintain a continuous commitment or program over the years. The exper-
iences of individual federal agencies seem to vary according to the nature
of the agency mission, the strength of its technology focus, the interest and
commitment of senior management and staff, and the nature of (and its
relationship to) client groups and potential technology users.
At the present time, federal technology transfer efforts are once
again in a state of flux. On the one hand, the Stevenson-Wydler Techno-
logy Innovation Act of 1980 provides federal agencies with a clear mandate
to actively pursue technology transfer activities. At the same time, how-
ever, these agencies must also respond to the demands of the current
administration. Budget cuts, restrictions on printing and information
dissemination, structural reorganizations and a general shift in the
priorities and objectives of the executive branch may limit the ability of
federal agencies to respond to this mandate.
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In light of the current situation, two points seen_clear:
_i. Because of resource limitations, future federal efforts
in the technology transfer area must be more carefully focused
(i.e., concentrate on maximizing results relative to the amount
of resources committed).
2. A re-examination of past and current approaches to federal
technology transfer is required. What lessons do the experiences
of federal agencies provide that might help today's program managers
structure their programs and allocate their resources most effectively?
Any attempt to draw conclusions from the past experiences of federal
agencies in the technology transfer field is fraught with danger. The
range of experiences is quite varied. A number of agency programs have
been short-lived, and manyhave suffered from inadequate funding and
staffing. Still others have achieved successes due largely to the nature
of the technology being transferred, the characteristics of the client
group, the efforts of a few highly motivated individuals, or someother
unique factor or situation which is unlikely to be duplicated in other
applications. Despite these limitations, the collective experiences of
federal agencies do represent an important source of information. A
review of these experiences reveals a number of commonthemesor "lessons."
These lessons are summarizedin capsule form below:
i. The Need to Institutionalize Technology Transfer Activities--Few
agencies have succeeded in incorporating technology transfer activities
into their basic mission and basic programs. In most cases, if technology
transfer activities have been pursued at all, they have been pursued as
an adjunct or related activity. Transfer activities need to be integrated
with routine functions (preparation of job descriptions, creation of a
reward system, budget preparation, program goal setting, etc.). Separate
isolated technology transfer structures have tended to be short-lived and
often have had limited impact. In agencies where transfer activities
have been viewed as a distraction to pursuit of the agency mission, they
have typically been among the first activities curtailed or eliminated
for budgetary reasons. In addition, a large portion of agency activities
that could potentially constitute technology transfer (such as procurement,
contracting, regulation, etc.) fall outside of and are often unrelated to
specifically identified agency transfer programs.
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2. The Nature of the Client Group and Potential Users--Asency successes
in the technology transfer field appear to have been greatly influenced by
the characteristics of client groups and potential users, and the nature
of their relationship with these groups. For example, the Department of
Agriculture (USDA) has been quite successful in transferring agricultural
technology to the U.S. farm community. This success can be attributed in
part to the nature of the client group--i.e., fragmented, engaged in
atomistic rather than rivalrous competition, visible and well organized,
plays a large role in setting agency research priorities, generally educated
and prone to experiment with new technology, etc. 1 In addition, USDA
(through its highly decentralized system of county agents) has developed a
close working relationship with these potential users of new technology.
The same high degree of success would not be possible with a less cohesive,
less well defined client group in which members engaged in more direct
competition with one another. Obviously the degree of difficulty increases
when the potential users of technology are not a part of or related to the
agency's traditional client group(s).
3. Transfer Mechanisms--Agency technology transfer programs have ex-
perimented with a number of different transfermechansims over the years.
Traditional mechanisms such as reports, articles for technical journals,
cataloguing systems, workshops and symposia have been most widely used.
Not surprisingly, it is not possible to generalize as to which mechanism
is "best" or even preferable to another. The effectiveness of each depends
on the particular situation. However, it does appear that the more passive
mechanisms (basic information collection and dissemination through tradi-
tional sources), while important, can play only a limited role. More
active mechanisms (where person-to-person contact is more likely to take
place) appear to hold greater potential to increase the flow of technology.
4. The Importance of Networks and Personal Contact--Federal agency ex-
periences highlight the value of creating networks and increasing personal
contact. Proximity to and regular interaction with potential users of
federal technology appear to have been important elements in a number
of successful transfer efforts. Although there are exceptions, de-centralized
structures (capable of promoting this type of interaction) appear to have
worked better than highly centralized structures. While the evidence is
limited, past experiences also seem to indicate that substantial benefits
can result from joint participation projects in which the generators and
potential users of technology work together.
5. Political and Social Support--Past experiences clearly indicate the need
for widespread political and social support for federal transfer activities
in order for them to i) succeed in achieving their objectives and 2) continue
to receive agency support and funding over the long run. Few agency
technology transfer efforts have enjoyed this type of political and social
support.
6. The Federal Role in R&D Support--Federal support of R&D appears to have
been most effective and least controversial when strengthening the infra-
structure of science and technology (i.e., through education, training,
basic research, etc.). 2 In general, the level of complexity and controversy
encountered has increased when federal support is applied to specific missions
and specific industries--where economic and market factors must be considered.
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7. The Characteristics of Successful Transfer Experiences--Presented
below is a list of some of the characteristics generally associated with
successful transfers of technology. No single transfer had all of these
characteristics, and many undoubtedly succeeded for reasons other than those
presented here. The following list simply indicates those factors which
more often than not have been present in successful federal transfer ex-
periences:
• users had ready access to the necessary information
• a market existed for the technology application
• transfer did not directly disrupt existing social systems
• support requirements (i.e., the user's technical capabilities,
facilities, resources, etc.) were not excessive
• advocates of transfer were trusted sources of information
• a limited number of individual approvals were required to adopt
the technology
• the adopted technology did not replace a standardized item where
the costs of change-over were high (unless the benefits far ex-
ceeded the cost)
• adoption required incremental rather than wholesale change
• adoption did not dramatically change the relationship between
suppliers and customers
• the federal government supported adoption (through technical
assistance, loans, etc.)
• the federal government subsidized the market (particularly where
the federal government was itself a customer--e.g., aircraft,
electronics, etc.)
8. The Nature and Focus of the Asency Mission--In the past, the more
specialized the agency mission (and the more divorced that mission from the
needs of the general economy), the less likely the agency would be to find
and diffuse technology to the general economy. For example, much of the
work performed by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the nuclear weapons
portion of the old Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) focused on very specific
economic sectors. The technologies developed by these agencies tended to
be costly, risky, inapplicable or inaccessible. These experiences can be
contrasted with those of agencies such as the USDA, the Department of
Energy (commercial nuclear and non-nuclear components), the Small Business
Administration (SBA) and the Department of Commerce's Minority Business
Development Agency (MBDA - formerly the Office of Minority Business Enter-
prise).
Recent efforts by DOD and others to increase their role in technology
transfer appear to have reduced, although not eliminated, the importance of
the agency mission as a factor in the transfer process. A specialized agency
mission with limited connection to the general economy need not present a
permanent obstacle to effective technology transfer.
9. Opportunities to Expand the Asency Role--Past experiences indicate
that more can be done to promote:
• inter-agency cooperation (particularly cooperative efforts between
technology generators like DOD and agencies with established net-
works among potential users, like SBA),
• agency/private sector cooperation (an increased emphasis on transfer
through joint participation),
F-5
• the use of more potential channels for technology transfer (in-
cluding federal procurement of hardware and services, development
work, etc).
The Experiences of Individual Federal Departments and Agencies
The technology transfer experiences of federal agencies are as varied
as the agencies themselves. Each has had its own unique history and par-
ticular approach to the diffusion of technical information. Because of
this variety, it is simply not possible to discuss these experiences
collectively. Instead, a brief description and discussion of the exper-
iences of a sample of federal agencies is provided below.
The Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC) for Technology Transfer. The
FLC was begun informally in 1970 at the Naval Weapons Center at China Lake,
California. The FLC, known then as the Defense Technology Transfer
Laboratory Consortium, consisted of eleven DOD laboratories. By 1974,
when all federal laboratories were invited to participate, the FLC had
34 members. Today, the FLC has over 200 federal laboratories and centers
(representing eleven federal agencies) as participating members. 3 Defense,
Forest Service and Fish and Wildlife facilities make up over 80 percent
of the total membership.
The FLC is currently organized into six geographic regions. Each
region is represented by a regional coordinator. Each member facility
has a designated technology transfer representative. Together, these
representatives form a substantial national network. In addition, the
FLC has identified ten technical specialists who provide support in
specialized fields on individual requests for assistance and special
projects.
The primary goal of the FLC is to facilitate the effective use of
federal technology and expertise in addressing domestic needs in the public
and private sectors by providing the environment, the operational structure,
and the necessary transfer mechanisms. The FLC seeks to do this by
F,6
eliminating barriers to the flow of technical information and promoting
person-to-person communication between the resource people in federal
laboratories and potential technology users.
From its beginnings as an ad hoc affiliation of a handful of DOD
laboratories, the FLChas slowly evolved into a larger, more mature organ-
ization. At present, the FLCrepresents one of the more active technology
transfer efforts within the federal government. Despite minimal funding
and varying levels of commitmentfrom the agencies represented, the FLC
has achieved somedegree of success. A large part of its efforts have been
directed at state and local governments. FLCmembershave provided assistance
to a number of state and local governmentson a "consulting" basis.
In addition to this type of ad hoc problem solving, the FLC also entered
into a pilot project with the U.S. Conference of Mayors. The project,
known as the CommunityTechnology Initiatives Program (CTIP), linked federal
laboratory resources with 32 small local governments through the use of
circuit riding technology agents. In 1981, the U.S. Conference of Mayors
estimated that the program had already saved local governments over $2.6
million. The FLChas also established cooperative efforts with the National
Association of Counties, the National Conference of State Legislatures,
and other public organizations.
In addition to its work with state and local governments, the FLChas
also attempted to develop similar linkages with private industry. These
efforts have included a demonstration program with the Santa Clara Chamber
of Commercein California, a technology showcasefor private industry
in NewMexico, and a series of business opportunities conferences. Each
of these activities has been designed to familiarize private industry with
the types of technologies and resources available in federal laboratories.
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Although it is potentially an important contributor in the technology
transfer field, the FLC suffers from a number of limitations. It has been
more than ten years since the Consortium was established, yet it still
lacks a reliable funding source and still has not obtained a high level
of commitment from the agencies involved (despite the provisions of the
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act). 4 The level of participation
and interest appears to vary greatly from one laboratory to another.
The continued operation of the FLCstill appears to be dependent on the
involvement of a relatively small number of highly motivated individuals
within the federal laboratory community (as it has been from the start).
The FLCappears to have been most effective in its role as a consultant/
problem solver for local and state governments. It has also succeeded
in establishing a national network of resource people and creating oppor-
tunities for personal contact between these people and potential technology
users. However, the FLChas yet to movemuchbeyond this consultant role
and has yet to establish an effective link with private industry. As a
result, muchof the available technology in the memberfederal laboratories
is still not reaching the industrial users who might potentially benefit
the most from it.
The Department of Defense (DOD). Of all the federal departments and
agencies, DOD's expenditures for research and development are by far the
largest. As a result, DOD is the largest generator of new technology
within the federal government. DOD's experiences in the technology trans-
fer field have evolved over the years, and have been greatly influenced
by the nature of the Department and its mission.
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For manyyears, DODmadeno special effort to transfer the technology
it supported and developed. Someelements were in fact successfully trans-
ferred (jet aircraft, helicopters, electronics, etc.), but not as the result
of a conscious effort or program. DODis highly mission-oriented, and the
national security objectives of that mission have encouraged the agency to
classify and limit access to information rather than disseminate it. In
the past, DODhas been criticized for failing to make technical information
available even to its own contractors.
DODR&Doperations are substantially different from those of other
federal agencies. DODplaces a great deal of emphasis on predevelopment
technical definition. Innovation and technical development within DOD
is highly centralized. The adoption or rejection of technology is typically
decided before applied research and development are completed. 5 Internal
client needs are known to a muchgreater extent than is true for most
federal agency programs. DOD's centralized approach to technology transfer
largely reflects these characteristics. DODtransfers technology to the
general economymainly by relinquishing patent rights to its prime contractors
(while maintaining a free license for the government). Little effort is
madeto evaluate information outside of the interest profiles of DODand
its prime contractors. DODalso affects the development and diffusion of
technology by furnishing a market (through highly detailed specifications)
for particular items and systems components.
In addition to these activities, DODalso engages in a variety of
training and informing activities. These efforts, however, are diKected
almost entirely to the needs of service personnel and DODcontractors
engaged in development work. DODrecords technical information and
reports generated by its R&Dwork in the Defense Technical Information
Center.
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Becausemuchof this material is classified, however, access is generally
limited to DODpersonnel and prime contractors on a need-to-know basis.
In addition, the Defense Logistics Agency also operates a number of In-
formation Analysis Centers. These centers contain technical personnel
capable of providing quick response analysis of specialized technical
problems or issues.
Although there has been a growing awareness of the need to transfer
someof the benefits of defense-related R&Dto the general economy,DOD
has not had (and still does not have) a particularly strong technology
transfer policy. Prior to the mid-1960s, DODmadelittle formal effort
to promote transfer. In 1967, D0Dattempted to open up its contracting
activities to new firms (thus allowing more private contractors to have
exposure and access to DODtechnology). In FY 1967, one in five of the
top 500 defense contractors had not been on the list in FY 1966 (although
the top recipients remained virtually unchanged). DOD's first formal
effort to address the need for technology transfer camewhen then Secretary
of Defense Melvin Laird established the Domestic Action Council "to secure
benefits for the economyfrom DODexpenditures." Since that time, however,
DODhas relied on its prime contractors as the main vehicle for achieving
technology transfer. Manyobservers have questioned whether defense con-
tractors actually produce products for commercial markets to any signifi-
6cant extent. Often the defense divisions and commercial divisions of
large DODcontractors operate quite independently, providing little
opportunity for a flow of people or technical information.
Each service branch within DODhas particular technological needs.
As a result, their R&Dactivities and contributions have varied. So too
have their efforts in the technology transfer field. By far, the Department
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of Navy has been the most active service branch. The activities of the
Army, Navy and Air Force are briefly summarizedbelow.
Army:
Army efforts in the technology transfer field have been somewhat
limited. Army regulation AR 70-57 endorses the concept of Army-civilian
technology transfer, but little has been done to formalize this support.
The bulk of the Army effort consists of the participation of 27 of its
laboratories and testing centers in the Federal Laboratory Consortium.
Several of these facilities have been quite active in FLCprograms. In
addition, the staff of the Office of Army Research attempts to maintain
contact with a variety of institutions in order to transfer new information
resulting from Army basic research.
Navy:
The U.S. Navy was the first service branch to issue an implementing
instruction calling for an active technology transfer program. In 1972,
the Navy instituted a formal Technology Transfer and Cooperative Development
Program. This program was initially oriented towards support of federal
agencies. In recent years, however, the Navy has broadened its focus
in an attempt to serve the needs of state and local governments, small
business, and industry as well. Navy personnel at the China Lake Weapons
Center were also responsible for the formation of what has grown to become
the Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC).
The Chief of Naval Material has responsibility for the Navy-wide
transfer program. An Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Material serves as
the Director of Military-Civilian Technology Transfer and Cooperative
Development. The major componentsof the Navy technology transfer pro-
gram include the following:
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i. The GovernmentIndustry Data ExchangeProgram
The Navy managesthis cooperative program, sponsored by DOD,other
federal agencies and the CanadianDepartment of Defense. The program
enables government and industry to supply information for and retrieve
information from four specialized data banks covering systems and equip-
ment reliability-maintainability, engineering, and failure experience.
The program offers two unique services. The ALERTsystem notifies parti-
cipants of particular problem areas, while the Urgent Data Request System
allows membersto query all participants on specific problems.
2. The Invention Licensing Program
The Office of Naval Researchmanagesthis program in cooperation with
the Headquarters Naval Material Command.Patented Navy inventions are
licensed to private industry and small business for commercial development.
Beginning in 1977, the Office of Naval Research also began filing selective
patent applications in foreign cQuntries for inventions with high commercial
potential.
3. The Federal Laboratory Consortium
Eighteen Navy facilities currently participate in FLCactivities. A
staff memberof the Naval WeaponsCenter has served as Consortium Chairman
since its inception. Naval personnel were particularly active in the FLC's
Far West Region Local GovernmentAssistance Task Force.
4. Intergovernmental Personnel Assignments
The Navy uses short-term intergovernmental personnel assignments to
makeNavy technical personnel available to federal agencies and state and
local governments.
In addition, the Navy also attempts to promote joint Navy/industry
research and development projects through the Navy Industry Cooperative
7Research and Development (NICRAD)program.
The transfer mechanismsemployedby the Navy include "
• a network of transfer contacts involved in approximately 70
Navy activities
• the use of technical advisers to assist other federal agencies,
state and local government, and industry
• publication of technical periodicals describing Navy inventions
and technology (including the Navy Technology Transfer Fact
Sheet, wnlcn is aistr±vUL=U each month to over 3 _ ...... =_I
,UUU _U L_LLL_
users in government and industry)
F-12
• sponsorship of or participation in a variety of conferences,
seminars, symposia and exhibits
• publication and dissemination of numerousdocuments other than
technical periodicals
• operation of information centers (including the Shock and Vibration
Center's Direct Information Service, which provides rapid response
to subscriber inquiries). Current Navy R&Dwork with potential
civilian benefits is also identified in the Work Unit Information
SystemData Bank operated by the Defense Technical Information
Center.
Air Force:
Air Force efforts continue to focus largely on the transfer of tech-
nology through its major contractors. Roughly three-quarters of all Air
Force funds are invested in direct contracts. In o_der to promote the spread of
technology beyond its direct contractors, the Air Force has established
the Scientific and Technical Information (STINFO)program. The purposes
of the program are to insure that "i) scientific and technical informa-
tion makes the maximumimpact on the advancementand development of Air
Force technology, and 2) the scientific and technical information generated
under Air Force R&Dprograms makesmaximumcontributions to the national
economy.''8 STINFOoffices have been established at all major Air Force
commandsand laboratories. Theseoffices are responsible for identifying
elements of Air Force technology with potential for civilian applications
and for ensuring that such information is madeavailable to the potential
users. The Air Force does n_t operate any information dissemination systems
comparable to those of the Navy.
In addition to the STINFOprogram, the Air Force also has a potential
contractor program, which certifies and registers non-government activities
(organizations) for access to controlled scientific and technical information.
Eleven Air Force laboratories and testing centers are also membersof the
Federal Laboratory Consortium.
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The Deparment of Commerce. Since its establishment in 1913, the Depart-
ment of Commerce has had a clear statutory mission to support technology
diffusion. The Department's major functions related to this mission include:
I. assuring the fullest use of the nation's scientific and
technical resources
2. administering the patent system
3. developing and publishing scientific, commercial, and
engineering standards
4. operating the National Technical Information Service for
federal research and development reporting
5. administering the Census Bureau for developing basic
economic, business, scientific, and environmental
information
6. encouraging economic growth by placing scientific
9
findings in the hands of industry and entrepreneurs.
Through the years, the Commerce Department has been involved in several
major efforts to stimulate technology development and dissemination. In
the Kennedy Administration, Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology
J. Herbert Holloman launched the short lived Civilian Industrial Technology
Program (CIT). The program was intended to i) provide funds for university
personnel to work on industrial research, 2) stimulate industry to under-
take more risky or expensive R&D, 3) develop a university-industry extension
service (similar to The Department of Agriculture model), and 4) collect and
disseminate technical information. Industry and organized labor succeeded
in killing the bulk of the program in Congress.
The "extension service," however, was established in 1965. The program,
known as the State Technical Services Program, provided funds to non-profit
institutions and public agencies. In turn, these organizations were expected
to provide the following services:
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• prepare and disseminate technical information
• establish state or interstate technical information
centers
• provide referral services
• sponsor industrial workshops, seminars and training
programs
The program resulted in the creation of a series of highly fragmented
and generally underfunded programs in 30 states. By 1967, Commercewas
funding 41 states and 16 "special merit" programs. The entire State Techni-
cal Services Program was eliminated in 1969.
In 1972, the Nixon Administration instituted the NewTechnology Opportu-
nities Program. Despite initial discussions of additional tax incentives for
private R&D, increased federal support of applied civilian research, changes
in the anti-trust laws and new approaches to federal R&Dmanagement,the
program presented to Congress prosed few drastic changes. The Nixon program
called for modest increases in research funding and the creation of a $40
million cooperative program under which the National Science Foundation and
the National Bureau of Standards would jointly test incentives to stimulate
R&D. The Office of Managementand Budget impoundedthese funds.
The most recent and most extensive effort by the executive branch to
promote technology diffusion cameduring the Carter administration} 0 Assistant
CommerceSecretary for Science and Technology Jordan Baruch conducted a
domestic policy review on innovation in 1979. From this review emergedthe
President's Industrial Innovation Initiatives. These initiatives included
three major programs--the Cooperative Generic Technology Program (COGENT);
the Cooperative Automotive Research Program (CARP);and the Federal Indus-
trial Energy Conservation Research, Development, and Demonstration Program.
COGENTwas intended to promote generic (as opposed to applied) R&Dby
creating a numberof Generic Technology Centers. These centers were to be
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independent, non-profit entities. Industrial representatives who wished to
participate in their research were to becomemembersof the center and place
a representative on the center's board of governors. Industrial partici-
pants would not be required to enter into any agreements restricting their
use of information or patents developed at the center. These centers were
also intended to provide a variety of consulting and technology evaluation
services. Each center was expected to becomefinancially self-sufficient
after five years. The COGENTprogramwas still in its formative stages
when the Carter administration cameto an end. The current administration
has shownno interest in implementing COGENTor any other form of generic
technology program.
The CARPprogram was intended to stimulate basic research on auto-
related technologies. The federal government and the auto makers had agreed
to focus their efforts on 12 general areas of auto technology. The program
called for the auto makers to fund basic research projects in those areas
at a location of their choice (i.e., in-house, university laboratories,
government facilities, etc.). For each dollar spent, the federal government
would have funded a matching amountof research. The type and location of
this research were to be left to government discretion. Unlike the COGENT
program, CARPcalled for little in the way of an institutional structure.
Instead, it simply provided a mechanismfor directing funds toward a par-
ticular type of research. Like COGENT,however, the program was eliminated
by the Reaganadministration before it was fully implemented.
Of the three programs advancedby the Carter administration, only the
industrial energy conservation programwas fully operational when elimina-
ted by the Reaganadministration. The elements of this program will be de-
scribed later along with other Department of Energy activities.
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At the present time, four organizations within the Department of Com-
merce remain at least minimally involved in the technology diffusion and
transfer process. These four include the Patent Office, the National Bureau
of Standards (NBS), the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), and
the Minority Business DevelopmentAgency (MBDA--formerly the Office of Mi-
nority Business Enterprise). Of this group, NTIS and MBDAappear to be the
most active. The patent system, while historically important in the trans-
fer of technology, is relatively static. The participation of the Patent
Office is largely limited to basic processing of patents and making informa-
tion on patented items available. NBS, through its role as a developer of
standards, has a great deal of contact with the scientific and technicial
community (in both industry and government). The majority of its activities
are oriented towards the developmentand distribution of technical informa-
tion.
NTIS had its earliest beginnings in 1951 in the Office of Technical
Services (OTS). In 1967, OTSbecamethe Clearinghouse for Federal and
Scientific Information. The Clearinghouse was part of NBS, and served
largely a library function. In 1972, NTIS was established and replaced
the Clearinghouse as the cataloger and disseminator of federal research
documents. In 1972, only DOD,NASAand the Atomic Energy Commissionwere
providing information to NTIS. Today, NTIS is the largest disseminator of
technical publications prepared by or for the federal government. The
service receives documentsand information from nearly all branches of the
federal government. NTIS services are oriented toward general public con-
sumption rather than highly specialized consumersof information. Still,
NTIS serves as a single source for access to a wide range of government publi-
cations. Recent emphasis on fully covering all of its costs may lead to
higher prices for NTiS services and somewhatreduced distribution.
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Amongthe various componentsof the Department of Commerce,the Minority
Business DevelopmentAgency may currently be the most active participant in
the technology transfer field. In 1979, the Office of Minority Business
Enterprise (now MBDA)established the Technology Commercialization Program.11
The goal of the program was to establish a public/private partnership to
identify and commercialize existing and newly developing technology. The
program is targeted to meet the needs of the minority business community.
MBDAcurrently operates ten Technology Commercialization Centers. These
centers provide access to technical evaluations and act as brokers between
technology developers and minority business clients. Each center has a re-
source committee madeup of representatives from industry and government.
Committee memberscurrently represent 40 Fortune 500 companiesand 18 federal
agencies. Three of the ten centers are primarily technically oriented.
These centers provide technical evaluations to clients. The remaining seven
centers act as brokers in specialized fields, matching technologies,
financing, markets, adaptive engineering and qualified minority firms or
entrepreneurs.
In addition to the ten centers, the Technology Commercialization Program
also maintains several data bases. These include:
• The Techtra Database - MBDAis one of the major funders
of this data base.
• Tech Lab - a data base which allows MBDAto survey
federal laboratories for potentially transferable
technologies.
• Tech Uni - a data base similar to Tech Lab used in
surveys of university laboratories.
• A data base identifying over 15,000 minority business
firms by SIC code and capability.
F-18 .:
At present, MBDAhas approximately 60 active projects in the Technology
Commercialization Program (with a similar number on hold for one reason or
another). Despite general cutbacks in the CommerceDepartment, this program
has actually received a small increase in funding for 1983. MBDAis cur-
rently working on expanding its network of contacts (both within and outside
of the minority community) and developing a closer relationship with the
venture capital community.
Aside from_he efforts described above, the CommerceDepartment is not
particularly active in the technology transfer field at this time. The
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 required Commerceto:
• Create an Office of Industrial Technology
• Establish Centers for Industrial Technology (af-
filiated with universities and other non-profit
organizations)
• Create a National Industrial Technology Board
• Establish a Center for the Utilization of Federal
Technology (CUFT)12
Under the Reaganadministration, Commercehas declined to take manyof
these steps (although a CUFThas been established within NTIS). The Depart-
ment will concentrate instead on the areas of productivity and foreign
competition. The Department will apparently place less emphasis on picking
technological "winners" for American industry and more emphasis on basic
information activities.
On the whole, the Departmentof Commerce'srecord in the technology
transfer field is less than spectacular. Commercemayhold the dubious
distinction of having launched and aborted the largest number of technology
programs of any federal department or agency. To someextent, the Depart-
ment's difficulties in developing and maintaining an effective program pro-
moting innovation and technology diffusion can be attributed to the fact that:
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i. Commercelacks a particularly strong, well focused con-
stituency or client group.
2. Commerceis not itself an innovator or generator of tech-
nology (and thus must act more as a catalyst or broker)°
Despite the shortcomings, the Department of Commercedoes provide a
number of services which support technology development and transfer (e.g.,
patents, NBSstandards, NTIS information services, etc.). For the most
part, Commercehas been and continues to be strongest in the area of infor-
mation dissemination--due largely to the efforts of NTIS. The MBDATechnology
Commercialization Program, however, does seemto have achieved a fair degree
of success. MBDA'snetwork of contacts and relationship with its client group
seemto allow the agency to function fairly effectively as a technology broker.
The Department of Asriculture (USDA). In contrast with the experiences
of most federal agencies, the USDA has been quite successful in transferring
new technologies to the U.S. farm community. USDA has maintained a contin-
uous program with a modest but stable level of funding over a great many
years. USDA technology transfer activities are highly decentralized, socially
institutionalized (i.e., economically and politically incorporated into
society), and well integrated with the Department's basic functions. Much
of USDA's success can be attributed to the nature of its client group and
its relationship to that group. In general, members of the agricultural
community tend to be engaged in atomistic rather than rivalrous competition,
are actively involved in setting research priorities for the Department, are
generally educated and prone to experiment with new technology by nature,
13
and are part of a large, well defined group.
The basic components of the USDA technology diffusion activities are the
Agricultural Research Service, the Cooperative State Research Service, and
the Extension Service. The Agricultural Research Service operates laboratories
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and state experiment stations at over 148 locations. The Cooperative State
Research Service is involved in research program planning and coordination
and encouraging cooperation amongthe states and between the states and
their federal research partners. The Extension Service represents the largest
off-campus informal education system in the world. Supported by federal,
state, and county governments, the Extension Service operates an office in
virtually every county in the United States. In addition, the National
Agricultural Research and Extension Users Advisory Board (a group of 21 citi-
zens representing producers and consumers) reviews and advises on USDApolicies,
research priorities, and resource allocations.
USDAtechnology developed in the federal laboratories, state experiment
stations and land grant universities is transferred to the agricultural sector
in a number of ways. By far the most important channel is through the Exten-
sion Service's highly decentralized system of county agents. These individuals
are accessible, familiar, trusted sources of information for potential technol-
ogy users in the farm community. Land grant universities and experiment
stations also engage directly in a number of dissemination andoutreach activi-
ties. In addition, USDAuses a wide variety of mechanisms,ranging from tech-
nical publications and educational programs to brief radio presentations and
exhibits at state fairs.
In addition to the factors already mentioned, successful transfer
of US_Atechnology is also facilitated by the following characteristics:
• a limited numberof approvals are required in order to
adopt USDAtechnology
• the decentralized Extension Service system facilitates
a great deal of personal contact between potential users
and generators of technology
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• the Department's client group is the targeted audience,
as opposed to someother segment of the general economy
with which it does not have an established relationship,
Each of these factors has played a significant role in the success of
USDA's technology transfer efforts. Because these factors are not likely
to be duplicated in other agency experiences, the opportunities for directly
applying the USDAmodel in other areas appear to be limited. Few federal
agencies are in a position to duplicate USDA'sdecentralized structure or
close relationship with its client group.
Within the Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Forest Service (USFS)
has also been active in the technology transfer field. The Forest Service,
like USDA,is a largely decentralized organization. Applied research and
activities have been a major part of the USFSprogram for more than 80 years.
In 1972, the Forest Service contracted with the Center for Research on
Utilization of Scientific Knowledge (CRUSK)at the University of Michigan
to critically review its efforts in this area. Shortly afterwards, a national
workshop on Research Implementation was conducted for Forest Service person-
nel. Out of this workshop camea numberof recommendations for increasing
the Forest Service's ability to transfer technology. Since the early 1970's,
the Forest Service has taken a numberof steps to implement these recommenda-
tions.
Perhaps more so than any other federal agency, the Forest Service has
emphasized the need to integrate technology transfer functions and responsi-
bilities within the agency's basic structure and mission. Technology
transfer responsibilities have been incorporated in the position descriptions
of line and staff personnel. In addition, the Forest Service has attempted
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to adjust its reward system to reward research personnel for achievements
in the area of implementation. Technology transfer responsibilities are
distributed throughout the Forest Service, and are allocated in the following
manner:
Deputy Chiefs - responsible for leadership and support
of transfer efforts; foster development of technology
transfer plans.
Technology Transfer Council - includes one Deputy Chief
from each area; responsible for establishing agency-
wide policies and recommending decisions on technology
transfer activities.
Technology Transfer Staff - Washington, D.C. - serves
as focal point for all USFS transfer activities; over-
sees all USFS transfer activities in Washington and in
the field offices.
Technology Transfer Coordination Committees - established
by Regional Foresters, State Directors and Area Directors;
composed of Research Coordinators and Experiment Station
Assistant Directors for Planning and Application; set
priorities for research application needs, make recommenda-
tions on assignments of personnel to develop new technology
transfer plans.
Assistant Directors for Planning and Application - have
primary responsibility for promoting research applica-
tions and implementation at the field level; one Assist-
ant Director for Planning and Application in each Experi-
ment Station.
Experiment Station Information Offices - provide technical
communication expertise to teams or work units preparing
technology transfer plans; prepa_ and distribute informa-
tion packages to potential user_
In addition, the Forest Service has worked with the Extension Service to
establish joint locations for extension foresters and Forest Service special-
ists at research centers and land grant universities.
Although it has taken a number of steps to institutionalize its technol-
ogy transfer program (and produced many detailed transfer plans), the Forest
Service program is not without its problems. An internal evaluation of the
agency's transfer efforts from 1978 through 1981 identifies the following
c %
F-23
factors as remaining obstacles to successful institutionalization:
i, Research and National Forest Systems (NFS) reluctance to accept
State & Private Forestry (S&PF) leadership in technology transfer.
2. Technology transfer activities supported by _search which cannot
be completed when qualified specialist counterparts in NFS and
S&PF are not available to work with research scientists.
3. Technology transfer planning that is obstructed where research
scientists are reluctant to involve NFS or S&PF specialists whom
the scientists consider to be unqualified.
4. Technology in which specialists are interested but is not avail-
able for transfer when scientists are reluctant to release
research findings until additional studies are completed.
5. Technology transfer that is inhibited by poorly defined research
and S&PF responsibilities for technology development.
6. Experiment Station Assistant Directors for Planning and Applica-
tion who spend a disporportionate amount of time on activities
relating to the planning element.
7. Technical expertise in technology transfer is not readily avail-
able to USFS field units.
8. USFS executive and administrative personnel who are not supportive
of technology transfer.
9. Some Washington Office functional staffs still believe that the
purpose of the Washington Office Technology Transfer Staff Group
is to do the technology transfer rather than to provide leadership,
coordination and support. 15
The same evaluation went on to note that much of the technology avail-
able for transfer within the Forest Service is of the supply push (as
opposed to demand pull) type. This reflects the lack of an effective
process for identifying research needs. Since available evidence indicates
that the potential for success is much greater in a demand pull situation,
the Forest Service must find better ways of involving clients in determin-
ing research needs. User participation helps insure research relevance to
user needs. The evaluation report also indicates the need for at least one
position in the Washington Office staffed by a knowledgeable professional
from the technology transfer field.
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Overall, the Forest Service has achieved a greater degree of success
in institutionalizing technology transfer activities than most other federal
agencies. Their efforts in this area and in the development of transfer
plans have served as models for other agencies. Still, these activities
are not immuneto budget and personnel cuts. In the last two years, Forest
Service transfer activities have declined substantially_ 16 Restrictions on
publications have further reduced the program's effectiveness. The Forest
Service traditionally has relyed on documentsand publications as one of its
primary transfer mechanisms. Thus, while manypieces of the transfer pro-
gram are still in place, they are currently receiving less attention.
The Small Business Administration (SBA). SBA's role in the technology
transfer process has largely been that of a facilitator or middleman. Be-
cause it is not itself a generator of technology, SBA has tended to rely on
other federal agencies. Through the mid-1960s, SBA concentrated primarily
on assisting small businesses in procuring government R&D contracts. SBA
participated in joint efforts to promote small business contracting with
NASA, DOD and the AEC. In 1966, SBA created a Technology Utilization
Division, designated to assist small businesses in applying federal
technology.
The Technology Utilization Division operated field offices in eight
major cities. The activities of these offices varied greatly, but generally
included specifying technical problems to be solved; identifying information
sources; providing limited information searches (often in conjunction with
other agencies or institutions); locating consultants; and obtaining assist-
ance from retired business executives affiliated with SBA's SCORE program.
In addition to these specialized centers, SBA also maintains more than 80
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general purpose field offices throughout the country. These offices engage
in a variety of technical assistance and information dissiminating activities.
Through its field offices, SBAhas attempted to promote small business
adoption of federal technology through conferences, publications (usually
free of charge or at reduced cost), and consulting and technical assistance
services.
SBA's technology transfer efforts appear to have had a limited impact.
On the positive side, SBA's dispersed system of field offices and the fact
that it deals with a relatively alert audience (i.e., small businesses actively
seeking ways to improve their performance) have allowed the agency to reach
a large numberof potential users. To its credit, SBAhas also done a par-
ticularly good job of mixing managementand technical information for use
by its clients. It is not clear, however, that these efforts have resulted
in substantial amounts of actual transfer. Often SBA's field offices have
been too sparsely staffed to respond effectively to the assistance requests
of clients. Likewise, SBArepresentatives at NASAand DODprocurement
offices were rarely able to overcomethe reluctance of contracting officers
to disclose technical data. Furthermore, muchof the technology-related
information distributed by the agencyhas reached small businesses who lack
the financial, technical andmanagerial resources required for adoption.
SBAloan and assistance programs have only partially addressed these con-
straints.
To summarize, SBAtransfer efforts have been facilitated by the follow-
ing factors:
• the agency's decentralized field office structure
• SBA's role as a trusted source of information
• the relatively close relationship that exists between the
small business community and the agency,
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The following factors, however, have generally inhihited successful
transfer:
• SBAis not itself a generator of technology, and thus is
dependent on the cooperation of other federal agencies
• SBAprograms often have been inadequately staffed and funded
• manyof SBA's small business clients lack the skills and/or
resources necessary for successful adoption of new technology.
Under the Reaganadministration, SBAtechnology transfer activities
have been severely curtailed. Funding for the SBATechnical Assistance
program has been completely eliminated for 1983.17 As a result, it is un-
likely that SBAwill be able to continue to play an active role as a
link between technology generators and potential users in small business.
The scope of the agency's efforts in the future maybe confined to limited
distribution of publications and provision of technical assistance through
its remaining programs.
The Department of Energy (DOE). The Department of Energy and its
predecessor agencies (particularly the AEC and the Energy Research and De-
velopment Administration--ERDA) also have engaged in a variety of technology
transfer activities. Of this group, the AEC was probably the most active.
From its inception, the AEC had a strong commitment to the development and
diffusion of nuclear technology. This attitude contrasts sharply with
that of more mission-oriented agencies such as DOD. AEC established a
vigorous program for disseminating unclassified R&D information, and placed
professional referees in each of its laboratories to evaluate reports
prepared by contractors and AEC staff for declassification and distribution.
In the early 1970s, the AEC operated 20 specialized data and information
centers. The AEC's Division of Industrial Information also supported a
variety of libraries and information depositories in the U.S. and through-
out the world.
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In addition to distribution of publications and information, the AEC
relied upon a variety of other mechanismsto encourage technology dif-
fusion. As early as 1954, the AECestablished an Industrial Cooperation
Program which allowed potential users of nuclear technology to meet and
work alongside its developers. In the late 1960s, the AECestablished In-
dustrial Cooperation Offices at both Argonne and Oak Ridge National Labora-
tories. These offices were responsible for responding to inquiries from
industry and disseminating information on laboratory innovations. These
offices were also directed to becomefamiliar with the technical needs of
particular segments of the nuclear industry. In addition, the Commission
madea conscious effort to changecontractors periodically as a way of in-
creasing the dissemination of knowledgeand technology. The AECalso made
use of access permits, which allowed industrial organizations to obtain
restricted data relevant to civilian applications of nuclear technology.
During its lifetime, the AECserved as the primary developer of nuclear
technology. Due to the nature of the technology and its security implica-
tions, the AECwas required to play a major role in regulating the
18integration of nuclear technology into the general economy. The AECachieved
a relatively high degree of success in transferring nuclear technology to
specialized segments of the economy. These successful transfer experiences,
however, rarely involved horizontal transfers of technology (i.e., use of
the technology in an unrelated field). By far, the largest beneficiary of
AECtransfer efforts appears to have been the commercial nuclear power in-
dustry.
In its relatively brief history, DOEhas promoted technology transfer
largely through the following three programs:
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• DOElaboratory participation in the FLC
• the Bartlesville Energy Technology Center's Enhanced
Oil Recovery Technology Transfer program
• the Federal Industrial Energy Conservation Research,
Development and Demonstration program (no longer in
operation).
Each is described briefly below.
FLCParticipation:
DOEoperates 41 research and development laboratories of widely varying
size. Ten of these laboratories, mainly the large multiprogram laboratories,
are membersof the FLC. Several of these laboratories (including Los Alamos,
Sandia, and Livermore) participate quite actively in FLCprograms. In re-
sponse to the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, DOEhas established
an Office of Research and Technology Applications at each of these major
laboratories. These offices are responsible for identifying transfer oppor"
tunities, developing and implementing transfer plans, and preparing annual
reports.
EnhancedOil Recovery Technology Transfer:
Since 1978, DOE's Bartlesville Energy Technology Center (BETC)has been
operating a transfer program designed to promote enhancedoil recovery (EOR).
This program relies on a variety of mechanismsto assemble and distribute in-
formation to potential users of EORtechnology (oil producers, service and
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supply organizations, engineering firms, consultants, etc.). A critical
element of the program is a series of extensive EORdata bases compiled by
BETC. DOEuses publications, films, workshops, symposia, direct access to
its data bases, and interaction between industry representatives and EOR
project managers to achieve transfer. Recent uncertainty about the future
of BETC(the center is scheduled to be turned over to a private contractor)
has affected, but not eliminated, the EORtransfer program.
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Energy Conservation Researchand Development:
The Federal Industrial Energy Conservation Research, Developmentand
Demonstration Programwas instituted during the Carter administration. The
goal of the program was to accelerate the adoption of energy saving technol-
ogy by industry. The program called for DOEto partially fund projects with
potentially high rates of return that were too risky to be undertaken alone
by private sponsors. The selection criteria developed ultimately required
DOEto pick technological "winners." Despite this apparent limitation, the
program was embracedand used by industry. Observers credited its success to
the following:
e the program concentrated on process innovation (as a
result, the uncertainties were limited to technological
and engineering concerns--as opposed to economic/
market concerns);
• competent managementby DOE;
20
• a generally low profile for the program as a whole.
The energy conservation research program was not funded by the Reagan
administration.
In addition to the three programs described above, DOEalso operates a
Technical Information Center that distributes research reports and other
documents. DOEalso provides material to NTIS for dissemination.
In general, DOEhas enjoyed limited success in the technology transfer
field. The BETCEORtransfer program appears to have significant potential
(if support is continued), due to the close relationship that exists between
BETCand the oil and gas industry. The long term impacts of the other
programs are less clear. To date, DOElaboratory participation in the FLC
activities still consists largely of problem solving on a consulting basis.
DOEas a whole appears to have suffered from a continually changing sense
of purpose and a limited (and often adversarial) relationship with the
energy industry. AECactivities are important only in an historical sense.
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Other Departments and Agencies:
In addition to the federal departments and agencies discussed above, a
handful of others have also pursued technology transfer activities of one form
or another. This group includes segmentsof the Department of the Interior,
the Department of Transportation, the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The efforts of each of
these organizations are described briefly below.
Within the Interior Department, two groups--the Office of Water Research
and Technology (OWRT)and the Bureau of Mines--at one time had active tech-
nology transfer programs. A 1971amendmento its authorizing legislation
specifically called on OWRTto undertake transfer activities. In response,
OWRTestablished a program to promote technology transfer through the net-
work of water resource research centers it supported at universities through-
out the country. In 1974, an Assistant Director of OWRTwas appointed to
coordinate those activities. The OWRTprogram encouraged researchers to focus
more of their efforts on application. Under the Reaganadministration, OWRT
has been reconstituted as an office of the Bureau of Reclamation with
lessened funding, fewer functions and reduced emphasis on transfer activi-
ties. The Bureau of Mines at one time had a Mining Research Technology
Transfer Group within the Mine SystemsEngineering Division. This group
used the Bureau's close relationship with the mining industry as a vehicle
for transferring improvements in mining technology. At the present time,
the Bureau of Mines no longer has a specifically designated technology
transfer group.
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) technology transfer efforts
have been oriented towards state and local government. DOThas an Office
of Technology Sharing in the Secretary's Office. This office is responsible
for insuring that the needs of state and local government are given full
consideration in the establishment of DOTresearch projects and technical
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assistance programs. DOT's Transportation Systems Center (a major research
facility in Cambridge, MA), also has an Office of Technology Sharing. In
addition, each Federal Highway Administration State Division Office has one
individual who serves as a technology transfer coordinator. Four DOTlabora-
tories are also membersof the FLC. Overall, DOTtransfer activities are
fairly passive. The major emphasis is on directing research priorities.
Only a very limited effort is madeto promote transfer once research has
been completed.
At one time, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)was
actively involved in the technology transfer field. Manyof the department's
efforts were coordinated by the nowdefunct Division of Product Dissemination
and Transfer. Probably the most famousof all the HUDprograms in this area
was Operation Breakthrough. Put simply, Operation Breakthrough was HUD's
attempt to improve the technology of the U.S. homebuilding industry through
applied research and development. In a sense, HUDattempted to duplicate
someof the successes of the USDAmodel. On the surface, homebuilders ap-
peared to have much in commonwith farmers. Both industries were highly
fragmented and filled with individual producers engagedin atomistic competi-
tion. Operation Breakthrough demonstrated, however, that the agricultural
model cannot be easily duplicated. The HUDprogram ultimately had little
impact on the housing industry and is generally regarded as a major failure.
Retrospective analysis indicates that Operation Breakthrough suffered from
the following weaknesses:
• While builders maynot engage in rivalrous competition,
producers and suppliers of building materials and equip-
ment do. Applied government research in this area posed
a direct threat to these groups.
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• Unlike agriculture, housing lacked a broad scientific
base or scientific community from which an applied
research and development effort could be launched.
• HUD was neither a major builder nor purchaser of non-
subsidized housing. Thus, the department lacked the
ability to select designs w_ch would ultimately
succeed in the marketplace. _
Since 1977, HUD has also operated a program designed to improve the
financial management capabilities of state and local governments. Known as
the Finanacial Management Capacity Sharing program, this effort has relied
on publications, conferences, workshops and direct technical assistance to
disseminate management information to state and local officials. In February
1981, the program's focus was shifted somewhat in response to requests from
local government. The program, now known as the Governmental Capacity
Sharing Program, focuses primarily on the areas of i) management, planning,
and financing of capital infrastructure projects and 2) creation of public/
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private partnerships. HUD officials believe the capacity sharing program
has contributed to substantial improvements in financial management at the
state and local levels.
Shortly after its establishment, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
entered into a joint program with NASA designed to transfer NASA technology to
the field of environmental science. The program relied on fairly traditional
mechanisms and by all accounts appears to have had little impact. In 1973 the
program was terminated. At the present time, EPA's Industrial Environmental
Research Laboratory in Cincinnati, Ohio produces a monthly technology transfer
newsletter. This publication contains general descriptions of recent EPA
research projects and findings. Other than the newsletter, EPA does not appear
to be actively engaged in transfer activities at this time.
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Conclusion
The brief description of federal technology transfer activities provided
above is admittedly incomplete. The experiences of each agency could be de-
scribed in much greater detail, and there are a number of organizations (such
as the Department of Health and Human Services m_d its predecessors, the National
Science Foundation and the Library of Congress) whose activities have not
been discussed at all. Even this limited review of federal transfer exper-
iences, however, is sufficient to demonstrate the wide range of approaches
that have been used. While many agency programs may have fallen short of
their objectives, all of these experiences provide valuable lessons for
managers of current and future federal technology transfer programs.
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NASAFIELD CENTERPERSPECTIVES
During February and March 1983, the Study Director visited the seven
in-house NASAField Centers: Marshall SpaceFlight Center, Goddard Space
Flight Center, Langley Research Center, KennedySpaceCenter, Johnson
Space Center, Lewis Research Center, and the AmesResearch Center. The
purpose was to discuss with senior staff at each Center their perceptions
of NASAtechnology transfer efforts, their receptivity to the new emphasis
upon a broadened program of technology transfer, and to solicit their views
on how such efforts might be improved over those in the past. In addition,
these discussions included recent experience at the various Centers in co-
operative efforts with industry, particularly nonaerospace industry, and
perceptions about each Center's role in advancing technology. In the course
of these visits, the Study Director interviewed each of the Center Directors
and a total of 45 other senior staff.
The Feasibility of A New Emphasis Upon NASA Technology Transfer
Discussions with the Center Directors and senior staff at the Field
Centers revealed a general consensus on three points regarding the feasibility
of a new emphasis by the NASA Administrator upon technology transfer--espe-
ciallythat directed toward nonaerospace industry: (i) a willingness to em-
brace such a program of emphasis by the Administrator, coupled with some
skepticism related to the past history of the Technology Utilization Program;
(2) a general acceptance and enthusiasm for a broader concept of technology
transfer, one beyond the formal Technology Utilization Program; and (3) agree-
ment that the key to substantially improved technology transfer is to catch
the interest of industry (especially nonaerospace industry) and forge more
effective links with industry.
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Field Center officials generally appear to be willing, and often
eager, to join in a renewed emphasisby the NASAAdministratQr on a pro-
gram of technology transfer focused toward nonaerospace industry. Funda-
mental caution expressed relates to past experience with the Technology
Utilization Program which has suffered from time to time: (I) a lack of
continuity of leadership or interest from top levels of NASAleadership,
(2) variations in resource allocation, (3) inadequate cues from past Ad-
ministrators regarding its priority, (4) uneven follow-up in program
execution, and (5) insufficient meansto institutionalize the process so
that there is continuity of effort beyond changes in Headquarters leadership.
Officials interviewed at the Field Centers believe that the current
Administrator is fully capable of overcoming this past legacy, building on
the strengths of the past programwhile instituting new efforts and promising
directions. Clear direction and commitmentby the Administrator and his
continuing attention to a renewedtechnology transfer effort would be wel-
comed. Concurrently, Field Center leadership will look for assignment of
priorities and allocation of resources commensuratewith the program objec-
tives. It is widely recognized that one of the most difficult challenges
is that of "institutionalizing" the technology transfer process into the day-
to-day activities of NASA. Interestingly, persons at several of the Field
Centers suggested including technology transfer activity within an individual's
performance assessment--not unlike that for monitoring and judging the equal
employment function. Managersand supervisors (Field Centers and Headquarters)
would then have this element considered in the overall assessment of their
performance.
There was general enthusiasm for the broader concept of technology trans-
fer beyond that of the formal Technology Utilization Program. The broader con-
text would include all systematic efforts to transfer technology by formal or
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informal means, including ad hoc problem solving, the use of NASAfacilities
to explore a technology problem, and the exchange of data, information, tech-
niques, etc. through site visits, telecommunications, or publication--princi-
pally _ocused on nonaerospace industry, but not limited to that context.
The concept behind this broader approach to technology transfer is the
model of the relationship betweenNACAand the aircraft and related industry--
expanded to the extent that it is practical. It was recognized that this
approach to technology transfer will be more easily carried out in the research
centers (Ames,Langley, and Lewis) where half or more of the activity is con-
ducted through in-house laboratories. Major project centers such as Goddard,
Johnson, and Marshall are unlikely to have as manyopportunities for this type
of transfer, since a substantially larger proportion of their work is conducted
through contractors. However, each has special in-house capabilities, and a
relationship with principal contractors that have the potential for expanding
effective transfer. The most challenging environment for technology transfer
is probably that at the KennedySpaceCenter. The mission of preparation
and launch of space vehicles involves intense operational pressures that in-
hibit attention to transfer activities. But even here examples of successful
past transfers were cited, and there was an optimism about their capability
to expand this in the future because of their close operating linkages to
industry.
There is universal acknowledgementamongCenter Directors that substan-
tially improved technology transfer involves capturing the interest of in-
dustry and developing more effective linkages for cooperation in the exchange
of information. Oneof the most important steps that can be taken is to pro-
vide more opportunities for personal, face-to-face contact between Field
Center scientists and engineers and those in nonaerospace industry. Sadly,
these opportunities have been substantially reduced in recent years because
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of travel restrictions limiting attendance at professional meetings, sym-
posia, sessions of technical societies, etc. Consistently one finds that
ad hoc problem solving activities which result in substantially successful
transfers of technology often have their origins in the meeting of an in-
dustrial engineer and a NASAengineer at a professional conference. A
second channel that was described as relatively underdeveloped is that of
using the publications of technical and professional societies most often
read in nonaerospace industry. Suchpublications can provide a meansfor
morewidely publicizing important technological advances stemmingfrom NASAre-
search and development. It was acknowledgedthat these channels need to be
pursued at both the Headquarters and the Field Center levels.
Finally, NASAhas unusually broad flexibility, stemming from the 1958
SpaceAct, to enter cooperative ventures or personnel exchanges in pursuit
of NASA's program purposes. This avenue for technical exchangealso remains
relatively underdeveloped comparedto its potential. Several of the Field
Centers have initiated preliminary efforts to explore these possibilities as
meansfor broader cooperation with nonaerospace industry. For example, at
the Lewis Research Center consideration is being given to instituting, on
a trial basis, an industrial fellowship that would permit an industrial
scientist to work in a Lewis laboratory for up to a year, pursuing areas of
mutual interest. For several years the AmesResearch Center has derived
benefits of a cooperative venture in the research of space law through mutual
efforts with the University of California Hastings College of the Law, the
Davis School of Law and the University of Santa Clara in what is titled the
"NASA-Ames/University Consortium for Astro Law Research." In these endeavors
each "partner" brings its special resources for the cooperative benefit of
those participating.
G-5
Lessons From Recent Experience
Although there was some variation from one Field Center to another,
there was a general consensus regarding technology transfer and cooperative
efforts with industry on five points. These were: (i) avoid overstructur-
ing such efforts, (2) focus such efforts on technical areas of either NASA's
strength or special NASA interest, (3) recognize technology transfer as a
two-way street, (4) seek opportunities for participation with industry in
"neutral third party" settings such as university consortia and professional
meetings, and (5) expand efforts to document and to better understand the
economic and other benefits flowing from technology transfer.
Based on past experience, it appears that the largest number of trans-
fers, and often those that appear to occur most "naturally," are of an ad hoc
nature where there rarely is any formal agreement or paper exchanged between
the parties involved. The typical modus operandi between NACA and aircraft
companies rarely involved any formal agreement. Prototypes were built by
the manufacturer, tests were run in NACA facilities, data were exchanged and
eventually analyzed--nearly always on no more than verbal agreement. This
may not always be possible with more complex, expensive undertakings. How-
ever, the strong feeling within the Field Center is that NASA Headquarters
needs to provide a principal focal point for the technology transfer function
and broad guidance to the program, but that the actual operations should be
handled in a decentralized fashion within the respective Field Centers. The
more formal the process becomes, the less likely are the informal networks
and relationships to develop and grow to fruitful and successful transfers.
Second, since the effort devoted to technology transfer necessarily must
be limited, those efforts should be focused in the technical areas where NASA
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has special strengths (in research, problem solving, or particular facili-
ties% or in areas of special interest in which NASAwants to learn more or
to expand its capabilities and can learn from universities or industry. It
was this characteristic of "leading from its strength" that created NACA's
excellent reputation. As one Center Director put it, "Wepossess two things
that industry sought: (i) special research and problem solving capabilities
and (2) unique facilities with highly trained support staff not available
elsewhere."
The technology transfer process needs to be recognized as a two-way
street (by both NASAand industry). It is generally acknowledged that
transfer occurs most successfully when all parties to it benefit and share
mutual interests. It is readily acknowledged in the Field Centers that
the image of the Technology Utilization Program has not always reflected
these characteristics, but occasionally reflects a "hard sell" image. A
fresh emphasis on cooperation, with information and benefits flowing in both
directions, appears more acceptable throughout the Field Centers. And it is one
that fits more naturally the general process of technology diffusion.
Experience at NASAresearch centers suggests that initial linkages with
nonaerospace industry representatives have been relatively successful when
participants are involved in commontechnological undertakings, such as those
found in university consortia. They offer "neutral" ground for the pursuit
of technical objectives in an environment that is conducive to information
exchange--both giving and receiving. Field Center personnel confirm the
utility of this type of interaction and believe that its expansion could
be accomplished with little difficulty and substantial benefit.
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Finally, there was general recognition amongField Center officials
that even a most successful program of technology transfer will not be able
to be sustained over time without concurrent efforts that will document its
success, and lead to an improved understanding of both the process and the
benefits accrued from it.
Areas of Technical Strensth
In the process of exploring various aspects of technology transfer with
Center officials, they were asked to list several areas in which their parti-
cular Field Center excelled or was at the "leading edge" of technology. In
aggregate, these areas are:
i. aeronautics
2. aerospace propulsion
3. bioinstrumentation
4. ceramics
5. composite materials
6. computer applications
7. computer applications to large engineering models
8. electronic instrumentation and flight control
9. full scale manufacturing pilot testing
i0. human factors
ii. large scale systems analysis
12. launch preparation and control
13. materials (including wear, fatigue)
14. measurement techniques
15. safety, fire control and flame retardant materials
16. satellite tracking and data reduction
17. simulators
18. Stirling engine technology
19. systems management
20. toxic materials handling
21. tribology
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EVALUATINGRECOMMENDATIONSFORENHANCING
NASA'STECHNOLOGYTRANSERPOLICY
DRI has offered two recommendationsfor reconstituting NASApolicy to
reflect an expandedconcept of technology transfer. The first of these
recommendationsaddresses the need for an internal policy change at NASA.
Whereastechnology transfer has somevocal support and a budget of around
$9 million, it ranks as a mission of minor secondary importance within the
space agency. Expanding our knowledge of space is, and should be, NASA's
primary mission, but the effect of relegating technology transfer to a
marginal secondary role has been to enervate the program. While recognizing
that technology transfer is not NASA'sprimary mission, DRI recommendsthat
NASAestablish technology transfer as a vital activity of the agency.
The second recommendation is that NASAexpand the channels of cooperation
with industry. These channels provide avenues for learning what industry
needs and how it operates--critical components to successful technology
transfer.
Specific courses for implementing both recommendations are offered.
In order to establish technology transfer as a vital activity of NASA, it
is recommended that NASA:
i. Focus the coordination of technology transfer activities in
NASA by creation of a new position at the Associate Adminis-
trator or Associate Deputy Administrator level.
2. Delegate technology transfer activities to Field Centers.
3. Increase the allocation of resources (funding and manpower)
to technology transfer activities.
4. Establish a technology transfer activity fund at each Field
Center under the authority of the Center Director.
5. Establish a NASA-wide recognition program for extraordinary
accomplishment in technology transfer activities.
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In order to expand the channels of cooperation with industry, it is recom-
mendedthat NASA:
i. Base cooperative efforts on areas of NASAtechnological
strength or areas of special interest to NASA.
2. Join with industry in industry/university consortia for
research and technology exchange.
3. ExpandJoint endeavor agreementsbeyond the current Materials
Processing in Space Program.
4. Bring industry representatives into NASA's technology planning
process.
5. Test the feasibility of encouraging engineers, representing
industry, to search and assess NASAtechnology for applications.
6. Explore meansto use industry-related publications as channels
to publicize NASAtechnology.
7. Review with the U.S. Air Force additional meansto expand or
assure the aerospace industrial base.
Implementing these recommendationswould involve a number of organi-
zational changes, resource decisions, and technical details which are be-
yond the scope of this policy paper. To the extent possible_however, DRI
has screened the recommendationsfor their practical feasibility.
The Screening Criteria
Four broad criteria were considered as factors for screening the recom-
mendations. These criteria are:
• NASA feasibility,
Q Industry feasibility,
• Public policy issues, and
• Future-oriented issues.
Evaluating an option in terms of its feasibility for NASA involves
asking whether the proposed action has a reasonable chance of being author-
ized and successfully carried out within NASA. For a recommendation to
succeed, it must have some comparability with the agency's mission, its
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resource capability, its organizational structure, and its way of doing
business. It is not necessarily the case that the best options are those
which conform most readily to the existing structure, however. A program
which requires a significant reallocation of resources maydisturb some
existing hierarchies, but this type of turbulence maybe what is needed to
achieve significant policy change. For any recommendation, its potential
benefits need to be weighed against the problems, resistance, costs, and
organizational changes inherent in implementation.
Industry feasibility issues test whether the recommendationsare real-
istic in view of normal industry goals and behavior. Technological exchange
with a government agency is not an everyday course of affairs for most
American businesses. Governmentand industry have different goals. One
seeks to makemoney, while the other has its imperatives laid out in the
U.S. Constitution. While someadaptation on the part of industry will be
required, the less NASA'sprograms conform to regular industry practices,
the less chance the agency has of succeeding in maintaining an effective
relationship. A successful program should recognize and help bridge the
gap between industry and government. It should offer incentives for in-
dustry participation, and it should take into account any potential dif-
ficulties with such problems as antitrust and conflict of interest.
These issues--anti_ust and conflict of interest--are a reminder that
NASAand industry operate in an environment of public policy constraints.
Oneprominent source of explicit constraints is the nation's legal system,
which establishes boundaries for cooperation amongcompanies, defines patent
rights, regulates commerceand so on. A prominent source of implicit (and
sometimes, explicit) constraints is the political environment, a network of
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elected and appointed officials whowatch and judge a government agency's
actions. Appendix E examines seven areas of public policy concern: tax
policy, regulatory policy, patent policy, antitrust policy, policy regarding
access to government-held information, organizational conflict of interest
issues, and R&Dsupport. These concerns are considered appropriate in
screening the options.
Public policy issues, particularly those which are politically based,
have potential to change over time. The fourth category of screening
criteria considers this eventuality by taking into account future-oriented
issues.* These concerns are the most difficult to define, but they are
vital to long term planning. Changesin the political environment, economic
trends, and future foreign competition mayhave a bearing on technology
transfer, and anticipating these effects is an important step toward coping
with them.
All four categories of screening criteria are not applicable to each
recommendation. WhereasNASAfeasibility is a hurdle each recommendation
must overcome, public policy and future-oriented issues are of less import-
ance to someof the recommendations. Onereason for this is that some
issues are more internally than externally focused and thus will have little
intercourse with NASA's operating environment. Also, someof the recommenda-
tions call for less significant change than others, and these will raise
fewer screening issues than the more substantial recommendations. In the
following discussion, screening criteria are considered as appropriate for
the recommendedactions.
*See Appendix K, The Future Environment for TechnologyTransfer.
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Screenin$ the Recommendations
i. Focus the coordination of technology transfer activities in
NASA by creation of a new position at the Associate Adminis-
trator or Associate Deputy Administrator level.
This recommendation raises significant issues in terms of NASA feasi-
bility. In particular, the action would require substantial organizational
change, as well as a reallocation of resources, and it may meet with internal
resistance from NASA personnel. Despite these potential barriers, the action
is worth taking for the following reasons:
• It would signal NASA's commitment to technology transfer.
• It would provide technology transfer with prestigious
spokesmen within NASA and on Capitol Hill.
• It would promote industry contact by creating a logical
liaison at NASA for senior corporate officials.
Creating a new administrative position is not an innovative or unusual
idea, but as a course of action, it is fundamental to legitimating technology
transfer within the agency. By appointing an official at this level with
technology transfer as his sole mission, NASA would confirm that it is serious
about technology exchange. The new administrator would be responsible for
providing direction, overcoming obstacles to new ventures, attracting personnel
and defending his budget before 0MB and the Congress. Without such leader-
ship, technology transfer is likely to languish at NASA.
Whether this office were supported with new funds or a reallocation
of existing funds, internal personnel may regard it as an encroachment on
their own resources and authority. In the zero sum game of government
agency budgets and hierarchies, creation of a new high level position rep-
resents an intrusion on existing domains. Yet it is just this type of
action which signals a commitment to a change in policy. Once the office
was created, it would be the new administrator's responsibility to ensure
that technology transfer is not relegated to a backseat role in the organi-
zation.
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This recommendationspecifically addresses concerns for industry feasi-
bility. By providing a liaison for senior corporate officials, it would help
in bridging the gap between governmentand industry. While most techno-
logical exchange occurs at the lower, more technical levels of an organi-
zation, complications can arise which require senior level decision making.
Under the present system, corporations dealing with NASAare not sure who
makes final decisions for the agency. In negotiations on technology exchange,
corporations need to know where the buck stops, and they do not want to
thread their way through a bureaucratic maze to obtain a decision. An
Associate Administrator for technology transfer would provide an authorita-
tive, visible contact for corporations needing timely answers.
Public policy issues are bound to arise whenprivate companies and
government agencies exchange information, and as changes in these areas of
concern occur, changes in policy will be necessary. Oneof the new adminis-
trator's primary roles would be to deal with these issues, whether it involves
making a decision on conflict of interest, acting as a lobbyist on Capitol
Hill, or redirecting the technological focus of transfer activities. A
personal, full-time commitmentto dealing with these issues would improve
the agency's ability to handle them.
The qualities needed for success in this job include those typically
associated with effective leadership in government: managerial expertise,
skill in dealing with Congress and OMB,and knowledge of the subject area.
Furthermore, it is essential that the Associate Administrator have familiarity
with business practices and needs and experience in dealing with senior
corporate officials.
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One danger associated with this recommendation is that the adminis-
trator would becometoo authoritative. In his efforts to promote technology
transfer, he mayovercentralize the function. Technology transfer should
have its focus at the Field Centers. The new administrator should recognize
that his is a support function, consisting of policy making, final decision
making and program advocacy. Efforts to direct the daily business of trans-
ferring technology could stultify activities in the Field Centers.
One step toward implementing this recommendationwould be to form a
search committee to identify candidates for the job. The committee should
be small, consisting of three to five members,with at least one represen-
tative from the Technology Utilization Program and one or more from industry.
In addition to identifying job candidates, the committee mayprovide input
on the costs and organizational details associated with opening a new office.
2. Delegate technology transfer activities to the Field Centers.
Technology transfer cannot be accomplished from Washington alone.
More often than not, those who recognize the applicability of NASAtech-
nology and work at adapting it to their needs are working level corporate
engineers in various locations around the country. It is essential that NASA
have the capacity to take the technology to them, and that it be able to
provide the kind of person-to-person contact that is essential to overcoming
application obstacles. Theseneeds argue for a dispersed effort, where
responsibility for transfer is in the hands of mobile NASAengineers. Each
of the Field Centers should develop a client base and familiarize itself
with the needs of the businesses in its area. While support and guidance
from Washington are essential, the individual transfers are most likely to
be accomplished through an on-going, personal approach in the field. Pro-
longed contact and easy accessibility are crucial qualities for the Field
Centers to possess.
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Thus, this recommendation is targeted toward industry concerns. It
is offered in recognition that most companies will not cometo Washington
in search of new technologies, nor are they likely to respond to broadcasts
of information from NASAHeadquarters. In terms of NASAfeasibility then,
the crux of this issue is to balance decision making at Headquarters with
autonomy in the Field Centers. As noted above, the Field Centers should
bear responsibility for the daily business of initiating and carrying out
transfers. The new Associate Administrator should operate in a staff capa-
city, providing support and guidance to the Field Centers, acting as a
source of final authority and decision making whennecessary, and providing
a central NASAfocus for relations with other Executive Branch agencies,
the Congress, and the public.
Oneproblem with delegating authority to the Field Centers is that
Headquarters loosens its control of public policy issues. While Headquarters
can provide direction on such subjects as conflict of interest and patent
rights, most of the daily decisions will be madein the Field Centers. In-
creasing Field Center autonomythus heightens the possibility of conflicting
policies or violation of directives from Headquarters. Without decision
making in the Field Center, however, the process of transferring technology
is bound to becomemore cumbersomebecause of the lag involved in conveying
information to Headquarters and receiving decisions.
This recommendationwill require someredefinition of Field Center
priorities. The Field Center personnel need to be madeaware of their re-
sponsibility for technology transfer and offered rewards for their success.
Field Center goals for technology transfer should be broad enough to allow
for autonomybut specific enoughto measureperformance. NASAshould strive
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to establish an entrepreneurial spirit in the Field Centers, by increasing
their responsibility, clarifying their goals, offering them rewards, and
giving them leeway for accomplishing these goals.
Implementing steps for this recommendation include:
• Meeting with the Field Center Directors to emphasize the
importance of technology transfer;
• Establishing technology trasnfer goals for each Field
Center;
• Formulating an appropriate incentive system; and
• Establishing a regular program of performance review.
3. Increase the allocation of resources (funding and manpower)
to technology transfer activities.
Funding demonstrates commitment. In constant dollars, NASA's 1983
budget for the Technology Utilization Program was 64 percent of its 1980
budget--not a very convincing sign of commitment to technology transfer
(see Appendix B). By increasing resources for enhanced technology trans-
fer, NASA would demonstrate that the TU Program is more than a public rela-
tions effort. Increased funding would provide a means for experimenting with
new programs, devoting more man hours to corporate contracts, traveling to
more corporate sites, and devoting more resources to overcoming technology
adaptation problems.
In terms of both NASA feasibility and public policy, increases or
reallocation of resources would meet resistance within the agency and pos-
sibly on Capitol Hill. The Office of Management and Budget has not been
supportive of past technology transfer activities, and resistance from this
quarter and from Congress (other than the authorizing committee) can be ex-
pected if NASA requests more funds. On the other hand, if NASA reallocates
its existing funds to expand technology transfer activities, it is fostering
a zero sum game where one program benefits at the expense of others. Re-
allocation decisions are bound to meet with internal resistance.
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Oneway of dealing with resistance on both these fronts is to emphasize
the benefits to NASAof a technology transfer program. Technology transfer
should be presented as a vehicle for exchanging and exploiting technology,
not merely dispersing it.
Increasing resources for technology transfer raises the possibility of
augmenting the existing program with new approaches. Without more money,
the remaining avenue to expanding technology transfer would be to scuttle
existing programs in favor of new experimental ones. As an extreme example,
one alternative would be to close out the existing Technology Utilization
Program and replace it with experimental efforts such as those suggested
in this report. In terms of NASA feasibility, the organizational and mana-
gerial problems associated with scrapping an existing program in favor of a
new one are self evident.
Industry feasibility and future-oriented issues are not of particular
relevance to this recommendation. A few points are worth noting_however:
• By devoting more resources to technology transfer, NASA
may Convince some industry skeptics that the agency is
interested in more than a public relations job.
• Future elections may change the budgetary picture for
NASA, perhaps to the benefit of technology transfer.
• Future successes scored by foreign competitors at the
expense of the U.S. may provide further evidence of the
need for cooperation between American industry and
government. This would create a favorable environment
for increasing resources for technology transfer.
As an implementing step to increasing the allocation of resources,
the administrator should increase funding for technology transfer as a
percent of the total budget. Then, in hearings before Congress, NASA could
request additional funding and point to its own resource allocations as
evidence of its commitment to technology transfer. In other words, NASA
could go to Congress requesting a matching funds type of arrangement.
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4. Establish a technology transfer activity fund at each Field
Center under the authority of the Center Director.
This recommendationaddresses a need for internal incentives at NASA.
As such, it does not pose significant problems in terms of industry feasi-
bility, public policy, or future-oriented issues.
The activity funds should be disbursed to the Field Centers on the
basis of performance in transferring technology. SomeField Centers may
enjoy an advantage over others because of their areas of emphasis and geo-
graphic locations, but funding must be allocated to the proven performers
in order to obtain the most effective return on the dollars spent. The
Field Centers should have substantial flexibility on how the funds are used,
and experimentation should be encouraged.
Oneof the managerial problems associated with this recommendation is
the difficulty of measuring performance in transferring technology. Are
sometransfers more important than others or can the numberof transfers
simply be counted? What constitutes a successful transfer of technology?
Given the vague nature of the process, a Field Center's performance in
transferring technology must be determined largely on a judgmental basis.
Quantitative measuresof technology transfer simply maynot be feasible.
Nevertheless, certain measurescan be used as indicators of performance.
Such indicators include: number of potential clients contacted, number of
documented cases of transfer, number of information requests received, and
number of hours devoted to transfer activities. Field Center Directors
should be required to document such measures when providing regular reports
of transfer activities. Activity funds should be allocated on the basis
of these reports.
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One of the first steps toward implementing this recommendationwould
be to identify a source of funds. If additional funds are allocated to
technology transfer, these may provide a source for Field Center activity
funds. If no additional funds are allocated, someportion of Field Center
funds needs to be designated as a discretionary pool for technology transfer
activity funds. Based on their performance, Field Centers mayreceive more
or less funds than they were receiving for TU activities.
A second implementing step would be to define the criteria to be used
in determining how the activity funds will be allocated. Suggestions for
these criteria have been provided above. A uniform but brief reporting
format (both written and oral) needs to be established for Field Center
Directors and regular reporting schedules established.
5. Establish a NASA-widerecognition program for extraordinary
accomplishment in technology transfer activity.
NASApersonnel tend to regard the Technology Utilization function as a
peripheral activity whose contribution to NASA'smission is not self-evident.
This recommendationaddresses the need to reinforce management'sgreater
emphasis on this function by providing the meansby which to recognize
accomplishments in technology transfer. By doing so, the agency conveys
the messagethat technology transfer is an important activity for which
exemplary performance will be recognized. Like the recommendation for
establishing activity funds, this action addresses an internal need. It
does not have significant ramifications in terms of industry feasibility,
public policy and future-oriented issues.
In terms of NASAfeasibility, the recommendedrecognition program
raises the classic issue of managerial control. Howcan the rewards be
formulated to makethem valuable to the recipient? On what criteria should
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the recipients be chosen? Given the difficulties of determining the extent
of a particular transfer's benefits or the parties ultimately responsible
for its successes, symbolic awardswould be easier to administer than mone-
tary ones, though the latter should not be precluded. The perceived value
of these awards will depend on their position along a continuum of such
factors as:
• manyaward recipients versus few recipients,
• recognition by the recipeint's immediate supervisor versus
recognition by a higher-level administrator,
• recognition in a letter versus recognition in an awards
ceremony, and
• low level publicity versus wide-ranging publicity.
One way to enhance the status of the awards would be to encourage in-
dustrial clients to nominate award recipients. By involving industry in
the recognition process, NASA would demonstrate that transferring technology
involves making and sustaining external contacts. Success in transferring
technology should be measured not just by NASA standards, but by industry
standards as well.
Industry satisfaction should be one of the criteria for choosing the
award recipient. Other criteria to consider may be expressed as questions:
• Did the potential recipient initiate the contact that led to
transfer, or was he exceptionally responsive to a query from
industry?
• Did the potential recipient take an innovative approach to
transferring technology? What barriers did he overcome?
• What were the benefits of the transfer for industry and NASA?
• How widespread were the benefits of the transfer?
• Does this transfer offer potential avenues for future transfers?
The recognition program provides a vehicle for emphasizing that tech-
nology transfer is an agency-wide responsibility, applicable at all levels
and involving not only NASA personnel, but those in universities and in-
dustry as well.
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Implementing steps include:
• determining an appropriate form of recognition,
• establishin_ the criteria for recognition, and
• soliciting candidates through notification of
appropriate industry, university and NASA personnel.
The five recommendations discussed above are components of a broader
recommendation that NASA establish technology transfer as a vital activity
of the agency. The next group of actions contributes to a second broad
recommendation that NASA expand the channels of cooperation with industry.
i. Base cooperative efforts on areas of NASA technological
strength or areas of special interest to NASA.
NASA should concentrate on the areas it knows best. These are the
areas where it is most likely that NASA will have something of value to
offer to industry. Recalling that technology transfer is a two-way process,
NASA should concentrate in its own areas of special interest or need.
In terms of NASA feasibility, this means that the agency needs to con-
duct an inventory of its strengths and special interests. In order to be
functional, this inventory must be brief--no more than a few pages long.
Requiring brevity forces the agency to focus its efforts, and it provides
industry with a quick, accessible introduction to NASA capabilities. In
terms of industry feasibility, detailed backup information would be desirable,
but a lengthy report of NASA's technological strengths is likely to go un-
read.
Interest in NASA technologies will vary according to industry needs and
changes in the future environment. For example, renewed concern with energy
shortages could rekindle interest in NASA's solar energy capabilities. The
definition of NASA strengths may vary according to the perspective of indus-
try engineers versus government scientists, or technical researchers versus
marketing professionals. These dynamics argue for a continuing reexamination
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of NASA'sareas of emphasis in transferring technology. In defining its
strengths for the purposes of technology transfer, NASAshould consider
not only what its most sophisticated technologies are but also what "sells."
Compiling such an inventory is a first step toward implementing this
recommendation. The result of this effort should receive wide distribution.
2. Join with industry in industry/university consortia for
research and technology exchange.
The advantage of industry/university consortia is that they provide
a structure for uniting diverse groups in a mutual research effort. Partici-
pants have an opportunity to trade information while working toward a common
end. Onechallenge in organizing these endeavors is to establish a framework
which provides incentives for participation by all parties while maintaining
the integrity of each.
For both NASAand industry, participation in consortia would involve
new institutional relationships. Initializing and sustaining such relation-
ships would require attention to a number of organizational details. For
industry, the incentive to participate would be the opportunity to acquire
knowledge that would be helpful in establishing a competitive edge--either
through new products or new production processes. For NASA,the incentive
would be not only the opportunity to acquire knowledge, but also the oppor-
tunity to transfer its own know-how. The critical ingredient to successful
partnership is that both parties be convinced of the value of NASA's exper-
tise. The consortia should focus on areas of NASA's technical strength.
In terms of public policy, antitrust issues maybe of particular con-
cern when several firms in the sameindustry join in a research consortium.
Thus far, the Justice Department has exhibited tolerance for these types of
arrangements. Conflict of interest and confidentiality issues may arise
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out of the tension inherent in cooperative efforts between a private, com-
petitive firm and a public agency. While NASAhas an obligation to serve
the general public, it risks undercutting the incentive for industrial
participation if it precludes its partners from garnering a competitive
advantage from the relationship.
The public policy problems inherent in new institutional relationships
between government and industry maynot be amenable to broadly formulated
solutions. Rather, each situation may require its own adaptations or
negotiated settlements.
Several factors are at work to make this an appropriate time for partici-
pation in industry/university consortia. The Justice Department has adopted
a tolerant attitude toward cooperation; economic problems and foreign com-
petition have fostered an awarenessof the need for innovative approaches
to maintaining competitive technologies; and a number of these consortia
have been started in recent years.
Onestep toward implementation of this alternative would be to review
the structure and performance of existing consortia in order to identify
someguidelines for successful organization. Candidate universities and in-
dustries should be identified on the basis of mutual interests. Negotia-
tions with these parties would need to address such areas as direction of
research, conflict of interest, proprietary rights, costs, and commitments
of personnel. A numberof unexpected organizational details are likely to
emerge. This suggests that a project managershould be designated who is
responsible for researching the issue, initiating contacts, and hammering
out the details of partnership. Without a project coordinator, who would
provide a logical contact for industry and university participants, partner-
ship in a consortium maynever get off the ground.
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3. Expandjoint endeavor agreementsbeyond the current Materials
Processing in SpaceProgram.
The Materials Processing in SpaceProgram (MPS)provides experience
NASAcan use in organizing future joint endeavor agreements. In terms of
NASAand industry feasibility, the challenge is to foster programs which
would generate rewards sufficient to justify the costs of participation,
including the up-front costs of initiating and organizing the endeavor.
Hammeringout details on such topics as lines of communication, facility
use, and personnel commitmentsmayrequire a significant amount of time
from NASAand industry.
Arrangements of this type generate a number of public policy concerns.
In certain situations, it may appear that NASA,a government agency, is
giving undue advantage to a private firm. On the other side, industry
may have concerns about divulging proprietary information to a government
agency. As noted earlier, issues of confidentiality, conflict of interest,
patent rights and other public policy concerns maybe more amenableto
problem-specific solutions than to broad declarations of policy. Each
decision will require that NASAweigh the need to offer industry incentives
against the need to avoid an appearance of subsidizing a particular firm.
A first step toward implementing this recommendationwould be to identify
potential areas for joint endeavors. On the basis of this determination,
firms could be identified which mayhave an interest in participating in the
program. These efforts already are underway at NASA.
4. Bring industry representatives into NASA's technology planning
process.
A precedent for this type of action was established by NACAwhen it
embraced industry participation in aeronautical research planning. It is
H-18
recommendedthat industry personnel participate in technology planning,
not in the more detailed concerns of daily business. Thus, the industry
participants would act in a role comparable to that of a Board of Directors
or consultants.
In terms of NASAfeasibility, the primary concern will be to design the
program and choose participants in such a way as to encourage constructive
participation. NASApersonnel maybe prone to regard the industry represen-
tatives as distractions from their first order of business, particularly if
the industry representatives appear ill-informed. Perhaps the best method
to avoid this problem would be to begin by soliciting and accepting support
only from individuals who have somefamiliarity with NASAand who possess
demonstrated expertise in the relevant technologies.
The incentive to industry for participation would be the opportunity
to improve familiarity with NASA,its technological needs and its technolog-
ical capabilities. Participation could raise conflict of interest issues
in that industry representatives might be pictured as directing NASAplan-
ning for their own corporate benefit. This issue maybe diffused, but not
avoided, by emphasizing broad, conceptual participation, rather than day-
to-day, nuts-and-bolts participation, and by selecting participants on the
basis of acknowledgedtechnical expertise.
Bringing outsiders into NASA'stechnology planning would assist the
agency in anticipating technological change. Industry representatives may
be no better informed than government representatives, but they have a
different network of contacts and interests. Their knowledge would sup-
plement NASA's in identifying potential developments relevant to NASA
technology.
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Steps toward implementation include reviewing the NACAprogram for
its pitfalls and successes and identifying candidates in industry for par-
ticipation in the program.
5. Test the feasibility of encouraging engineers, representing
industry, to search and assess NASAtechnology for applica-
tions.
Encouraging industry engineers to assess NASAtechnology for possible
applications would substitute a "demand-pull" situation for the typical
"technology-push" situation. Instead of having NASApromote its technology
to them, the industry representatives would have the opportunity to initiate
the process with their own needs foremost in mind. The essence of this
recommendation is that industry has the best idea of what it needs. Thus,
it is a recommendationformulated with industry feasibility in mind. The
incentive to participate for industry is the opportunity to gain access to
new technology.
This incentive raises familiar public policy issues. Would NASAbe
giving undue advantage to a private firm by allowing it to search NASA
technology? Would this open-door policy accelerate the leakage of techno-
logical know-howto foreign countries? The questions are interrelated.
NASAmayavoid the appearance of favoring one firm at the expenseof others
if it opens its technology to all comers. By doing sojhowever, the agency
weakens its ability to control the flow of information to foreigners.
It may be necessary to classify sometechnology as proprietary informa-
tion. Beyondthat, NASAshould screen candidates according to their inter-
ests and expertise, but it need not make special efforts to be overly pro-
tective of access to its technology. Oneof the basic tenets of technology
transfer is that technological advantages are gained through active exchange
of information, not by harboring secrets.
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In terms of NASAfeasibility, there maybe someresentment of industry
engineers "intruding" to study and ask questions about NASAtechnology.
The agency should limit these technology reviews to a reasonable number,
and the candidate screening process should serve this purpose Evenwith
these limits, there maybe some internal resistance to the program, but such
a reaction seemsan inevitable part of making technology transfer a vital
(e.g., time-consuming) activity.
This recommendationwould benefit NASAnot only by facilitating tech-
nology transfer, but also by improving its industry contacts. These contacts
would provide valuable information in terms of technological trends and in-
dustry needs and capabilities.
As steps toward implementing this recommendation, NASAneeds to consider
a number of procedural details. What technology is available for review?
What form should the review take (literature searches, laboratory tours,
engineering interviews, etc_? Howshould industry candidates be identified
and screened? Each of these questions requires a working knowledge of how
the agency functions, but none should constitute a significant barrier to
implementing the recommendation.
6. Explore meansto use industry-related publications as
channels to publicize NASAtechnology.
NASAscientists and engineers cannot be blamed for seeking to publish
only in the most prestigious journals. Unfortunately, these journals may
not be the ones with the widest readership in industry. Simply publishing
information does not constitute an active approach to technology transfer,
particularly if the information is distributed in publications rarely read
by industry. On the other hand, publishing in trade magazines and industry
journals at least demonstrates an effort to concentrate on target markets.
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In terms of NASAfeasibility, several steps maybe taken to encourage
the use of these publications:
• Distribute a list of target magazines, along with information
on how to submit articles, to NASApersonnel.
• Offer recognition awards for articles receiving the widest
distribution.
• Makepublication in these magazines one criterion considered
in performance review.
• Advertise NASAtechnology and publications in these magazines
whether NASAarticles are published in them or not.
While industry-related publications are an obvious form of dissemination,
others should be considered as well. These include trade fairs, computer-
based information banks, and new forms of information exchange madepossible
by advances in telecommunications. Organizing this effort and creating
incentives for participation by NASApersonnel are the major tasks to imple-
menting this recommendation. Concerns for industry feasibility, public policy
issues and future-oriented issues are relatively minor.
7. Review with the U.S. Air Force additional meansto expand or
assure NASAan aerospace industrial base.
Contracts are one of NASA'smost powerful tools for transferring tech-
nology. Its contract specifications can foster innovation by requiring the
contract recipient to either develop new technologies or adopt someoneelse's
technology. Either way, a new technology is "transferred" to the contract
recipient. By expanding its contractor base, NASAexpands the field of
recipients for these new technologies.
Air Force contractors provide a logical avenue for expanding this base
since NASAand USAFhave similar contracting needs. The Air Force can provide
NASAwith an expandedpool of recipients for requests for proposals. This
recommendationoffers no real difficulties in terms of the screening criteria
and requires only somecoordination with the Air Force in order to be imple-
mented.
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Case Studies of NASA-Industry Cooperation in the
Transfer of Technology
The three short papers which follow are brief "case studies," limited
to the systematic description of three examples in which NASAworked closely
with representatives of industry to cooperatively push the frontiers of
technology. Each, in a different way, provides an example of how technology
has been transferred or shared.
Two, "Wind Tunnels," and "Crashworthiness Design Technology," are in
aeronautics, while the third, "Goddard Battery Workshop," has its origins
in a commonspace technology challenge. Each deals with a program that
stretches over manyyears.
The first, "Wind Tunnels," exemplifies a special characteristic of
NASA(and its precurser, NACA)--unique facilities and the capability to
provide qualified staff for their operation and data reduction. The
crashworthiness case study reflects a variety of cooperative means, based
upon voluntary sharing, to meet commontechnical objectives. The battery
conferences reveal how an ad hoc approach to dealing with a problem became
regularized into a recognized, annual event.
These cases suggest the pervasiveness of opportunities for technology
sharing and transfer between NASAand industry.
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CASESTUDY:WINDTUNNELS
"The wind tunnel is indispensible to the development
of modern aircraft. Todayno aeronautical engineer
would contemplate committing an advanced aircraft
design to flight without first measuring its lift and
drag properties and its stability and controllability
in a wind tunnel. Tunnel tests first, free]_lighttests later, is the proper order of things.
In 1908, Wilbur Wright startled the Europeanaviation communityby
piloting his Flyer for a successful one and one-half hour flight. While
the United States governmenthad not purchased any sort of flying machine,
by this time European countries began to pour major resources into aero-
nautical development, including wind tunnels. Between 1903 and the start of
World War I, Europe had captured technical leadership in aviation. Central-
ized government-funded aeronautical laboratories were built in England,
France, Germany, Italy and Russia. Whenthe war began, France had 1,400
military aircraft; Germany,1,000; Russia, 800; and Britian, 400. The U.S.
flying machine inventory was 23.
NACA/NASA's Research Role
Prior to the end of the war, NACA began drawing plans for its first
wind tunnel at Langley Field. The emphasis of this new course of action
was based on the idea that, when the war ended, there would be
classes of aircraft and trained personnel available for full operation.
Also envisioned was a strong link to a new industry of plane-makers, since
NACA had no intention of manufacturing aircraft. Ames and Lewis Research
Centers both were placed close to the fledgling aviation industry sites in
recognition of the twofold purpose of servicing the industry and learning
from it.
Airfoil, or wing, research began as early as 1923 and, with the com-
pletion of the Variable Density Tunnel at Langley, has become one of the
most fruitful and long-running programs. The VDT quickly established NACA
as a technically competent research organization and witnessed all manner
of aircraft from monstrous Zeppelins to military aircraft. An NACA Technical
Report puslished in 1933 listed a total of 78 airfoil sections that were
tested. This technical report eventually found its way into the
iBaals, Donald D., and Corliss, William R. Wind Tunnels of NASA,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, page i.
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designs of manysuccessful aircraft companies' ships, e.g., the Douglas
DC-8 transport, the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, and the famousLockheed
twin-tailed P-38. Airfoil design and analysis remain important areas in
the changing designs of manufacturers today. On the west coast, the
original Amestunnel began in 1944and has tested over i00 aircraft.
Nearly anything that flies has been tested at Ames, including sleek jet
fighters, cargo planes, helicopters, commercial airliners, and the
space shuttle orbitor.
Coordinating Arrangements
In tracing progress of aerospace and aircraft industries over the
past 65 years, it would be impossible to ignore the joint efforts of
NACA/NASA and private industry. Each concern involved--whether it was the
Air Force, Navy, Lockheed, Grumman, Bell, Rockwell, United Technology, Mc-
Donnell Douglas, Ames, Langley or Lewis--committed expertise, problems,
time and money. According to the experience of Donald Baals, an aeronautical
_ngineer with NACA/NASA fo_ more than 40 years, each partner had a comple-
mentary function. As the aircraft industry developed, it was only natural
that aircraft and NASA engineers worked together to transfer technical in-
formation and share facilities to lessen the financial burden of each. Baals
remembers the 1940's as the most interesting and productive in that NACA
often served as a catalyst and the most effective give and take of information
occurred in a very short turn-around time.
During the First and Second World Wars, NACA and the armed forces were
inevitable partners in problem solving. But out of these years rose the
need for industry involvement in manufacturing engines, flight systems and
the like. Agreements during this time included the exchange of personnel
and technical data, access to use of facilities without charge, and publi-
cation of research papers. The aircraft industry did thrive despite the
accessibility of confidential data, and out of these endeavors emerged monu-
mental results. Research and development included countless areas of real
concern--tail-spin recovery and life-saving parachutes, propeller and
basic wing design for vertical and short takeoff and landing situations,
retractable landing gears, wing and propeller icing, swept and delta wing
evolution, laminar flow experimentation and full scale testing.
Nearly every present-day aircraft was developed out of a need to assure pre-
dictability and performance. The industry began in the 1950's to exploit
all of the wind tunnel theories towards the primary goal of manufacturing
civil transports.
Currently at Ames, NASA and McDonnell Douglas are engaged in a project
which is part of the Aircraft Energy Efficiency Program. This model jet
engine simulation, conducted with the help of various other industries, will
help aircraft designers develop jet transports that hav_ 1_ss dr_g _nd are
more economical to fly. NASA and Hamilton Standard are deep into a joint
research program which will lay the groundwork for prop fan technology, as
industry planners cannot ignore fuel prices and the depletion of natural
resources. In the wind tunnel tests, the prop fan experiments are realizing
an efficiency of 80 percent. The partnership that now exists between NASA and
the aeronautics industry has evolved over two-thirds of a century. It is
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a unique working relationship that is an exemplary procedure for effectively
interacting with the private sector. It would be difficult to create such
a relationship between the government and a mature industry today.
Current and Future Problem Areas
Today, despite the willingness to cooperate on everyone's part, cooper-
ative agreements have turned into major undertakings. Wind tunnel facilities
have become more than major in size, as of course have their capacities.
This has created problems. It is difficult to schedule time and/or facili-
ties. NASA is also limited by budgets and a pressing need to cover all
operational costs. A "sales job" approach, wherein a company pays for
tunnel time, is often advantageous in recouping ongoing operational costs.
The space program has also occupied in-house testing time.
It is of course an advantage to have one's own wind tunnel--an idea
followed by many aircraft manufacturers, such as Boeing, Lockheed, North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas. Often these companies do routine
testing in their own facility and return to Ames, Langley, and Lewis to
complete and/or verify their own findings.
Tracing specific involvements over time appears to be next to impossible
due to personnel turnover, records retrieval problems, the number of facili-
ties involved and time lapsed. Lee Stollar, Deputy Director of Aeronautics
at Ames, estimates that cooperative efforts involve perhaps 33 percent of opera-
tions time at that facility today. Most often, a private company, the military
and NASA invest equal time and resources.
Conclusion
In 1980, 60 U.S. aviation experts assembled at the National Academy of
Sciences Study Center in Woods Hole, MA, for the purpose of determining
NASA's future role in aeronautics. One of the three major conclusions of
the workshop exemplifies opinions of those mentioned above:
"The close and successful working relationship that was
initiated in 1915 between the National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics. . and the fledgeling aviation industry
and has continued uninterrupted to its present mature state
under. . . NASA must be strengthened and maintained. The
present relationship is unique in the United States and
stands as an example of effective cooperation between govern-
ment and industry, which is particularly important in light
of the current concern with developing a cooperative and
supportive relationship between government and industry.
Contrary to a view widely held by many sectors of private
industry that there should be little or no government in-
volvement in their affairs, the various sectors of the
aviation industry that were represented, clearly
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endorsed the present NASA-industry working relationship.
The key point here is that government cooperation. .
can have a stimulating and strengthening effect on an
industry that will enable it to compete more effectively
in the international marketplace and pre_ent its vul-
nerability to foreign trade offensives. ''_
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CASESTUDY: CRASHWORTHINESSDESIGNTECHNOLOGY
In 1972 Langley Research Center in cooperation with the FAAand in-
dustry began a program to develop technology for improved crashworthiness
and occupant survivability in general aviation aircraft. The ongoing
program includes formal contract relationships as well as informal exchanges
of information with the FAA(Research Center in NewJersey and Civil Aero-
medical Institute in Oklahoma) and several industrial entities. The effort
includes analytical and experimental work and structural concept development.
Crashworthiness design technology is divided into three areas addressed by
both Langley and the FAAbut, due to the nature of each agency's designated
functions within the government, their tasks vary.
Under the general area of environmental technology, Langley acquires
actual crash data, through records voluntarily submitted by air carriers
and from its own crash tests, to use in prototype development; the FAA, as
a regulatory agency, evaluates quantitative crash data to define a crash
envelope. Concerning the second area --airframe design--Langley conducts
full scale crash tests, develops and validates advanced analytical techniques,
and conceives and evaluates concepts for future designs of airframes; the
FAAassesses current analytical technology. Finally, under componentdesign
technology, Langley develops all aspects of cabin interiors and the FAA
evaluates seats and restraint systems.
The flow of information betweenNASAand the FAAappears to be open and
easy. Each critiques the other's work and joint contracts are sometimes
let. Both agencies often participate in the samegovernment, industrial and
association conferences which reinforces each group's understanding of the
other's work and needs. There are, however, minor barriers to a totally
satisfactory relationship. Oneofficial at Langley related a perceived "slug-
gishness" in the setting of regulations at the FAA. Another source related
that the Army requires more stringent safety precautions in its helicopters
than does the FAA. But, becausepersonnel at Langley work closely with
both the FAA, which regulates, and with industry, which bears the expense
of any regulations, they are careful to "walk a fine line" between them by
remaining neutral and presenting information only and by not making any recom-
mendations regarding those regulations.
Langley and Private Industry
Researchers at NASA and in private enterprise stress the importance of
working openly with peers. Personal communication is considered important to
avoid misinterpretations. But in so estoric an endeavor as flight safety
which is based on mathematics and physics, it is someL±m=_ u_±eu_L _u f_L1u
others with enough of the same background and understanding with whom to
easily communicate. Most of Langley's activities, therefore, have been in
the nature of sharing information rather than mutual participation on particu-
lar projects. In many instances there is no formal contract established be-
tween the entities. Both NASA, with its vast facilities such as wind t,,nnels
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and laboratories, and industry, with the ability to provide test items such
as seats and other equipment, find it mutually beneficial to foster informal
avenues of cooperation. The following case studies exemplify the results of
such cooperation.
i. GrummanAerospace Corporation
A close relationship has existed between Grummanand Langley for approxi-
mately 15 years. Both entities work on crashworthiness but NASAis evidently
at the forefront of research becauseGrummanhas conducted its work "almost
as an adjunct to Langley's efforts." Besides mutually exchanging information,
Grummanhas been a NASAcontractor. One of the better knownprojects done
under NASAcontract is DYCAST,a computer program which simulates crashes of
planes, helicopters or even automobiles. The Grummanprogram is based on
a Langley concept and was returned to Langley where it was refined and applied
to vast amounts of crash data in order to further understand impact phenomena.
It was also used at Langley to simulate tests of load limiting substructures(floors). The benefits to NASAand the FAAare in eventual increased aviation
safety. Grummanbenefits by being able to use the program for its own research
and as a consulting tool which it will market to automobile, helicopter, and
aircraft companies. DYCASTwas prereleased to interested companies and indi-
viduals for evaluation. In its final form it will be disseminated through
COSMIC,and Grummanwill continue to privately sell courses and consulting
on the program's specific uses. Personnel at Grummanconsider the NASArela-
tionship of prime importance and stated a willingness to give NASAprojects
top priority in task assignments.
2. MooneyAircraft Corporation
MooneyAircraft personnel had been studying laminar flow dynamics.
Whenit was noticed that there were small inconsistencies between the results
they were getting and NASA's data, Mooneyresearchers went to Langley to
learn more about the problem. Theyexplained everything they had done and
NASAagreed to investigate the samearea. Later, Mooneysubcontracted to a
research center at Texas A&Mfor further work and no formal contract was
ever negotiated with Langley. In relation to the Crashworthiness Program,
researchers at Mooney"simply becamefriendly with people at Langley working
in the samearea." Again there wasno particular project, but each visited
the other's facilities. Since the issues involved were so complex, the
contact at Mooneyestimates that it took about a year to establish effective
communications between the companyand Langley.
Someof the specific ways in which Mooneyand Langley have shared ex-
pertise are: Mooneyused NASAresearch data in air flow research for develop-
ment of its air foil; Mooneygave NASAresults of wind tunnel tests which
led to insights into prediction of crashworthiness; Mooneywill give full
scale verification of results gained from a new plane on which Mooneyhas
worked for four years and will soon test. There are no formal contracts
for any of these arrangements.
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3. Bell Helicopter
Langley and Bell "shared and looked at concepts together" to get ideas
for civil aircraft. For the last test, Langley used one of Bell's experi-
mental seats. The two groups shared all available engineering data. There
was no contract involved.
4. Boeing, Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas
Sometimesa way can be found to transfer information even though one or
more of the participants is reluctant. Suchwas the case whenLangley re-
quested crash data from Boeing, Lockheedand McDonnell Douglas for the period
1959-1979. Aircraft manufacturers are extremely sensitive to the possibility
of litigation over past accidents and none cared to be singled out. Langley
was aware of this, and the request was worded so that the companiesknew
that only accident trends were to be studied and not specific crashes or
specific carriers. The companiescomplied, went through their own files to
preserve confidentiality, and were entitled to all information derived from
the study.
5. Ford Motor Company
Although not part of the Crashworthiness Program, another type of
"partnership" is exemplified by NASAand Ford. Ford Motor Companyprovided
test vehicles for noise reduction studies and was given test data to further
its own research.
Conferences
Langley Research Center actively participates in industrial and associa-
tion conferences and, of course, holds many seminars and workshops of its
own. At the workshops, small groups of research peers are invited to attend
and interact. All participants seem to freely share their most current data.
A formal conference was recently held jointly by NASA and the AIAA
(American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics). The attendees were
principally members of nonaerospace industries from the Fortune i000.
Speakers were from Langley, Lewis, Ames and Headquarters. The topic was
Advanced Materials Technologies. Participants were encouraged to interact
with the agency representatives and among themselves. "Partnership" arrange-
ments are expected to spinoff from these meetings.
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has provided a well respected
forum for the presentation of Langley papers (as well as others) and for the
exchange of information among all researchers interested in aviation.
Langley reports much of its seat and substructure work here.
The EAA (Experimental Aircraft Association), directed by Paul Poberezny,
is the largest experimental aviation group in existence. The purpose of its
meetings is the open ended transfer of technology. Attendees include research-
ers, manufacturers, and government agency personnel.
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NASA and the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA)
The RTCA is a nongovernment organization looking at problems in aviation.
It is funded by the FAA. Langley is assisting the RTCA by studying in depth
a problem with the reliability of emergency locator transmitters. Informa-
tion is being provided by every segment of the aviation community. The
investigating committee, called Special Committee - 136, is chaired by
Dr. Robert Thomson of Langley. Langley is demonstrating ELT sensor activa-
tion problems by mounting ELT specimens in full-scale crash test aircraft
as well as conducting other tests. Other members of RTCA will provide data
from actual crashes and non-distress activation.
Barriers and Incentives
Very few barriers to cooperative efforts are evident from the interviews
made for this report. Contacts frequently stressed the benefits to all con-
cerned in being able to openly discuss and share data with others in the field
of crash dynamics. There do not seem to be many problems with proprietary
information since, in one contact's words, "What happens is that details
of specific research are sufficiently complex that only researchers on the
problem at the moment are able to understand it. Details of the mathematics
and testing are so precise that, unless one has been working for some time
on it, the information would not be useful. Anyone else might as well wait
for the information to be published." However, the esoteric nature of the
technology may make current methods of scientific exchange less than efficient.
In so highly technical a field as crash dynamics, researchers must often
spend a great deal of time searching for other individuals working on exactly
the same problem and using similar approaches. In general, though, it was
felt that an imposed systematized method of technology transfer would shut
off needed creativity and openness of contacts. One contact also expressed
concern that management tends to simplify transmission of technology and
needs to work more closely with their research people to better understand
the intricacies involved.
Perhaps a more concrete barrier is industry's fear of litigation. Air-
craft manufacturers, for instance, fear regulations made by the FAA but they
are also reluctant to make changes through their own research because they
may be held responsible for not making them sooner, especially if it could
be shown that injury occurred because of lack of innovation. Consequently
they must be dealt with sensitively by NASA.
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CASESTUDY: GODDARDBATTERYWORKSHOP
Backsround and Format
In 1968 a two-day review was held at Goddard Space Flight Center to
determine why cells in the battery of an orbiting astronomical laboratory
had failed a performance test. Those involved were battery users from
industry and government and the manufacturer of the cells in question.
Two things became apparent: first, that the manufacturer was reluctant
to share proprietary production information and, second, that attendees
had not previously had such an opportunity to communicate with each other.
To alleviate the latter problem and to increase efficiency and lifetime of
spacecraft battery systems through exchange of information between users
and manufacturers, the first formal annual Battery Workshop was held at
Goddard in 1969.
Each year the workshop is announced in publications such as Advanced
Battery Technolosy and Batteries Today. Invitations are sent to the
Electrochemical Society and a mailing list of 600 interested people amassed
over the years. Participation is open to all including battery users, manu-
facturers, and researchers from industry, government, and academia; foreign-
ers must have clearance to attend. At the 1981 workshop 222 individuals
attended from the following types of organizations: 24 different battery
manufacturers, 22 battery users, 17 government and military agencies, 11
universities and consulting firms, and 25 other types.
The workshop is oriented to emphasize problem solving and getting results.
Unlike a conference or symposium, the intent is not to make formal presenta-
tions of dated material but to bring notes and visuals describing up-to-the-
minute progress. Free-wheeling discussion and intercommunication are con-
sidered of prime importance. Failures and problems are verbally communicated
which would not have been admitted to in formal papers.
Originally, the number of presentations was limited and length of dis-
cussion sessions was not. NASA used a court reporting service to provide
verbatim transcripts of the sessions. However, more and more people re-
quested time to give reports; some had to present a paper or they couldn't
come. To allow for this and yet not curtail discussion time, the workshop
was lengthened from two to three days around 1973. At about the same time
NASA started producing the proceedings as a conference publication, which
are available through Scientific Technical Aerospace Reports (STAR) and
Selected Current Aerospace Notices (SCAN).
The first workshop topic was nickel cadmium batteries; nickel hydrogen
batteries were included in the mid-1970's and lithium in the late 1970's.
Time ' -_ _-_ ..... ___ .... _ _^_ ...... _ _.... +k_ years +_
format has been altered to optimally accomodate both freewheeling discussion
and prepared presentations. The workshop is now a combination of panel
sessions, paper presentations, and question/answer periods.
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It normally costs $25,000 to put on a workshop, including a court re-
porter at $8,000-$10,000 taping, word processing, typing, reviewing, etc.
Funding for the 1982 workshop wascut to $7,000-$8,000.
The workshop is unique in the industry. An Electrochemical Society
conference requires reports to be submitted 6-9 months before presentation.
Becauseof the workshop's informal format and no prior clearance requirement,
a person can showup on the day of a session and present yesterday's results.
Quality of presentations and visuals maynot be uniformly high due to the
lack of screening, but this drawback is more than compensatedfor by the
catalytic stimulation of ideas.
As an annual affair, the workshophas established a feeling of continuity
and comaraderie throughout the industry. The pattern of communication and
information sharing that has been produced otherwise wouldn't exist. While
year-round communication within the industry has been enhancedby contacts
madeat the workshops, what occurs at a workshop cannot be duplicated. The
variety of ideas presented within those three days brings the overall picture
of a development's status into focus in a way two people can never approach.
The feedback a manufacturer gets en masseat a workshop maybe considered
more valuable than individual customer =o_nplaints.
Participants
The workshop is directed by the battery users, from both government and
industry. They candidly describe their experiences with the manufacturers'
products, including test results as well as actual performance successes and
failures. Manufacturers basically listen to this feedback, taking the
problems raised back to their own laboratories to examine in greater
detail. While discussion of performance can be very specific--for example,
pinpointing exactly where a leak occurs in a certain battery and under what
conditions--the discussion does not go into production methods that may have
resulted in the leak, as such methods are considered proprietary by the manu-
facturer. Users' comments are limited to government programs for which test
results are available and public information; testing for the commercial
sector is considered proprietary.
This protective behavior of manufacturers creates some problems but
does not critically limit what the workshop accomplishes. Manufacturing
techniques may not be presented at the workshop but users are familiar with
them from close association with particular manufacturers. Users must be
careful during the workshop, therefore, to not reveal such information to
competitors.
The role of academic researchers is somewhat unclear. Bec_,,se the werk-
shop is engineering oriented little effort is made to present theoretical
research, which some perceive as a weakness. To others, the academicians
attending have had a limited "hands on" experience and are there to learn
about the "real world"; their interests, such as how to design an electrode,
are not suitable workshop topics but they contribute during discussions of
basic concepts.
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TechnolosY Transfer
Workshop topics and the problems discussed are geared toward aerospace
applications from NASA and unclassified Air Force programs. Aerospace
batteries and terrestrial batteries do differ. Whereas a car battery is
said to be "flooded," space batteries operate in a "starved" system, i.e.,
there is no electrolyte solution in a space battery because fluid in space
separates into droplets. Space batteries have to be efficient, reliable,
and durable for a number of years. These qualities and ancillary improve-
ments in testing and storage are applicable to terrestrial batteries as
well.
Working with batteries for space involves a different philosophy from
batteries for use on earth, however. Batteries for space are produced in
small quantities and each must be 100 percent reliable, whereas terrestrial
batteries are produced in large numbers and the goal is to make a large per-
cent of those produced highly reliable.
Cost is the major barrier to technology transfer. The cost to make a
high-quality aerospace battery is of little concern when it means a satellite
either works or doesn't. The consumer, however, will not pay for the quality
required to make a battery last ten years; a less than i00 percent reliable
battery is perfectly acceptable.
Such marketing dictates are joined by other evidence of lag in the
application of innovative aerospace technology to terrestrial batteries.
Manufacturers, having already made a big capital investment in production
methods, are reluctant to make the changes necessary to produce, e.g., the
improved electrochemically made positive electrodes introduced at the work-
shop.
Aerospace battery technology transfer exemplifies that impediment to
transfer in which the users may identify the benefits of a new technology
but its implementation gets delayed in the commercial sector, where the costs
and benefits of adopting the new technology are weighed differently.
As far as dissemination of information beyond the workshop is concerned,
there is no indication that the proceedings themselves have much of an
impact on the industry. No other specific NASA documentation, such as
Special Publications or Technical Support Packages, have resulted from work-
shop activity. SP's, TSP's, and other relevant NASA documents are made
available during the workshop.
Benefits
The workshops have proved beneficial to participants who have neither
provided in one three-day period. Airing problems that aerospace engineers
have with batteries helps to avoid pitfalls, educates inexperienced and junior
level people, and provides a mechanism for obtaining help with potential prob-
lems. The exposure and give-and-take afforded by the workshop setting pro-
motes changes and lessens the impact of a new technology, although it is
impossible to determine to what degree.
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Over the years batteries have become more reliable and reproduceable,
partly because of workshop feedback. In the aerospace industry, improvements
in battery production have meant marked savings. For example, the need for
duplicate testing has been eliminated. Aerospace contractors used to buy
3-4 times as many cells as necessary--enough for testing and selecting matched
cells for the flight set. The battery manufacturer's test data were unreliable,
so the aerospace contractor did its own testing; such duplicate testing is
very costly. Due to improvements in manufacturing, reproduction, and selection,
the aerospace contractor no longer has to conduct tests.
Another example of how the workshop has benefitted battery technology is
accelerated aging testing. The industry can't afford to wait ten years test-
ing a battery that is supposed to last ten years; battery testing must be
done as fast as possible. This demands the development of accelerated aging
techniques that will yield the same data as real time testing. Accelerated
aging procedures are still being formulated and discussions over the years at
the workshop have contributed to improving the methodology.
Other specific benefits attributed to the workshop are a better definition
of reconditioning, better thermal control, and the general shift toward use of
electrochemically made positive electrodes.
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ILLUSTRATIONSOFINDUSTRY-UNIVERSITYCONSORTIA
As part of NASA's effort to expand the channels of cooperation with in-
dustry, DRI has recommendedthat the agency join with industry, universities
and research laboratories in consortia for research and technology exchange.
This attachment provides an introduction to existing industry/university
consortia by providing examples of various types of consortia and an indica-
tion of their funding levels. This information demonstrates someof the al-
ternatives available to NASAand provides a starting point for investigating
the feasibility of NASAparticipation.
Between 1975and 1982, industry funding for university research climbed
from less than $i00 million to more than $200 million. By 1990, industry
ifunding could be as high as $600million. Cooperative efforts between
Carnegie-Mellon and Westinghouse, Massachusetts General Hospital (Harvard)
and Hoechst A.G., and Washington University and Monsanto are well-publicized
examples of the increasing numberof industry/university consortia. These
consortia may take a variety of forms, several of which are discussed below.
Centers of excellence. In consortia of this type, industry funds are
used to establish university research centers which address topics of in-
terest to industry. An example is provided by the Semiconductor Research
Cooperative (SRC) which is a subsidiary of the Semiconductor Industry
Association. SRC is soliciting corporate contributions of at least $50,000
in an effort to build an annual budget of $40-50 million. With this money,
SRC plans to establish 8 to I0 "centers of excellence" beginning with a
l"colleges, Firms Discuss Conflicts of Industry-Backed Research," Argus
Leader, 19 December 1982, Section F, p. 2.
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joint project between the University of California at Berkeley and Carnegie-
Mellon and another project at Cornell University. Both of these centers
2
will be working in the area of computer-aided design.
Special state funds maybe earmarked to support centers of excellence.
In Arizona, for example, the state has assisted Arizona State University in
establishing the Center for Engineering Excellence. Of nearly $30 million
projected to underwrite the new center, the state is supplying $20 million,
with industry contributing the remainder; construction of microelectronic
and computer laboratory facilities is under way.
University-sponsored liaison programs. The Industrial Liaison Program
(ILP) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) provides an example
of this type of program. Each company belonging to the program has a liaison
officer to assess company interests and needs. The officer tries to match
these needs with services provided by ILP. This program is passive in the
sense that transfer is accomplished by review of current MIT research problems
and new ideas, review of MIT publications and member attendance at symposia
and seminars. Any research work on specific problems a company might have
would be referred to a faculty consultant. Over 270 companies belong to the
3
program, including 40 companies in Europe and 30 in Japan.
University/industry cooperative centers. In the early 1970s, the National
Science Foundation (NSF) launched the Experimental R&D Incentives Program
to provide startup funds for research programs which have matching industry
support. The MIT-Industry Polymer Processing Program was begun in 1973 on
2"Industry Invests In Research Centers," High Technology, May 1983, p. 15.
3The Industrial Liaison Program of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (brochure presented by MIT)_ April 1981, no pagination.
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this basis. Today, the MIT program is fully supported by a consortium of 12
industrial firms which pay an annual fee depending on the firm's size.
The Experimental R&DIncentives Program has evolved into the University-
Industry Cooperative Research Centers Program. This program is part of NSF's
Innovation Processes Research Section under the Division of Industrial Science
and Technological Innovation (ISTI). The program has provided startup funds
for nine university research efforts.
Oneof these is the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute's Center for Inter-
active ComputerGraphics. Formedin 1977, the Center had an operating
budget of $620,000 in 1982, which included $480,000 in industry support.
Companiescontribute about $20,000annually to become"Industrial Associates";
these funds are used to support graduate students and research staff. The
Industrial Associates are involved in setting guidelines for selection of
research projects concentrating on interactive computer graphics and CAD/
4CAMprojects.
Besides the MIT Polymer Processing Program and Rensselaer's Center for
Interactive ComputerGraphics, there are seven other programs partially
5funded by NSF:
4Developmentof University-lndustry Cooperative Research Centers:
Historical £rofiies, ed. J.D. Eveiand and William Hetzner, innovation
Processes Research Section, National Science Foundation, May 1982j p. 75.
5james D. Bruce, "University-Industry Interactions, The M.I.T. Experience,"
paper presented to the International Association of Consultants in Higher
Education in Essex, United Kingdom, Sept. 13-15, 1981, no pagination.
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Sponsoring University ProgramName
University of Massachusetts
Ohio State University
CaseWestern Reserve University
North Carolina State University
Rutgers University
Iowa State University
Center for U-Mass/Industry Research
in Polymers
Center for Welding Research
Center for Applied Polymer Research
Cooperative Research Center for Communi-
cations and Signal Processing
Ceramics Cooperative Research Center
Advancementof Building Technologies
Source: NSF
These programs are not limited to those initiated with government funding.
The University of Illinois, for example, established a Fracture Control
Program nearly ten years ago, based upon cooperative funding and information
interchange with interested industry. Representatives of participating
companies attend semiannual briefings, consult with faculty, and exchange
data and research results. Faculty mayvisit plants, collect operating
information, and even run cooperative tests or other procedures. Informa-
tion is shared, first, within the consortium of participants, then with the
wider community.
Issues in industry/university consortia. The types of consortia dis-
cussed above exemplify an increasingly common arrangement: a research
center which combines the facilities and expertise of universities with the
expertise and financial capabilities of industry. The following consortia
may be able to provide valuable information on how these arrangements work,
their strengths and weaknesses, and how NASA can participate:
Sponsoring University
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Program Name
Washington University
Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology
Stanford University
Arizona State University
University of Minnesota
North Carolina State, University of
North Carolina/Chapel Hill,
North Carolina A&T
Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology
University of Michigan
University of RhodeIsland
Carnegie-Mellon University
Center for Biotechnology
Laboratory for Manufacturing and
Productivity
Center for Integrated Systems (CIS)
Engineering Excellence for the 80s
Microelectronics and Information
Sciences (MEIS)
Microelectronics Center of North
Carolina
Polymer Processing Program
Center for Robotics and Integrated
Manufacturing (CRIM)
Robotics Center
Robotics Institute
Source: "Industry Invests in ResearchCenters," Hish Technolosy, May 1983,
p. 17.
With the proliferation of industry/university consortia, several recurrln_
issues have emerged. One is what to do about patents and licensing. The
emerging consensus seems to be that the universities retain patent rights
to all new items produced, and the companies involved in the relationship
automatically have non-exclusive royalty-free licenses. Any non-member com-
panies who wish to use the patent must pay for the non-exclusive license
and the royalty income is retained by the university. In cases where the
companies are involved with a university on a very limited membership program,
an exclusive license would be granted to the company involved and any royalty
income would be shared.
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It is necessary for both sides to compromise in order to meld the ob-
jectives of the academic communitywith the shorter-term profit objectives
of the business community. In the area of publications, the general agree-
ment seemsto be that publication of information sponsored by industry is
usually held back for a few months to allow companyreview. This seemsto
be done on the basis of "reasonable" time periods rather than by any set
guidelines. The fear that close university/industry relationships will
hamper academic and intellectual freedom and curtail basic research in favor
of more applied projects seemsto be growing stronger. The "profit" motive
is not seen as an appropriate posture for a university. To take that sug-
gestion further, Dr. JamesBruce of MIT's Industrial Liaison Program states
that starting university/industry collaboration programs with the intent of
raising moneyfor the university will cause eventual failure. In his ex-
perience these programs must be service-oriented with a stated purpose of
6increasing transfer of technology.
Industry/university consortia appear to have a numberof benefits.
They provide hands-on experience for graduate students and an opportunity
for participating companies to look over prospective employees. The research
findings may contribute to the strength of a company,an industry, or the
economyas a whole. Technology transfer is accelerated. These benefits,
of course, will be weighed against the costs of participation--costs which
maybe measured in terms of dollars, academic freedom, threats to proprietary
information, patent rights, and other factors. Whether the trend toward
starting and operating these consortia will continue to grow will depend on
the performance of existing institutions in dealing with these issues.
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THEFUTURENVIRONMENTFORTECHNOLOGYTRANSFER
The purpose of this review is to examine possible shifts in the future
environment for their potential impact on NASA'sefforts to enhance tech-
nology transfer. Three areas of concern are reviewed: the economy, foreign
competition, and the political environment. Future developments in these
areas are uncertain, but the types of developments discussed below appear
reasonably likely to occur. The justification for discussing these develop-
ments and not others is that these are particularly relevant to technology
transfer.
The Economy
Possible developments. There is a consensus that the U.S. is shifting
from a manufacturing to a service-based economy. In the manufacturing
sector, high technology industries may prosper while the smokestack in-
dustries continue to decline. These transitions may be characterized by a
period of difficult adjustment, marked by such problems as structural un-
employment, labor shortages in some high technology industries, and contro-
versies over the allocation of capital.
Evidence of these problems is widespread. While the nationwide unem-
ployment rate remains high, the unemployment problem is particularly acute
along the Ohio Valley and other old industrial areas in the country. Auto-
motive and steel workers who have been laid off are only beginning to realize
that their jobs may be permanently lost. While some may seek to retrain
themselves, frustration and despair may be more widespread reactions° par-
ticularly if retraining programs are unavailable or ineffective in placing
their graduates in jobs. The result may be the emergence of a large group
of structurally unemployed workers who constitute a drag on the economy and
a source of political discontent.
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Meanwhile, there is concern that the country will lack sufficient
numbers of engineers and technical people to sustain the growth of high
technology industries. The problem is self perpetuating. As the supply
of engineers dwindles in relation to demand, the starting salary for en-
gineers climbs. Universities find it more difficult to competewith
industry salaries, and as a result, fewer engineers choose to pursue
advanced degrees and careers in teaching. With fewer engineering teachers,
the supply of well trained engineers declines even further.
Concern over capital allocation is evident in current controversies
over the federal deficit and the perceived need for a national industrial
policy. It appears that substantial amounts of capital will be needed
to finance the national debt. As a result, manyeconomists theorize that
competition for capital will increase, interest rates will rise, and many
private firms, particularly small businesses, may find themselves unable
to afford new debt.
Oneof the central issues in the industrial policy debate concerns
the allocation of capital amongdeclining smokestack industries and rising
high technology industries. The federal governmenthas contributed to capi-
tal formation for ailing companies in order to save jobs. Actions such as
the Chrysler loan guarantee have been criticized for supporting declining
industries when governmentaid should be targeted toward stimulating growth
industries. As the decline of smokestack industries and rise of high tech-
nology industries continue, it is likely that there will be calls for govern-
merit aid to bnth sector_-
Implications for NASA. Conventional wisdom has it that growing econo-
mies provide the best environment for technology transfer. When economic
conditions are good, capital is available for new ventures, and businesses
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are more willing to take the risks associated with innovation. Future
economic dislocations, as evidenced in high interest rates and low profits,
may discourage business from adopting new technologies.
On the other hand, the need for new technologies maybe most evident
during times of economic distress. The recent proliferation of innovative
institutions for performing research (such as industry-university consortia)
maybe attributable to the widespread perception that conventional R&Defforts
are inadequate. The successes of foreign competitors (discussed below) and
continuing economic problems at homehave forced businesses to consider new
ways of achieving and maintaining a technological edge. Such an environment
would be conducive to NASA'stechnology transfer efforts.
Future economic developments should shape NASApolicy, and the way NASA
presents that policy, in several ways. First, NASAshould demonstrate a
willingness to participate in innovative ventures between government and
industry. If economic dislocations continue, and institutions such as
industry-university consortia enjoy somesuccess, acceptance of these and
similar institutions may spread. If NASAhas demonstrated its competence
in these types of arrangements, the growing interest in these institutions
may generate interest in cooperation with NASAas well.
Second, NASAmaybe able to capitalize on the interest in a national
industrial policy and gain more funding for technology transfer. After
all, NASA'sefforts do represent cooperation between government and in-
dustry, and they do provide a meansof maintaining America's technological
edge. NANA's technology transfer program offers the allure of hiEh tech-
nology and innovative cooperation without raising the explosive issue of
competition between declining and growing industries. Thus, technology
transfer offers the government an opportunity to attack economicproblems
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in a noncontroversial way. NASAtechnology is a resource this country under-
utilizes. Making better use of this resource could be an acceptable com-
ponent in a variety of otherwise dissimilar industrial policy options.
Third, NASAshould monitor the economyin order to better understand
its industrial clients. Lay-offs, the cost of capital, and shortages of en-
gineering talent are daily concerns for manybusinesses. By improving its
understanding of these concerns and the related needs and opportunities,
NASAimproves its ability to sustain a cooperative relationship with industry.
Foreign Competition
Possible Developments. Japan's economic success, much of it gained
at the expense of American industry, has led to an increased awareness of
the challenge posed by foreign competition. With the growing industrial
strength of other foreign countries, particularly in the Third World, it is
likely that intense foreign competition will characterize the future eco-
nomic environment. This trend is discussed at length in "Factors Enhancing
the Competitive Posture of Foreign High Technology" (Appendix C). The result
of this competition is likely to include the three effects discussed below.
First, foreign competition may exacerbate problems in the U.S. economy.
Competition from countries with low-cost labor and relatively modern manu-
facturing plants may continue to erode the economic base of older American
manufacturing industries. Furthermore, competition from technologically
advanced economies with strong government support (e.g., Japan) may lower
the growth potential for American high technology industries.
Second, America may respond to this competition with protectionist
measures. Specifically, imports may be curtailed or subjected to tariffs,
and exports of American technology may be more strictly controlled. A
"fortress" mentality may emerge whereby America seeks to maintain a
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technological edge by guarding technological secrets. Such a policy would
be particularly applicable to technologies with real or perceived value to
national security. The threat of leaking sensitive technologies to adver-
sary nations maylead to further efforts to restrict technology transfer.
Third, America may follow the example of its foreign competitiors by
adopting a more comprehensivenational industrial policy. Such a policy
would include closer cooperation between governmentand industry, probably
influencing the future direction of research and development and capital
allocation. Given this country's tradition of free enterprise, such a
policy undoubtedly would be temperedby a concern for maintaining some
distance between government and industry.
Implications for NASA. The implications of economic dislocations and
attempts to design a national industrial policy have been considered above.
Efforts to reduce technological leaks could have (already appear to have
had some) negative consequences for NASA's technology transfer program.
These efforts are bound to create barriers to technology transfer, either by
requiring various forms of personnel and technology clearance or by preclud-
ing certain technologies from transfer altogether. Furthermore, a rising
concern with technological leaks could foster distrust of the technology
transfer program regardless of the kinds of technologies transferred. With
foreign competitors benefiting from adaptations of U.S. technologies, any
program which publicizes technology could be subject to criticism. Isolated
instances of foreign countries using NASA technology could lead to a back-
la_h against the entire program.
The problem could become more acute if NASA becomes more "militarized"
in the future. Greater use of the space shuttle or other NASA technology
for defense purposes raises a concern for guarding NASA secrets from
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adversary nations. This concern maylead to a policy of "erring on the safe
side," whereby most or all NASAtechnology is restricted from transfer.
It is helpful to distinguish between commercial technologies and those
which are vital to national security. Protecting the former is a difficult
and often fruitless business. If technologies are used on a commercial
basis, it is difficult to restrict access to these technologies. Sooner
or later, foreign competitors are likely to acquire these technologies through
product purchases, literature reviews, professional conferences, informal
conversations, industrial espionage or someother means. Funds devoted to
restricting this process maybe better spent developing new technologies that
will contribute to America's technological lead. In the future, NASAshould
present its policy as one which contributes to economic progress and point
out the futility of protecting most commercial technology.
Guarding technology which is vital to national security is a more
legitimate and feasible concern. These technologies are fewer in number and
have a narrower distribution than commercial technologies. If NASAbecomes
more "militarized," it maybe expected to help protect military secrets.
The agency has little choice but to acquiesce to this concern. NASAcan con-
tinue to pursue transfer of nonsensitive technologies however.
The Political Environment
Possible developments. Trends in current politics may be noted, but
these are subject to rapid change. Perhaps the only safe assumption is that
national elections and congressional budget hearings will occur with predict-
able regularity. The timing of these events provides a framework for NASA
planning purposes, and their outcome provides an indicator of prevailing
attitudes toward NASA technology transfer.
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Onecurrent trend in politics is increased support for various forms
of research and development. As discussed in Appendix E, the Justice De-
partment has demonstrated an apparent willingness to relax antitrust regula-
tions in favor of joint endeavors for R&D. Federal spending for basic
research is rising. Newtax laws designed to facilitate capital formation
maymake the implementation of innovative technologies easier in the future.
Another political trend is toward decentralization in government. Ex-
planations for this trend maybe found in the "NewRegionalism," which lowered
levels of federal aid to state governments, as well as in other causes:*
• Prolonged economic stagnation has fostered disillusionment
with federal macroeconomicpolicy.
• The spread of corporate headquarters and manufacturing centers
has led to a realignment in the economic standing of the nation's
regions.
• The "war on poverty" programs have fostered a numberof active
locally based economic development programs.
Oneaspect of this trend maybe that states will take a stronger role
in regulating technology. Recent efforts to formulate state policies re-
gulating hazardous waste and nuclear power maybe harbingers of an effort
to tighten local control over potentially dangerous technologies.
A more widespread aspect of the "new regionalism" is increased competi-
tion between the states for new industry. Various states have adopted a range
of approaches to luring and fostering industry. These include tax breaks,
new business "incubation" centers, and industry-university research consortia.
The states maytake the lead from the federal government in implementing
See "The NewRegionalism," National Journal, 21 May 1983.
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Implications for NASA. The current attitude toward R&D provides a
favorable climate for adopting new technology and pursuing technology trans-
fer. If this attitude prevails, NASA should continue to pursue innovative
R&D arrangements. Decentralization of technology regulation may pose new
barriers to technology transfer, but only for those technologies which are
potentially dangerous. Business competition among the states may foster in-
terest in certain states for cooperating with NASA in joint research efforts.
In general, a pro-business attitude currently prevails in American
politics. Continuation of this attitude would support NASA's efforts to
increase cooperation with industry. Some conservative resistance to govern-
ment-industry cooperation may arise out of concern that technology transfer
or cooperation represent governmental interference in the free market. The
success or failure of current innovative efforts may determine the strength
of this resistance.
By commiting itself to cooperation with industry and by enhancing its
technology transfer efforts, NASA will be in a position to benefit from in-
creased receptivity to government-industry cooperation. The economy, foreign
competition, and political trends provide evidence this receptivity may
continue to grow.
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